U.S.S. Oklahoma, 7 December 1941


Pearl Harbor

F - J

Farago, Ladislas. The Broken Seal: The Story of "Operation Magic" and the Pearl Harbor Disaster. New York: Random House, 1967. London: Arthur Barker, 1967. The Broken Seal: "Operation Magic" and the Secret Road to Pearl Harbor. New York: Bantam Books, 1968. [pb]

According to Constantinides, "[e]xperts have found the book unreliable as cryptological and intelligence history." Sexton finds that the book "[f]urnishes valuable background, but has been superseded by more recent works."

Ferrell, Robert H. "Pearl Harbor and the Revisionists." The Historian 17 (1955): 215-233. [Petersen]

Fish, Hamilton.

Fish, a former member of the U.S. Congress (R-NY), died in 1991. His memoirs continued the anti-FDR theme established in at least two earlier books.

1. Hamilton Fish: Memoir of an American Patriot. Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 1992.

Surveillant 2.5: Fish argued that the "U.S. defeat at Pearl Harbor was compounded by the knowledge that it was deliberately provoked by a U.S. President influenced by a Soviet spy in his own government. That spy, we are told, was Harry Dexter White. White, called here a Soviet spy taking direct orders from Moscow, assisted FDR in implementing a covert and treasonous plan to issue a war ultimatum to the Japanese in order to prompt a strike on the U.S."

2. FDR: The Other Side of the Coin -- How We Were Tricked into World War II. New York: Vantage, 1976.

3. Tragic Deception -- FDR and America's Involvement in World War II. Greenwich, CT: Devin-Adair, 1983.

Fishel, Edwin C., and Louis W. Tordello. "FDR's Mistake? Not Likely." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 5, no. 3 (Fall 1991): 360-372.

This article is a refutation of the ideas presented in Barkin and Meyer, "COMINT and Pearl Harbor: FDR's Mistake," IJI&C 2.4 (Winter 1988), 513-531. The latter article focuses on the work of "neo-revisionists" who emphasize the interception of Japanese Naval radio transmissions, rather than MAGIC, as warnings that were ignored -- or, rather, that Roosevelt deliberately failed to communicate to the commanders at Pearl Harbor.

Flynn, John T.

Flynn was a conservative journalist and a leader in the pre-World War II America First movement. In the two pamphlets listed below, "Flynn accused [President] Roosevelt of pursuing policies against Japan throughout 1941 that could only lead to war." Zimmerman, I&NS 17.2/127.

1. The Truth about Pearl Harbor. New York: J.T. Flynn, 1944.

2. The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor. New York: J.T. Flynn, 1945.

Furer, Julius A. "The Pearl Harbor Attack." In Administration of the Navy Department in World War II, 87-102. Washington, DC: GPO, 1959. [Petersen]

Goldstein, Donald, and Katherine V. Dillon, eds. The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside the Japanese Plans. Washington, DC: Brassey's (US), 1993.

According to Bates, NIPQ 11.1, this book contains "translations of documents by Japanese naval officers involved in the planning and execution of the attack on Pearl Harbor.... [The] authors contend that these documents prove, in so far as memory can be trusted, that the Japanese task force never broke radio silence until the strike was in the air, and that neither Churchill nor Roosevelt could have known of the attack plan." Kruh, Cryptologia 18.1, also notes the presence of "records confirming that the Japanese task force never broke radio silence," and calls this work a "major contribution to our understanding of that unforgettable day."

Hanyok, Robert J.

1. "'Catching the Fox Unaware': Japanese Radio Denial and Deception and the Attack on Pearl Harbor." Naval War College Review 61, no. 4 (Autumn 2008): 99-124.

"The completeness of the operational surprise [at Pearl Harbor] ... was due largely to the success of the Japanese cover plan of radio denial and deception in hiding the existence, makeup, purpose, and timing of the attack." Japanese planners "developed a synchronized plan for the Pearl Harbor Striking Force that combined the three elements of radio silence, active radio deception, and radio intelligence in a way that assured Tokyo that the U.S. Pacific Fleet was unaware of the approaching Kido Butai." In essence, "the Japanese convinced American intelligence that their carriers, the spear point of the Imperial Japanese Navy, were still in the home islands on 7 December 1941."

2. and David P. Mowry. West Wind Clear: Cryptology and the Winds Message Controversy -- A Documentary History. Ft George G. Meade, MD: Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency, 2008.

This "volume contains all of the standard, critical documents." It "also includes many documents that have not been seen before, such as the U.S. Navy's translation and cryptanalytic worksheets of the 19 November 1941 Japanese Winds instruction messages, and the translation worksheets of the Federal Communications Commission from early December 1941." This is "really a documentary history of the [Winds] controversy, is intended to make available to all sides the basic sources: the worksheets and the translations of the pertinent Japanese diplomatic correspondence, the logs and chronologies of events, the pertinent correspondence amongst the major players, and associated memorandom and notes." (x-xi)

Booker, Cryptologia 34.1 (Jan. 2010), argues that the authors "prove, beyond any doubt, that the Winds message was not the indicator of the attack on Pearl Harbor and was not broadcast until after the attack.... [T]he Winds message controversy can finally be laid to rest with this study."

