Davies, Huw, ed. "Special Issue on 'Intelligence and the Art of Command, 1799-1945.'" Intelligence and National Security 22, no. 5 (Oct. 2007): entire issue.


1. Huw Davies, "Intelligence and the Art of Command, 1799-1945," 589-600.

Introduces the themes and articles in this edited volume.

2. Michael Duffy, "British Intelligence and the Breakout of the French Atlantic Fleet from Brest in 1799," 601-618.

"The French had masked their intentions with some skill and the British agents had never been able to penetrate the secret. On the contrary British ministers had been led away on the false trail that the French had laid before them."

3. Huw Davies, "The Influence of Intelligence on Wellington's Art of Command," 619-643.

"Over the course of his career, Wellington's understanding of intelligence moved from a perception that it was necessary only to justify his pre-existing beliefs, to a central focus of his decision-making process."

4. Stephen Manning, "Learning the Trade: Use and Misuse of Intelligence during the British Colonial Campaigns of the 1870s," 644-660.

The focus here is on the Red River Campaign (1870) in Canada, the Ashanti war (1873-1874) in modern day Ghana, and the Zulu war (1879). In each instance, the commanders had limited information about the terrain over which they would be fighting; and they had to establish their own networks to keep up with the enemy.

5. Edward M. Spiers, "Intelligence and Command in Britain's Small Colonial Wars of the 1890s," 661-681.

The author reviews the lessons from two campaigns -- Sudan (1896-1899) and South Africa (1899-1902). "Intelligence may not have decided the outcome in either of these conflicts but it certainly affected command decisions, tactical choices, and the evolution of British operations in the face of new conditions of warfare."

6. Alex Marshall, "Russian Intelligence during the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05," 682-698.

The author finds the roots of the Soviet surveillance state in the reforms instituted in Russia following the Russo-Japanese War.

7. Greg Kennedy, "Intelligence and the Blockade, 1914-17: A Study in Administration, Friction and Command," 699-721.

"Without the constant acquisition and provision of accurate and timely intelligence, commanders of the Blockade strategy ... would have been blind to ... key issues. Blockade intelligence saw the most sophisticated and wide-ranging intelligence assessment acitivities ever done to that date."

8. Pia Molander, "Intelligence, Diplomacy and the Swedish Dilemma: The Special Operations Executive in Neutral Sweden, 1939-45," 722-744.

"SOE's organization in Sweden had a dual mandate, as much political as operational. Its primary function was to serve as an instrument for the use of regional SOE headquarters, and as a conduit for operations into Germany and axis-occupied territory.... [I]n the end it was decided the British diplomatic mission in Sweden was too important to be jeopardized by unrestricted espionage."

9. Kevin Jones, "A Curb on Ambition: Intelligence and the Planning of Eighth Army's Liri Valley Offensive, May 1944," 745-766.

The planning of Lt.-Gen. Sir Oliver Leese's offensive in the Liri Valley in May 1944 "was founded more on cautious consolidaion that it was bold exploitation. Moreover, rather than facilitating exploitation, intelligence was used to curb ambition still further."

10. Jon Robb-Webb, "Anglo-American Naval Intelligence Co-operation in the Pacific, 1944-45," 767-786.

"The experience of the British Pacific Fleet (BPF) at the operational and tactical levels of war demonstrates a degree of co-operation that was perhaps more intimate than any other Allied services" during World War II.

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