General and War on Terrorism

Materials presented chronologically.

Bowman, M. E. "Some-Time, Part-Time and One-Time Terrorism." Intelligencer 13, no. 2 (Winter-Spring 2003): 13-18.

"The challenge to prevent terrorism from the unaligned terrorists is perhaps the greatest challenge ever given to the law enforcement (LE) and intelligence communities (IC)."

Woolsey, R. James. "World War IV." Intelligencer 13, no. 2 (Winter-Spring 2003): 5-12.

The Cold War having been World War III, the war on terrorism is World War IV. The former DCI looks at the enemy, the war at home, and the war abroad. He concludes that we will need to convince the peoples of those countries that are not democracies, particularly in the Middle East, that this is not a war of "us against them," but a war of "freedom against tyranny."

Goldberg, Jeffrey. "The Unknown: The C.I.A. and the Pentagon Take Another Look at Al Qaeda and Iraq." The New Yorker, 2 Feb. 2003. [http://www.newyorker.com]

This is a lengthy article that seeks to get at some of the problems associated with predictive analysis, with the focus on the events of 9/11 and analytic issues surrounding the question of ties between al Qaeda and Iraq.

Priest, Dana. "Telling Secrets: Not Just What, but How; Speech Is Revealing on Gathering Intelligence." Washington Post, 6 Feb. 2003, A23. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"Never had the U.S. government disclosed as much sensitive, recent intelligence as Secretary of State Colin L. Powell did [on 5 February 2003] when he released surreptitiously intercepted calls between Iraqi officials and information supplied by Iraqi informants apparently close to Saddam Hussein. Beyond the extraordinary array of U.S. intelligence capabilities put on display for the U.N. Security Council -- signals intercepts, satellite imagery, reports from captives and in-country agents -- 10 foreign intelligence services, both European and Middle Eastern, agreed to allow the United States to disclose classified information they had collected on Iraq." See also, Karen DeYoung and Walter Pincus, "Satellite Images, Communications Intercepts and Defectors' Briefings," Washington Post, 6 Feb. 2003, A1.

Tyler, Patrick E. "Intelligence Break Led U.S. to Tie Envoy Killing to Iraqi Qaeda Cell."  New York Times, 6 Feb. 2003. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"An intelligence breakthrough in the last several weeks made it possible for Secretary of State Colin L. Powell to set forth the first evidence of what he said was a well developed cell of Al Qaeda operating out of Baghdad that was responsible for the assassination of the American diplomat Laurence Foley last October."

Shanker, Thom, and Eric Schmitt. "Firing Leaflets and Electrons, U.S. Wages Information War."  New York Times, 24 Feb. 2003. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"[T]he military is starting an ambitious assault [on Iraq] using a growing arsenal of electronic and psychological weapons on the information battlefield. American cyber-warfare experts recently waged an e-mail assault, directed at Iraq's political, military and economic leadership, urging them to break with Saddam Hussein's government. A wave of calls has gone to the private cellphone numbers of specially selected officials inside Iraq, according to leaders at the Pentagon and in the regional Central Command.

"As of last week, more than eight million leaflets had been dropped over Iraq ... warning Iraqi antiaircraft missile operators that their bunkers will be destroyed if they track or fire at allied warplanes. In the same way, a blunt offer has gone to Iraqi ground troops: surrender and live.... Radio transmitters hauled aloft by Air Force Special Operations EC-130E planes are broadcasting directly to the Iraqi public in Arabic with programs that mimic the program styles of local radio stations and are more sophisticated than the clumsy preachings of previous wartime propaganda efforts."

Eggen, Dan. "GAO Criticizes System For Tracking Terrorists: 'Watch Lists' Are Called Incompatible." Washington Post, 30 Apr. 2003, A21. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

A General Accounting Office (GAO) report released on 30 April 2003 describes the government's system of keeping track of suspected terrorists as "disorganized and inefficient.... The GAO report found that the federal agencies that compile watch lists 'do not have a consistent and uniform approach to sharing watch lists,' and that much of the data are not provided to local and state law enforcement."

Shoham, Dany. "The Anthrax Evidence Points to Iraq." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 16, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 39-68.

The title correctly states the thesis of this article.

