Wesley K. Wark, ed., "Special Issue on Twenty-First Century Intelligence," Intelligence and National Security 18, no. 4 (Winter 2003): entire issue.
1. Wesley K. Wark, "Introduction: 'Learning to Live with Intelligence.'" pp. 1-14.
"Learning to live with an open-ended 'war on terrorism' will mean learning to live with intelligence."
2. Alan Dupont, "Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century," pp. 15-39.
"[T]he transformation of intelligence architectures, particularly in the West, is no less profound than that of the weapons, platforms and warfighting systems they are designed to support and enhance."
3. Michael Herman, "Counter-Terrorism, Information Technology and Intelligence Change," pp. 40-58.
"Counter-terrorism appears to put a special emphasis on accessing and relating different kinds of data residing in different organisations. Developing IT 'systems of systems' to provide interoperability, integration and interdependence between these separate databases may be the key to greater overall effectiveness." In addition, a "managerial/human component of developing an IT 'system of systems'" will be needed.
4. Melvin A. Goodman, "9/11: The Failure of Strategic Intelligence," pp. 59-71.
The author again manages to discuss his favorite topic, the "politicization" of intelligence by William Casey and Robert Gates; and, then, takes it one step further by accusing DCI George Tenet of "serving the policy interests of the Bush administration." Whether there is some truth in the latter accusation will probably be argued about into some distant future, although a simple assertion that it is true is hardly sufficient as proof.
5. Matthew M. Aid, "All Glory Is Fleeting: Sigint and the Fight against International Terrorism," pp. 72-120.
The author points to some lessons learned from reviewing the performance of U.S. intelligence prior to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks: (1) "an urgent need for more clandestine or unconventional Sigint collection resources"; (2) a need for intelligence services to "break down the barriers that have historically existed between Humint agencies and Sigint services"; (3) "the critical need to improve Sigint's ability to handle the ever-increasing volume of communications traffic being intercepted"; (4) a need for "Sigint processing, reporting and analysis [to] become faster and more efficient"; and (5) a need for "international cooperation among national Sigint agencies," especially in Europe.
6. Gregory F. Treverton, "Terrorism, Intelligence and Law Enforcement: Learning the Right Lessons," pp. 121-140.
This is a balanced discussion of the differences between intelligence and law enforcement, and of the changes emerging in the way in which these two disciplines are viewed since 11 September 2001. Treverton does not offer up trite answers to the dilemma of finding the right balance between security and privacy, but seeks to clarify the questions we need to be asking.
7. Nick Cullather, "Bombing at the Speed of Thought: Intelligence in the Coming Age of Cyberwar," pp. 141-154.
"The intelligence community should share the historicists' concerns" that the wired military ("Battlespace") "tailors perception and decision to suit military requirements. In the mass of documentation on the RMA [Revolution in Military Affairs], there is little indication that the virtual battlespace will be visible to the president, cabinet, congress, or indeed any civilian."
8. John Ferris, "A New American Way of War? C4ISR, Intelligence and Information Operations in Operation 'Iraqi Freedom': A Provisional Assessment," pp. 155-174.
"In Operation 'Iraqi Freedom,' the success of C4ISR [command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] and IO [Information Operations] was mixed at strategic-political levels, and overwhelming at operational ones, better at action than calculation."
9. Ronald J. Deibert, "Deep Probe: The Evolution of Network Intelligence," pp. 175-193.
The focus here is on "a different type of intelligence practice that is emerging not among states but among non-state actors and in particular among citizens groups with computer networking capabilities.... There are a variety of good reasons to monitor" this type of transnational activity.
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