Included here:

1. Prior to World War II

2. The Netherlands in World War II

3. Post-World War II

1. Prior to World War II

Aubin, Chantal. "French Counterintelligence and British Secret Intelligence in the Netherlands, 1920-40." In Battleground Western Europe: Intelligence Operations in Germany and The Netherlands in the Twentieth Century, eds. Beatrice de Graaf, Ben de Jong, and Wies Platje, 17-47. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 2007.

de Leeuw, Karl. "Johann Friedrich Euler (1741-1800): Mathematician and Cryptologist at the Court of the Dutch Stadholder William V." Cryptologia 25, no. 4 (Oct. 2001): 256-274.

van Tuyll, Hubert P. "The Dutch Mobilization of 1914: Reading the 'Enemy's' Intentions." Journal of Military History 64, no. 3 (Jul. 2000): 711-738.

Pre-1914 Netherlands lacked a formal intelligence apparatus and had only a small diplomatic corps. Nevertheless, the country "did fairly well in gathering information and making military use of it. The Netherlands was the first country in Western Europe to mobilize ... and did this on the basis of closely held information received from inside Germany."

2. The Netherlands in World War II

3. Post-World War II

Aid, Matthew M. "A Tale of Two Countries. US Intelligence Community Relations with the Dutch and German Intelligence and Security Services, 1945-1950." In Battleground Western Europe: Intelligence Operations in Germany and The Netherlands in the Twentieth Century, eds. Beatrice de Graaf, Ben de Jong, and Wies Platje, 95-122. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 2007.

Brodeur, Jean-Paul, Peter Gill, and Dennis Töllborg, eds. Democracy, Law and Security:  Internal Security Services in Contemporary Europe.  New York:  Columbia University Press, 2003. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003.

Peake, Studies 47.3 (2003), notes that this work is "drawn from papers presented at two symposia in Gothenburg, Sweden, that compare intelligence services in 10 countries:  Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  The various chapters look at historical, organizational, and political differences.... In most cases, very little has been published in English about the services discussed, and that enhances the book's importance.  For students of intelligence, and especially counterintelligence, this is a very worthwhile contribution."

For Henderson, IJI&C 17.3, this work "provides useful background reference material on several less well-known European domestic security systems." However, "the index and bibliography ... are generally weak"; and the "collection lacks, except for Spain, organizational charts for the various national communities and individual services."

De Graaf, Beatrice.

1. "Détente from Below: The Stasi and the Dutch Peace Movement." Journal of Intelligence History 3, no. 2 (Winter 2003). [http://www.intelligence-history.org/jih/ previous.html]

From abstract: "During a period when the Cold War returned to icy conditions (1979-1983) the East German Politburo and the Stasi unleashed a campaign to influence Dutch public opinion against the impending deployment of new NATO missiles.... East German communists used the openings of détente and funded the Dutch peace movement. However successful the East German campaign was in the beginning, they experienced a heavy setback."

2. "Stasi Operations in the Netherlands, 1979-89." Studies in Intelligence 52, no. 1 (Extracts - Mar. 2008): 1-12.

This article investigates "what the MfS was after in and against the Netherlands and to what extent these operations were affected by its thinking about the enemy."

De Graaff, Bob. "Accessibility of Secret Service Archives in the Netherlands." Intelligence and National Security 12, no. 2 (Apr. 1997): 154-160.

De Graaff, Bob, and Cees Wiebes.

1. "Intelligence and the Cold War behind the Dikes: The Relationship between the American and Dutch Intelligence Communities, 1946-1994." Intelligence and National Security 12, no. 1 (Jan. 1997): 41-58.

The article focuses on the now-defunct (since 1994) Dutch Foreign Intelligence Service (IDB), the Internal Security Service (BVD), and Military Intelligence Division (MID). The Dutch Navy's COMINT/SIGINT unit (TIVC) is also mentioned. The authors conclude that CIA ties with the BVD were closer and drew greater respect than the relationship with the IDB. The Dutch military preferred to work with their U.S. military counterparts. Clark comment: I hope the authors are aware that some of us are not impressed -- in terms of either scholarship or accuracy -- by footnotes stating "Interview with former [CIA or IDB] officers."

2. Villa Maarheeze: The Netherlands Foreign Intelligence Service. The Hague, Netherlands: Dutch Government Printing Office, 1998.

According to an E-mail from Cees Wiebes, this work "describes the history of the Netherlands Foreign Intelligence Service (Inlichtingendienst Buitenland, IDB) and its forerunner." The Service was established in 1946 and dissolved in 1994.

