Arizona Memorial


Pearl Harbor

U - Wh

U.S. Congress. Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack: Report of the Joint Committee, Congress of the United States, Pursuant to Senate Concurrent Resolution 27, 79th Congress. Laguna Hills, CA: Aegean Park Press, 1994.

Surveillant 3.6: "Two new items have been added to th[is] reprint[:] index of names ... and ... Report which sets forth the intelligence aspects of the Original Report ... dated July 16, 1946."

U.S. Department of Defense. The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor. 8 vols. Washington, DC: GPO, 1979.

According to Pforzheimer, these volumes "cover the period from 14 January-7 December 1941. The major centerpiece comprises the instructions and preparations for each of the meetings between Secretary of State Hull and the Japanese Ambassador in Washington." Other items included are the decrypted text of Japanese messages and historical material from Hull's official memoranda and memoirs. "This work ... is virtually unequalled for material of this kind." Constantinides suggests that these volumes, together with the Ultra items released by the British PRO, "provide a source of material to the researcher that is hard to equal."

Victor, George. The Pearl Harbor Myth: Rethinking the Unthinkable. Dulles, VA: Potomac, 2007.

Brooks, Proceedings 133.5 (May 2007), finds it sad that the author "rests his book on the unproven -- and almost surely unprovable -- contention that FDR knew Pearl Harbor to be the target.... It is a shame that Victor did not limit his argument to Roosevelt knowing that an attack was imminent.... The unbalanced result greatly diminishes the book and relegates it to the pile of not-to-be-taken-seriously revisionist histories." Hanyok, I&NS 26.2&3 (Apr.-Jun. 2011), sees the book as "largely derivative." Victor rewords "the material put forward by conspiracist writers," repeats their mistakes, and "adds a few of his own." This "is an awful book."

Villa, Brian, and Timothy Wilford.

1. "Signals Intelligence and Pearl Harbor:  The State of the Question." Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 4 (Aug. 2006):  520-556.

The authors examine recent writings on Pearl Harbor, challenge Philip Jacobsen's criticisms and methodology, and argue that the revisionist thesis merits further scholarly attention.

Clark comment: It is difficult to argue with the authors' point that it is the nature of history to be rewritten as new information is discovered or becomes available. To put it differently, revising our interpretations of historical events is not a loathsome sin, but the obligation of those who would call themselves historians. Regrettably, too much of the ongoing dispute between the authors (both as themselves and as stand-ins for other revisionists) and Philip Jacobsen has taken on a personal tone -- now, seemingly on both sides of the argument. Serious researchers (a status easily granted to Villa and Wilford) might better avoid the type of "personal contest" in which a portion of this article engages. As interesting and tightly argued as this article is, the main "revisionist" theories remain unproven to this follower of the debate. Nonetheless, the idea that further study remains warranted seems logical and normal.

2. "Warning at Pearl Harbor: Leslie Grogan and the Tracking of the Kido Butai." The Northern Mainer/Le Marin du nord 11, no. 2 (Apr. 2001): 1-17.

The authors argue that the pre-Pearl Harbor reports of Leslie Grogan, 2d Radio Officer aboard the SS Lurline, deserve much greater credence than they have previously been given. They believe that "it is virtually unarguable that Grogan heard the signals" of Japan's Strike Force and "communicated this information to USN intelligence in Hawaii three days prior to the Pearl Harbor attack."

Ward, Robert E. "The Inside Story of the Pearl Harbor Plan." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 77 (Dec. 1951): 1271-1283.

Japanese planning and preparation for the Pearl Harbor attack.

Washington Post. "Senators Exonerate Pearl Harbor Chiefs." 26 May 1999. [http://www.]

On 25 May 1999, the U.S. Senate voted "to exonerate two American military commanders [Adm. Husband Kimmel and Gen. Walter Short] accused of dereliction of duty in the bombing of Pearl Harbor. The vote followed a heated debate that divided the chamber's small band of World War II veterans."

West, Nigel. [Rupert Allason] Unreliable Witness: Espionage Myths of the Second World War. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1984. A Thread of Deceit: Espionage Myths of World War II. New York: Random House, 1985. [pb] New York: Dell, 1987.

According to Sayle, IJI&C 1.1, West does a "splendid job in addressing the problem of World War II intelligence lore." This book is "recommended [for the] reading list of anyone concerned with counterintelligence analysis." There is a "mediocre chapter" on Pearl Harbor.

Whitlock, Duane L. [CAPT/USN (Ret.)] "Station 'C' and Fleet Radio Unit Melbourne (FRUMMEL) [FRUMEL] Revisited." Cryptolog 14, no. 2 (Spring 1993): 1, 7-8, 19.

Commenting on the importance of traffic analysis to the cryptanalytic effort, Whitlock states: "[I]t was the cryptanalytic success scored against the Japanese Navy callsign system, not the reading of JN-25, that allowed Nimitz to draw up his estimate of enemy strength and to muster as best he could the forces he needed to oppose it." Whitlock finds no credibility to Rusbridger and Neve's Betrayal at Pearl Harbor.

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