1. "Assembling the Puzzle Game: The Jacek Jurzak Spy Case." Cryptologia 36, no. 3 (Jul. 2012): 215-229.
"This article is devoted to the analysis of a 1983 case conducted by the Polish security service, which culminated in the detection and compromise of a U.S. asset [Jacek Jurzak]. The achievement was made possible thanks to the cooperation of various communications intelligence branches of the communist Polish security service."
2. "From the Archives: The U.S. and West German Agent Radio Ciphers." Cryptologia 31, no. 4 (Oct. 2007): 343-357.
From abstract: This article presents a "translation of an in-house research paper of the communist Polish counterintelligence depicting the ciphers and the one-way radio communications patterns used by the U.S. and West German intelligence services against Poland in the 1960s and early 1970s."
3. "Operation Lotos: An Unsuccessful Attempt on U.S. Government Communications." Cryptologia 34, no. 1 (Jan. 2010): 60-87.
Using declassified files of the Polish security service, the author provides new details on an unsuccessful joint Polish-East German operation in the 1980s, which targeted the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw's satellite communications.
4. "Operation Stonka: An Ultimate Deception Spy Game." Cryptologia 35, no. 4 (Oct. 2011): 297-327.
Working from declassified files of the Polish communist security services, the author traces "a Cold War counterintelligence operation conducted by Polish and Soviet secret servies against the Stephan Bandera Faction of the Ukrainian Nationalists Organizatrion between 1959 and 1961."
5. "Polish Cold War Codebreaking of 1959-1989: A Preliminary Assessment." Cryptologia 36, no. 4 (Oct. 2012): 341-379..
The author seeks "to assess the scope of communist Polish codebreaking during the middle and late periods of the Cold War based on the released documents available now at the Polish Institute of National Remembrance (IPN)."
6. "Project Kalina: The Lotos Operation Conundrum." Cryptologia 36, no. 2 (Apr. 2012): 119-128.
From "Abstract": This article "discusses the late 1980s aftermath of a Cold War Polish and East German signal intelligence operation against US covert communication lines."
Chapman, Robert D. "Remembering the Polish Underground." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 19, no. 4 (Winter 2006-2007): 746-752.
The author reviews briefly the CIA's support of the Polish underground organization Wolnosc i Niezawislosc (WiN -- Freedom and Independence) in the early 1950s, as well as events surrounding the Warsaw Uprising of 1944.
Gluchowski, L.W. "The Defection of Jozef Swialto and the Search for Jewish Scapegoats in the Polish United Workers' Party, 1953-1954." Intermarium (Columbia University Electronic Journal of Modern East Central European Postwar History) 3, no. 2 (1999). [http://www.columbia.edu/cu/ece/research/intermarium/vol3no2/gluchowski.pdf]
"New evidence from the Polish archives suggests that further study of postwar anti- Semitism in Poland, as well as how Polish communist ideologues and guardians of national security investigated Stalinist crimes in Poland, must include greater emphasis on the international component."
Goldstein, Frank L., and Benjamin F. Findley, Jr., eds. Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1996.
Stech, Parameters (Autumn 1997), finds two "original, worthwhile" chapters in this edited work -- one on Poland's underground media (Laurence Orzell) and the other on psychological operations during Operation Just Cause in Panama (Dennis Walko). "Unfortunately, the remainder of this anthology is disappointing." A number of the older articles have been bypassed by events.
For Jacobson, Special Warfare (Spring 1999), the strength of this work "lies in the expertise and experience of its editors and contributors." However, the volume "has suffered at the hands of time and several of its essays are notably dated." The case studies were "developed largely within the framework of the Cold War," and "there are almost no references to the profound technological advances and political revolutions that have already affected the nature of PSYOP as a tool of diplomacy and as a weapon of war."
MacEachin, Douglas J. US Intelligence and the Polish Crisis, 1980 - 1981. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2001.
