G - J

Gaiduk, Ilya V.

1. The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996.

Jones, I&NS 20.3 (Sep. 2005), notes that this work explores "the extensive support offered by Moscow" to the DRV after 1964, "and the subsequent competition with the Chinese for influence with Hanoi."

2. Confronting Vietnam: Soviet Policy toward the Indochina Conflict, 1954-1963. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003.

Jones, I&NS 20.3 (Sep. 2005), sees the author taking the reader "through a period when the dominant trend in Russian policy was one of disinterest toward a region where the primary role had to be played by the Chinese, except when disputes over Indochina threatened to escalate into a wider conflict with the United States.... Gaiduk has done a fine job in excavating archival sources."

Gelb, Leslie H., with Richard K. Betts. The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked. Washington, DC: Brookings, 1979.

Gibbons, William C. The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships. 3 vols. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986-1989.

Gilbert, James L. The Most Secret War: Army Signals Intelligence in Vietnam. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, Military History Office, 2003.

Kruh, Cryptologia 28.1, says that this "expertly written text" includes over a hundred photographs of "ASA and other personnel performing their duties, from the routine to the dangerous." For Hanyok, I&NS 19.2, this book "is well put together and illustrated." The reviewer notes that there is "[n]o need to worry about this history being an official gloss. ASA's successes and failures are recounted here." However, the book is hampered by the lack of source notes.

Gillespie, Robert M. Black Ops, Vietnam: An Operational History of MACVSOG. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011.

From publisher: "Without doubt the most unique U.S. unit to participate in the Vietnam War,... MACVSOG participated in most of the significant operations of the conflict." Peake, Studies 56.3 (Sep. 2012) and Intelligencer 19.3 (Winter-Spring 2013), notes that the author "doesn’t alibi the failures, but he does explain that they were inherently the result of the political and military strategy imposed on forces in the country." This "is a well-documented, well-told account."

Gordon, Don E. "Private Minnock's Private War." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 4, no. 2 (Summer 1990): 199-218.

Hale, Richard W. "A CIA Officer in Saigon." Vietnam. []

The author arrived in Saigon in June 1973, serving at the CIA's Saigon base, first, as the head of "a new external branch focused on a target of opportunity, the Hungarian and Polish members of the International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS)" and, after a year, as base executive officer. His story is of the last days of the the CIA's presence in Saigon, up to his departure in April 1975.

Hammer, Ellen J. A Death in November: America in Vietnam, 1963. New York: Dutton, 1987.

Hanyok, Robert J. Spartans in Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975. Ft. George Meade, MD: National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History, 2002. []

Aftergood, Secrecy News, 7 Jan. 2008, notes that this work is "an exhaustive history of American signals intelligence (SIGINT) in the Vietnam War.... Hanyok[] writes in a lively, occasionally florid style that is accessible even to those who are not well-versed in the history of SIGINT or Vietnam." See also, Peter Grier, "Declassified Study Puts Vietnam Events in New Light," Christian Science Monitor, 9 Jan. 2008.

Hastings, Deborah. "Secret Vietnam Group Clings to Past." Associated Press, 13 Nov. 1999. []

This is a report on the Special Operations Association annual convention, held in October 1999 in Las Vegas. Although the writer probably believes that she is presenting these veterans in a fair and sympathetic manner, it is clear that she -- as is the case of all of us who never served in the Special Operations milieu -- does not understand them. A quote from Maj. John Plaster is worth repeating: These "'are the best people I've ever met in my life,' he said. 'There's not many people in this life who would genuinely give their life for yours. The only respect we had was from each other. We were never recognized.'"

Hubbard, Douglass H., Jr. Special Agent, Vietnam: A Naval Intelligence Memoir. Washington, DC: Potomac, 2006.

According to Sulick, Studies 51.2 (2007), the author "chronicles the demanding counterintelligence and criminal investigation missions of the NIS [Naval Investigative Service (now Naval Criminal Investigative Service or NCIS] through detailed vignettes of cases drawn from his own experience and interviews with colleagues." However, the work "provides more insight into NIS criminal investigations than its counterintelligence operations.... Special Agent, Vietnam brims with atmospherics that only someone with first-hand experience like Hubbard could provide."

Prout, DIJ 16.1 (2007), comments that "[w]hile this book has merit, it holds little value to an intelligence professional seeking to learn about the U.S. Navy's intelligence or counterintelligence activities during the Vietnam era. The bulk of the cases are criminal in nature, and those few intelligence cases sadly lack any meaningful detail." Ochiai, I&NS 23.4 (Aug. 2008), also notes that most of the stories here "are about investigations of crimes committed by US servicemen."

Jensen-Stevenson, Monika. Spite House: The Last Secret of the War in Vietnam. New York: Norton, 1997.

Jones, Frank Leith. Blowtorch: Robert Komer, Vietnam, and American Cold War Strategy. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013.

Freedman, FA 92.3 (May-Jun. 2013), notes that this is a "sympathetic biography." The authior "makes a convincing argument that Komer was, in fact, a master strategist, able to put short-term issues in their wider context and think through the likely consequences of action." For Wirtz, IJI&C 27.4 (Winter 2014), this is a "finely crafted monograph." It "makes a convincing case that Komer was a gifted strategist who was able to devise politically sensitive policies that matched ends to means to achieve realistic objectives that furthered U.S. interests."

Peake, Studies 59.2 (Jun. 2015), says the author "adds particulars to a colorful though relatively unknown CIA analyst who became an advisor to four presidents." Komer's "passion for and contribution to strategic issues and national policy have received insufficient attention. Blowtorch adjusts the balance."

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