RECONNAISSANCE

Satellites

Articles

1990-1994

Abrahams, Doug. "Martin Marietta Wins Billion-Dollar Job." Washington Times, 26 Jul. 1994, B7.

See also, Ralph Vartabedian, "TRW Contract on Spy Satellites Voided by GAO," Los Angeles Times, 2 Jul. 1994, D1, D2.

Aviation Week & Space Technology. Editors. "Spacecraft Played Vital Role in Gulf War Victory." 22 Apr. 1991, 91.

The focus here is more on problems and lessons learned than on accomplishments. Among the issues mentioned are a backup of satellite imagery at processing facilities, "connectivity" problems, a lack of mapping information for the Gulf area, and insufficient communications satellite capability. The article calls the Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) a "technological hero of the war."

Brender, Mark. "Remote-Sensing Satellites: Our Eyes in the Sky." Communicator, Oct. 1992, 56-57.

Broad, William J. "Science Seeking Military's Data from Cold War." New York Times, 23 Jun. 1992, A1, B11.

On 28 May 1992, President Bush "signed a directive that cleared the way for environmentalists to use the nation's spy gear and records." Intelligence collection "platforms" which might provide information in monitoring the global environment include satellites, aircraft, ships, and submarines.

Covault, Craig. "Recon Satellites Lead Allied Intelligence Effort." Aviation Week & Space Technology, 4 Feb. 1991, 25-26.

U.S. reconnaissance satellite imaging is "the allied forces' primary source of information for bomb damage assessment and attack mission planning" in the Gulf War. The author also reviews the number and kinds of imaging spacecraft involved in this reconnaissance effort.

Kiernan, Vincent, and Neil Munro. "U.S. Senator Rails against Spy Satellite." Defense News, 8-14 Fed. 1993, 3, 50.

Lackman, William. "Future Direction for the United States Imagery System." American Intelligence Journal 14, no. 3 (Autum-Winter 1993-1994): 31-34.

At a time of constrained resources and high tension in the management of the U.S. space reconaissance program, a central figure in that program tries to put the best face forward.

Pearson-Mackie, Nancy. "The Need to Know: The Proliferation of Space-Based Surveillance." Arms Control 12, no. 1 (May 1991): 94-122.

Prados, John. "High-Flying Spies." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Sep. 1992, 11-12.

Richelson, Jeffrey T.

1. "From Corona to Lacrosse: A Short History of Satellites." Washington Post, 25 Fed. 1990, B1, B4.

2. "The Future of Space Reconnaissance." Scientific American 264, no. 1 (1991): 38-44.

Rip, Michael Russell, and Joseph F. Fontanella. "A Window on the Arab-Israeli 'Yom Kippur' War of October 1973: Military Photo-Reconnaissance from High Altitude and Space." Intelligence and National Security 6, no. 1 (Jan. 1991): 15-89.

After about 15 pages of background on Soviet and U.S. photo-reconnaissance platforms and activities, the authors get down to their primary subject: the satellite and aircraft deployments made by the Soviet Union and the United States to cover the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. "The dimension of Soviet involvement can be ascertained by noting that within a three and a half week period, no less than seven photo-reconnaissance satellites were launched: a rate almost four times that observed for the rest of the year.... Additionally,... Soviet-manned ... MiG-25R ... reconnaissance jet aircraft ... specifically performed high-altitude/high-speed photographic missions off the Israeli coastline and over the Sinai desert.... [I]t is practically certain that the US provided the Israelis with valuable IMINT and Sigint information during the 1973 conflict."

The authors go off into less well-grounded speculation (that orbits were modified to look at specific target areas does not prove their point) when they argue in favor of digital transmission of photographic imagery from KH-8 satellites. The authors fail to tie down with any precision the use of SR-71 aircraft to overfly the conflict area, relying too much on too many qualifiers to their argument. They also are on less than firm ground with their suggestion that U.S.-supplied tactical intelligence made possible the Israeli crossing of the Suez canal on 15 October 1973. However, the conclusion that "the 1973 Arab-Israeli war demonstrated that with their superior surge launch capability the Soviets certainly were at no tactical disadvantage with the US" is probably accurate.

Ross, Bill [LTC/USAF] "Space Support to the Warrior: The Intelligence Professional's Responsibility." American Intelligence Journal 15, no. 2 (Autumn/Winter 1994): 72-76.

Ross concludes that "space warfare has arrived and DESERT STORM was the first space war." To make space work for the intelligence professional in supporting the warfighter "the military intelligence community needs to ... define space war fighting doctrine and vision and ... [develop] a robust and dynamic intelligence-wide training program."

Scott, William B. "High Demand Stretches NRO Intelligence Assets." Aviation Week & Space Technology, 1 Feb. 1993, 49-52.

"The uncertainties of the post-Cold War world have triggered an explosion of requests for a broad range of intelligence data.... The surge in requirements for national security intelligence conflicts directly with shrinking budgets."

Return to Satellites Table of Contents