Best, Richard A., Jr. Intelligence to Counter Terrorism: Issues for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Updated 27 May 2003. Available at: http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/21217.pdf.

"Counterterrorism is highly dependent upon human intelligence (humint).... Countering terrorism requires close cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence agencies.... Military operations to counter terrorism are dependent on the availability of precise, real-time intelligence to support bombing campaigns using precision guided munitions."

Byman, Daniel. "Scoring the War on Terrorism." National Interest 72 (Summer 2003): 75-85.

Shannon, Elaine, Timothy J. Burger, and Massimo Calabresi. "FBI Sets Up Shop in Yemen." Time, 9 Aug. 2003. [http://www.time.com]

The Yemeni government "has quietly allowed the FBI to open an office in its capital city, San'a." Along with the CIA and the U.S. military, the FBI "is urgently trying to disrupt efforts" by al-Qaeda fighters "to reconstitute command and control structures in parts of rural Yemen controlled by clans hostile to the government in San'a and sympathetic to Osama Bin Laden." [Clark comment: And the military and CIA cannot do this because they lack the FBI's experience overseas?]

Johnston, David, and Raymond Bonner. "Suspect in Indonesia Bombings Is Captured in Asia." New York Times, 15 Aug. 2003. [http://www.nytimes.com]

According to Indonesian and U.S. officials, Riduan Isamuddin, an Indonesian believed to be the mastermind behind the Bali bombings, was captured on 19 August 2003 "in Thailand in an operation" by the CIA. Isamuddin, also known as Hambali, was taken by U.S. authorities "to an undisclosed location in another country where he is being questioned." See also, Ellen Nakashima and Alan Sipress, "Al Qaeda Figure Seized in Thailand: Local Units, CIA Cooperated to Nab Top Asian Terror Suspect," Washington Post, 15 Aug. 2003, A1.

Barringer, Felicity. "Libya Admits Culpability in Crash of Pan Am Plane." New York Times, 16 Aug. 2003. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 15 August 2003, Libya "formally accepted responsibility for the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 in general language that lacked any expression of remorse for the 270 lives lost when the plane exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland. A letter containing Libya's admission and its pledge to compensate the survivors and renounce terrorism was presented to the [UN] Security Council president as part of a carefully choreographed diplomatic pas de trois between Tripoli, London, and Washington, all to pave the way to the final lifting of United Nations sanctions against Libya early next week." See also, Peter Slevin, "Libya Takes Blame for Lockerbie Bombing," Washington Post, 16 Aug. 2003, A1.

Pincus, Walter. "2 CIA Employees Killed in Ambush: Ex-Special Forces Officers Worked in Eastern Afghanistan." Washington Post, 29 Oct. 2003, A20. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

The CIA announced on 28 October 2003 that William Carlson and Christopher Glenn Mueller, "former Special Forces officers working as contract employees in counterterrorism for the CIA[,] were killed in an ambush in eastern Afghanistan" on 25 October 2003. "The two were involved in what became a six-hour firefight between Taliban rebels and U.S.-led coalition and Afghan forces." See also, Douglas Jehl, "Two C.I.A. Operatives Killed in an Ambush in Afghanistan." New York Times, 29 Oct. 2003.

Farah, Douglas, and Dan Eggen. "Joint Intelligence Center Is Urged: Rep. Wolf Says Information Should Be Shared Globally to Fight Terror." Washington Post, 21 Dec. 2003, A25. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

In a letter to Attorney General John D. Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III, Rep. Frank R. Wolf (R-VA), chairman of the Appropriations subcommittee that oversees the FBI budget, has asked that "the United States to take the lead in establishing a joint intelligence center modeled on NATO to share information on terrorist money and movements."

De Graaff, Bob. "The Fight Against the New Fanaticism: A Losing Battle for the Western Intelligence Communities?" Journal of Intelligence History 3, no. 2 (Winter 2003). [http://www.intelligence-history.org/jih/previous.html]

From abstract: "[N]owadays too much emphasis is being laid upon a military approach [to try to counter the phenomenon of 'modern fanaticism'], detracting from the use that can be made of intelligence and security services. However, these services are ill equipped to operate against the new fanatics. Often they still function according to principles dating from the Cold War."

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