CIA-Specific Reform Proposals

A - G

Alterman, Eric. "A View to a Kill." Rolling Stone, 23 Mar. 1995, 48-54.

The author questions the need for incurring the continuing cost of the CIA in a world where information is so readily available.

Berkowitz, Bruce D. and Allan E. Goodman. "Why Spy -- and How -- in the 1990s?" Orbis 36, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 269-280.

Boggs, James. "The CIA: Can We Afford to Retire Its Colors?" American Sentinel 2, no. 13 (28 Mar. 1993): 6.

Boren, David L. "New World, New CIA." New York Times, 17 Jun. 1990, E21.

Then-Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

Braden, Tom. "The Spies Who Came in from the Cold War. The World Changed. Can the CIA?" Washington Monthly, Mar. 1992, 18-23.

The "disappearance of the [communist] menace leaves the CIA without a cause.... Then why not abolish the CIA?... [A]s Truman understood, we still need an intelligence agency -- a centralized, vigilant agency.... So what should be done with the CIA?" Braden asked that question of Clark Clifford, Richard Helms, William Colby, and Ray Cline. "These men ... agree ... on two things: The CIA should remain in business, and its chief business should be intelligence.... At the end of World War II, Bill Donovan was very good at rapid change.... My hope is that Robert Gates, even without a cause, will be good at changing too."

Cannistraro, Vincent. "The CIA Dinosaur." Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 9-15 Sep. 1991, 29.

Cassata, Donna. "Experts: CIA Needs Reform But Not a 'Czar.'" Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 27 May 1995, 1517-1518.

Report on testimony of six former DCIs to HPSCI on 22 May 1995. Stansfield Turner was alone in supporting the idea of a national intelligence director. Others consulted by the committee have been Bobby Ray Inman, Richard Haass, William Odom, and Steven Aftergood.

Godson, Roy, with Richard Kerr [Former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence] and Ernest May [Professor of History, Harvard University]. Covert Action in the 1990s. Working Group on Intelligence Reform. Washington, DC: Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 1992.

Goodman, Melvin A. [arranged chronologically]

1. "Oldthink at the C.I.A.?" New York Times, 7 Jan. 1993, A23.

2. "Reforming the CIA." Foreign Service Journal, Jun. 1993, 18-23.

3. "We Need Two C.I.A.s?" New York Times, 21 Jul. 1994, A23.

4. "Ending the CIA's Cold War Legacy." Foreign Policy 106 (Spring 1997): 128-143.

The author continues to beat the dull drum of how the next director needs to address the Agency's failure to predict the fall of the Soviet Union.

5. "India Fallout: Embarrassingly Missed Signals. U.S. Intelligence Failure Shows Need for Reform." Christian Science Monitor, 18 May 1998. [http://www.csmonitor. com]

"The Indian fiasco has exposed the three major deficiencies evident at the CIA for the past several years: politicization, bureaucratization, and a fundamental misunderstanding of the proper interaction between intelligence and policymaking....

"The CIA has ... been victimized by its efforts to be 'relevant' to the policy community in Washington. The Aspin-Brown Commission on Intelligence in 1996 encouraged the CIA to identify 'relevant customers ... by position' and to consult them 'with respect to the type of intelligence support they prefer.' As a result, intelligence analysis has lost much of its objectivity and, in the case of India, CIA analysts missed numerous political and scientific signals that pointed to the likelihood of nuclear tests....

"Another recommendation of the Aspin-Brown commission, the consolidation of all analysis of satellite imagery in the newly-created National Imagery and Mapping Agency, also contributed to the intelligence failure.... If the Pentagon continues to dominate the analysis of satellite photography..., we can expect additional intelligence failures that will adversely affect US national security....

"CIA Director George Tenet ... himself has set the wrong tone at the CIA.... Tenet and his immediate predecessors have severely limited research and the production of national intelligence estimates, transferred military intelligence to the Pentagon, and returned economic intelligence to the Commerce Department and the Department of Energy....

"It is time to create a separate analytical agency outside the policy process in order to return to Harry Truman's raison d'être for the CIA: producing objective and incisive intelligence reports."

6. "Starting Over at the CIA.", 18 Jun. 1998. []

See Goodman's Christian Science Monitor article above (the words are different, but the thrust is the same).

7. "The Role of Intelligence in the War Against Terrorism.", 27 Aug. 1998. []

"[I]ntelligence has been less useful in anticipating acts of terrorism but very useful in the investigative process following ... terrorist attacks.... Unfortunately, the CIA has its own credibility problem in the war against terrorism because of its misuse of intelligence information." Here follows a standard Goodman litany about the politicization of intelligence by William Casey and Robert Gates.

"The CIA is good at pinpointing terrorists and describing terrorism, but the intentions of terrorists are more elusive, and it will be difficult to predict their next moves.... But this is no time to reverse a series of executive orders that prohibit U.S. officials from 'engaging in, or conspiring to engage in, political assassination'.... It is also no time to be making a greater economic investment in intelligence against terrorism. Sufficient collection platforms are already in place to target terrorist groups, as well as a sufficient number of intelligence analysts throughout the intelligence community."

Gries, David D.

1. "Opening Up Secret Intelligence." Orbis 37, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 365-372.

ProQuest: "The CIA's efforts to relax its tradition of secrecy and adjust to public oversight are discussed.... New public uses of intelligence information must be included in the CIA's policy."

2. "Openness and Secrecy: A Basic Tension." Studies in Intelligence 37, no. 5 (1994): 33-35.

'The task before intelligence agencies now is to build higher fences around fewer secrets, limiting protection only to sources and methods that merit it, while disclosing as much as possible of everything else."

Griffin, Rodman D.

1. "CIA: Where Is the Spy Agency Heading Now That the Cold War Is Over?" American Caucus 1, no. 20 (21 Dec. 1992): 8-9.

2. "The Winds of Change Gust Through the CIA." American Caucus 1, no. 20 (21 Dec. 1992): 10.

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