Haffner, Sebastian [pseud., Raimund Pretzel]. Offensive Against Germany. London: Seeker & Warburg, 1941.
Wilcox: "Account of psychological warfare against Germany in World War II."
Hauenstein, Ralph W., with Donald E. Markle. Intelligence Was My Line: Inside Eisenhower's Other Command. New York: Hippocrene, 2005.
From publisher: Hauenstein was chief, Intelligence Branch (G2), Headquarters, European Theater of U.S. Operations (ETOUSA), during World War II.
Hogan, David W., Jr. U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II. CMH Publication 70-42. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1992
Table of Contents
Chapter 1. Introduction
Chapter 3. Special Operations in the European Theater
The 29th Ranger Battalion
The 2d and 5th Ranger Battalions
The Jedburghs and Operational Groups in France
Chapter 6. Conclusion
Koch, Oscar W. [BGEN/USA], with Robert G. Hays. G-2: Intelligence for Patton. Philadelphia: Whitmore Publishing Co., 1971.
See "Oscar Koch and the Confidence of the Commander" at the Huachuca History Program under "Masters of the Intelligence Art": http://huachuca.army.mil/files/History_MKOCH.PDF.
According to Pforzheimer, Koch was Patton's G-2 from the start-up of planning for the invasion of Sicily through the end of the war in Europe. "He relates his experiences ... in a highly readable fashion." However, publication predates the revelations about Ultra; therefore, the book does not include discussion of the role of communications intelligence on Patton's decisions. Constantinides notes that "[a]ccounts by U.S. Army intelligence officers at Koch's level of responsibility in World War II are rare."
Laurie, Clayton D. The Propaganda Warriors: America's Crusade Against Nazi Germany. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996.
Hoffman, FA 75.5: Laurie "focuses on the difficulties and rivalries that plagued the agencies that were put in charge" of U.S. efforts to combat Nazi propaganda with a matching propaganda campaign. These agencies included the OSS' Moral Operations Branch, the Army's Psychological Warfare Division, and the Office of War Information (OWI). "The author concludes that the 'winning weapon in psychological warfare' was finally developed by the Army,... [b]ut there is no attempt here to provide evidence regarding the success of all these policies."
Marshall, Charles F. A Ramble Through My War: Anzio and Other Joys. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1998.
According to a reviewer in Publishers Weekly, 9 Nov. 1998, the author served with the intelligence section of the U.S. Army's Sixth Corps from Anzio across the Rhine. His duties included document assessment and prisoner interrogation. This is an "engrossing, perceptive memoir."
Mierzejewski, Alfred C. "Intelligence and the Strategic Bombing of Germany: The Combined Strategic Targets Committee." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 3, no. 1 (Spring 1989): 83-104.
Naftali, Timothy J. "De Gaulle's Pique and the Allied Counterespionage Triangle in World War II." In In the Name of Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Walter Pforzheimer, eds. Hayden B. Peake and Samuel Halpern, 379-410. Washington, DC: NIBC Press, 1994.
O'Halpin, Eunan. "Irish-Allied Security Relations and the 'American Note' Crisis: New Evidence from British Records." Irish Studies in International Affairs 11 (2000).
Patton, George S., Jr. War As I Knew It. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1975.
Reece, T. Dennis. Captains of Bomb Disposal 1942-1946. Philadelphia, PA: Xlibris, 2005.
According to the author, "[i]n 1946 U.S. G-2 in Frankfurt organized Operation 'Hidden Documents.' It seized documents buried near Stechovice, Czechoslovakia, by the German SS in early 1945. Some of the documents were used as evidence to convict and execute Karl Hermann Frank for war crimes, including the notorious destruction of the village of Lidice." This operation forms Part II of Captains of Bomb Disposal.
Rezabek, Randy. "TICOM and the Search for OKW/Chi." Cryptologia 37, no. 2 (2013): 139-153.
The Target Intelligence Committee (TICOM) was a joint Allied operation to send teams of cryptologic experts "into Germany with the front line troops and to capture the documents, technology, and personnel of the various German SIGINT organizations." Here, the focus is on the SIGINT agency of the Supreme Command of the German armed forces (OKW/Chi).
Richards, Robert R. Alias "The Fox": The Wartime Recollections of Robert R. Richards. Columbus, OH: Richards/Morgan, 1994.
Chambers: CIC, 7th Army memoirs.
Shoemaker, Lloyd R. The Escape Factory: The Story of MIS-X, the Super-Secret U.S. Agency behind World War II's Greatest Escapes. New York: St. Martin's, 1990.
Surveillant 1.1: This book is about the "organization responsible for supervising [escape] attempts by American POWs in Nazi prison camps."
Click for other materials on Allied POW escape mechanisms.
Smith, Michael. "Bletchley Park and the Holocaust." Intelligence and National Security 19, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 262-274.
The author takes issue with the conclusions in Breitman, Official Secrets: What the Nazis Planned, What the British and Americans Knew (1998). According to Smith, Breitman argues in his work "that British codebreakers knew Nazi police operating behind the German troops invading the Soviet Union were murdering thousands of Jews but that they and the British wartime Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who read the messages, did nothing about it." Smith disagrees with Breitman's interpretation and declares that "both the Bletchley Park code breakers and Churchill are innocent of the charges laid against them."
Strong, Kenneth W. D. [Maj.-Gen. Sir]. Intelligence at the Top: The Recollections of an Intelligence Officer. London: Cassell, 1968. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1969.
According to Pforzheimer, "General Strong ... served as G-2 for General Eisenhower during World War II" and held important positions in British military intelligence in the postwar years. This book relates (with great discretion) the general's "experiences during his intelligence career, his views of the role of intelligence in government, and important insights into the profession." There is no discussion of the use of Ultra material. Constantinides adds that this is "a mainly autobiographical work that looks at the nature and role of military intelligence rather than intelligence as a whole (except for the final chapter)."
In a biographical sketch, Kenneth Campbell, "General Eisenhower's J-2: Major General Kenneth Strong, British Army Intelligence," American Intelligence Journal 17, no. 3/4 (1997), 81-83, finds several factors behind General Strong's success as Eisenhower's J-2: "his long-term assignment to intelligence, his exceptional dedication to educating himself professionally, his loyalty to his commander, and his talents for working in an international joint command context."
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