World War II


Benton, Kenneth. "The ISOS Years: Madrid, 1941-3." Journal of Contemporary History 30 (1995): 366-370.

Bristow, Desmond, and Bill Bristow. A Game of Moles: The Deceptions of an MI6 Officer. Boston & London: Little, Brown, 1993.

Surveillant 3.4/5 notes that this book presents the "part Bristow played within Section V -- the counterintelligence arm of MI6." He spent the "wartime years working for MI6 in Gibraltar and Algiers ... [and] retired in 1954.... [He] remains convinced that Roger Hollis of MI5 was a Soviet spy, that Guy Liddell was in the same category, and that David Footman (chief of MI6's political section for Central Europe) was working for the Russians, too."

For West, WIR 13.4, the author's account of his adventures in wartime Spain is "one entertaining anecdote after another." The book "dovetails with Philby's memoirs,... [as] the only detailed recollections in the public domain of Section V's activities.... [It] offers a fascinating insight into a rather obscure corner of the secret war."

Defty, I&NS 10.1, suggests that Bristow's critical stance toward his former employers may be "in no small part the result of his friendship with Peter Wright.... Bristow digresses rather often, apparently unable to contain his anger at 'how badly many worthy people have been treated by the powers that be....' [T]he charges he makes [against Hollis and Liddell] are largely a reiteration of those of his friend Peter Wright, and they are thankfully largely confined to one chapter." Most of the book "offers an engaging, occasionally revealing, and often diverting insight into some of more successful wartime deception operations conducted by SIS in the Mediterranean theatre."

Burns, Jimmy. Papa Spy: Love, Faith, and Betrayal in Wartime Spain. New York: Walker, 2009.

According to Goulden, Washington Times, 12 Mar. 2010, the author wanted to unravel the mystery surrounding his father, Tom Burns, ostensibly a "press attache" in the UK's wartime Madrid embassy. Along the way, Jimmy Burns details "how British diplomats ... managed to keep Franco from flipping to the German side at a time when Adolf Hitler's military was sweeping through Europe.... In the end, Franco decided that his best interests dictated continued neutrality, so Gibraltar remained in Allied hands. Jimmy Burns documents how his decision was heavily influenced by British intelligence."

Hernandez-Sandoica, Elena, and Enrique Moradiellos. "Spain and the Second World War, 1939-1945." In European Neutrals and Non-Belligerents during the Second World War, ed. Neville Wylie. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Juárez, Javier. Madrid, Londres, Berlín: espías de Franco al servicio de Hitler. Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 2005.

Messenger, David A.

1. "'Against the Grain': Special Operations Executive in Spain, 1941-45." Intelligence and National Security 20, no. 1 (Mar. 2005): 173-190.

In an intelligence-gathering role, "particularly as it related to economic intelligence, SOE in Spain did achieve some success and carved out a limited role for itself in assisting Britain to realize some of its aims in wartime Spain."

2. "Fighting for Relevance: Economic Intelligence and Special Operations Executive in Spain, 1943-1945." Intelligence and National Security 15, no. 3 (Autumn 2000): 33-54.

In Spain, SOE was "forbidden from any involvement in direct action and sabotage.... [However,] SOE managed, over time, to find some small parts to play, most notably through intelligence gathering in connection with the Allied wolfram [tungsten] campaign.... [I]ntelligence gathering ... inevitably brought it into conflict with the Secret Intelligence Service, upon whose preserve it was trespassing.

Smyth, Denis.

1. "Les Chevaliers de Saint-George: la Grande-Bretagne et la corruption des généraux espagnols (1940-1942)." Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains 162 (1991): 29-54.

2. Diplomacy and Strategy of Survival: British Policy and Franco's Spain, 1940-41. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.

From publisher: This work analyses "Britain's diplomatic efforts to preserve the non-belligerency of Franco's Spain, during the period from late 1940 to the end of 1941." The author makes "extensive use of recently available British and Spanish documentary records," and "explains how Britain's uphill struggle to secure Spanish non-belligerency had been rewarded with success by December 1940."

3. "Screening 'Torch': Allied Counter-Intelligence and the Spanish Threat to the Secrecy of the Allied Invasion of French North Africa in November 1942." Intelligence and National Security 4, no. 2 (Apr. 1989): 335-356.

"The Anglo-American counter-intelligence and security services ... managed to keep the Spaniards in the dark about Torch for as long as secrecy ... matter[ed]."

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