Table of Contents:
Copyright and Attribution Statement
Chapter 1: The Burgeoning Confrontation
Chapter 2: The Confrontation Escalates
Chapter 3: US Launches Public Policy and Diplomatic Offensive
Chapter 4: Filling Out the Picture
Chapter 5: Intelligence and Policy
Chapter 6: Escalating Challenges to the Polish Regime
Chapter 7: Jaruzelski Takes the Government Reins
Chapter 8: A Setup for Military Crackdown
Chapter 9: A Close Call?
Chapter 10: Liberalization Infects the Party
Chapter 11: Solidarity Charges Ahead, and the Regime Digs In
Chapter 12: Bringing Down the Curtain
Chapter 13: Caught Off Guard
Chapter 14: Would It Have Made a Difference
Clark comment: This will not be the last word on how the United States interacted with the Polish Crisis of 1980-1981, but it serves as an excellent starting point. For Zelikow, FA 80.6 (Nov.-Dec. 2001), this is "one of the best published analyses of the Polish crisis." MacEachin's critique of the intelligence community is "ruthless but fair."
Monat, Pawel, with John Dille. Spy in the U.S. New York: Harper & Row, 1961. London: Frederick Muller, 1964.
Clark comment: The author was a Polish intelligence officer and military attaché in Washington in the mid-to-late 1950s. Spy in the U.S. focuses primarily on Monat's intelligence collection activities in the United States. According to Pforzheimer, "[i]ntelligence tradecraft ... is well described" in the book. Constantinides notes that while there may some dispute as to whether or not the author was involved in all the activities he describes, "the technical descriptions he gives of the tradecraft involved are of a professional level."
Persak, Krzysztof, and Lukasz Kaminski, eds. A Handbook of the Communist Security Apparatus in East Central Europe, 1944-1989. Warsaw, Poland: Institute of National Remembrance, 2005.
Holland, IJI&C 19.2 (Summer 2006), sees this as an "exceptionally useful volume." Although the "volume's chapters are uneven,... each chapter provides a dependable base line of information."
Weiser, Benjamin. "A Secret Warsaw Pact with the U.S. in the Cold War." Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 21-27 Feb. 1994, 18-19.
In an "extraordinary intelligence effort coordinated by the CIA," the United States acquired "advanced Soviet weapons from Warsaw Pact countries" during the 1980s. Poland was "the most significant collaborator in the program," but Romania also was a source and one deal in 1987 involved the purchase of 12 T-72 Soviet battle tanks from Czechoslovakia and East Germany.
West, Nigel [Rupert Allason]. The Third Secret: The CIA, Solidarity and the KGB's Plot to Kill the Pope. London: HarperCollins, 2000. 2001. [pb]
At http://www.nigelwest.com/thethirdsecret.htm, West describes this work thusly: "The rise of the Solidarity movement in Poland in the 1980s, which began the undermining of the Soviet Bloc and the defeat of international communism, was essentially funded by the CIA covertly, through the Vatican. Pope John Paul II (elected in 1978) had a deep interest in mysticism and long believed in 'the third secret' -- the third piece of advice given to the eldest of the three children at Fatima (Portugal) in 1917 by an apparition of the Virgin Mary. This secret, written down by the last surviving child, who became a nun, was revealed by the Pope in 1980 and described an avoidable apocalyptic catastrophe in Europe. Thereafter the Pope began his ideological offensive against the Soviet Bloc."
X, Mr., with Bruce E. Henderson and C.C. Cyr. Double Eagle: The Autobiography of a Polish Spy Who Defected to the West. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1979. [pb] New York: Ballantine, 1983.
Clark comment: The author was a Polish Security Service (UB) lieutenant colonel who was recruited by the CIA and worked in place in Norway from 1964 to 1966 when he defected to the United States. According to Pforzheimer, "[p]ersonal, familial, and nationalist concerns have apparently soured him." Nevertheless, the book gives a "window ... into the organization, selection, training, and the operational flavor of UB life, including the workings of the Soviet advisor system." Constantinides finds that the author "does not discuss his operations in sufficient length or detail to make them interesting."
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