Holmes, Wilfred J. "Pearl Harbor Aftermath." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Dec. 1978, 68-75.

Howard, Michael E. "Military Intelligence and Surprise Attack: The 'Lessons' of Pearl Harbor." World Politics 15 (Jul. 1963): 701-711. [Petersen]

Jacobsen, Philip H. [LTCDR/USN (Ret.)]

1. "'Day of Deceit': An Analysis by a Veteran Navy Cryptologist." Cryptologia 24, no. 2 (Apr. 2000), 110-118.

With no small touch of sarcasm, Jacobsen notes that "through his exceptional foresight, unique expertise and diligence, Stinnett was able to see through [President Roosevelt's] monstrous conspiracy and its cover-up to reveal its details to us some 58 years later when all previous efforts by revisionist conspiracy theorists have failed and all the participants are dead and cannot defend themselves....

"[Although] Stinnett came up with many new documents not generally known to be available..., these documents do not add anything new to the question of who knew what and when. In his zeal, Stinnett misinterprets not only these documents but comes up with new meanings for the plain words and characterizations of well accepted documentation already available in this Pearl Harbor arena."

Jacobsen declares Stinett's theory to be unproven and an "impossibility," and makes his conclusion clear: "No U.S. officials knew beforehand of the Japanese plans to attack PH or discovered that the Kito Butai was on its way to Hawaii."

Clark comment: Jacobsen's review deserves to be read in full to get the flavor of some of the "gross omissions, errors and misinterpretations that Stinnett had to assemble to try to make his revisionist conspiracy theory seem plausible to the uninitiated."

2. "Foreknowledge of Pearl Harbor? No!: The Story of the U.S. Navy's Efforts on JN-25B." Cryptologia 27, no. 3 (Jul. 2003): 193-205.

The author attacks the revisionist conspiracy interpretations of pre-Pearl Harbor events by Stinnett, Day of Deceit (1999) and Wilford, Pearl Harbor Redefined (2001). Jacobsen states: "When all the revisionist chaff is separated out, there is no credible evidence that Corregidor produced JN-25B decrypts of intelligence value, much less any cryptanalytic intelligence on the Kido Butai, prior to 7 December 1941.... It is abundantly clear that revisionist allegations that pre-war Corregidor decrypts of JN-25B messages provided a forewarning of the Japanese attack are completely and utterly unfounded."

3. "No RDF on the Japanese Strike Force: No Conspiracy!" International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 18, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 142-149.

"[N]ot one single radio direction finder bearing, much less any locating 'fix,' was obtained on any actual Kido Butai unit or command during its transit ... to Hawaii."

4. "Pearl Harbor: Radio Officer Leslie Grogan of the SS Lurline and His Misidentified Signals." Cryptologia 29, no. 2 (Apr. 2005): 97-120.

"[A]nalysis of Grogan's many conflicting stories ... shows that the reported signals, at best, were only plain language messages in the Japanese telegraphic code between Yokohama and the huge Japanese commercial fleet that had bunched up in home waters just prior to the initiation of hostilities."

5. "Radio Silence and Radio Deception: Secrecy Insurance for the Pearl Harbor Strike Force." Intelligence and National Security 19, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 695-718.

"[T]here is no evidence whatsoever to back up revisionist ... theories or suspicions that high level US, British or Canadian officials had advanced knowledge of the Japanese plans to attack Pearl Harbor ... and consequently no Washington official withheld such non-existent information from Hawaiian officials for political purposes."

6. "Who Deceived Whom?" Naval History 17, no. 6 (Dec. 2003): 27-31.

"A review of newly declassified U.S. naval communications intelligence (ComInt) records refutes attempts by revisionist conspiracy theorists to 'prove' President Franklin D. Roosevelt knew of the Japanese plan to attack Pearl Harbor and withheld information to draw the United States into the European war. Evidence now corroborates a long-held view that Japanese radio deception masked movement of their carriers ... effectively ensuring a surprise attack."

Stinnett, Naval History 18.3 (Jun. 2004), takes issue with Jacobsen's analysis. Jacobsen replies in Naval History 19.1 (Feb. 2005).

7. Ed., Colin Burke. "Radio Silence of the Pearl Harbor Strike Force Confirmed Again: The Saga of Secret Message Serial (SMS) Numbers." Cryptologia 31, no. 3 (Jul. 2007): 223-232

In this posthumously published article, Jacobsen argues that an analysis of the SMS numbers confirms that "there were zero Strike Force transmissions." Therefore, there could be "no concurrent Allied DF bearings and/or 'fixes'" showing the Strike Force's ultimate goal.

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