De Vries, Tity. "The Absent Dutch: Dutch Intellectuals and the Congress for Cultural Freedom." Intelligence and National Security 18, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 254-266.

"[T]he Dutch were almost completely absent" from the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF). "[T]he main explanation for the Dutch lack of interest in the CCF [is] to be found in Dutch society itself.... [P]ost-war Dutch writers and artists hardly had a deeply-rooted tradition of political engagement." At the same time, "Dutch political intellectuals lacked cultural interest."

Dröge, Philip. Beroep Meesterspion: Het Geheime Leven von Prinz Bernhard. Amsterdam: Vassallucci, 2002.

Scott-Smith, I&NS 19.1, comments that the "main value" of this biography of Prince Bernhard "is that it gathers together the material, most of it already published in various other works, concerning Bernhard's noteworthy relationship with various intelligence services, including the Abwehr, MI6, and CIA." The author made "a serious effort to gather new material" but "is unable to offer much more than extra details to stories already in the public domain."

Hoekstra, Frits. "The Dutch BVD and Transatlantic Co-operation During the Cold War Era: Some Experiences." Journal of Intelligence History 3, no. 1 (Summer 2003). [http://www.intelligence-history.org/jih/previous.html]

Abstract: "The author recounts his experience as operational case officer of the BVD -- the Dutch state security service -- his relationship with MI5/MI6 colleagues in their dealings with the IRA, the Rote Armee Fraktion, and Maoists, in addition to his experience with CIA and MI6 in the 1980s."

Platje, Wies. "Dutch Sigint and the Conflict with Indonesia." Intelligence and National Security 16, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 285-312.

The Sigint capability set up by the Dutch to intercept Japanese communications was very useful in the campaign against Indonesian nationalist troops following WWII.

Scott-Smith, Giles. "Confronting Peaceful Co-existence: Psychological Warfare and the Role of Interdoc, 1963-72." Cold War History 7, no. 1 (Feb. 2007): 19-43.

From abstract: The International Information and Documentation Center was founded in 1963 in The Hague, and "was the result of discussions between French, German, and Dutch intelligence services, along with individuals from industry and academia…. Interdoc's central focus was to increase the level of understanding of communist doctrine and practice by stimulating and making available well-researched information on the policies and realities of the Soviet bloc…. Chancellor Brandt's pursuit of Ostpolitik caused a catastrophic withdrawal of German financial support."

Wiebes, Cees. "Dutch Sigint during the Cold War, 1945-94." Intelligence and National Security 16, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 243-284.

The author views his article "as a real first attempt to reconstruct the Sigint history" of the Mathematical Centre (WKC)/Technical Information Collection Centre (TIVC) during the Cold War.

Wiebes, Cees. Intelligence and the War in Bosnia, 1992-1995. Amsterdam: Netherlands Institute for War Documentation, 2002. Hamburg and London: LIT Verlag, 2003. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction, 2003.

The author provides the following: This work "includes chapters on sharing of intelligence with the UN, plus US, British, Canadian and European Intelligence operations in Bosnia and Croatia, Human Intelligence, Imint, Sigint (2 chapters including NSA operations} and Covert Operations. It is based on top secret Dutch intel. archives plus (de)classified US, UK, Canadian, Bosnian and UN documents."

According to Jonkers, AFIO WIN 26-02 (1 Jul. 2002), Wiebes had "unrestricted access to the Dutch intelligence community to prepare an intelligence report as an Annex to the overall Dutch after-action report" regarding the participation of a Dutch Air Mobile Battalion in the UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia. The report provides "a different perspective on the interplay of foreign attitudes and capabilities with US intelligence and policy."

Peake, Studies 48.1, says that "[t]his book is not easy reading. The names are strange, the acronyms profuse, the political alignments complex, and the geography often confusing.... These shortcomings notwithstanding, it is an important work -- the most thorough treatment of the topic to date."

To Martyn, IJI&C 18.1 (Spring 2005), the author "is quite harsh in his indictment of the political leadership which sent the Dutch Battalion (DutchBat) into harm's way with inadequate intelligence support." In the telling of his story, "Wiebes gets maximum utility out of disparate, incomplete details." This work "is a thoroughly researched and thoughtful examination of this dark period in the history of multinational peacekeeping."

See also, Brendan O'Neill, "You are only allowed to see Bosnia in black and white," 23 Jan. 2004 at http://www.spiked-online.com/Articles/0000000CA374.htm.

Wiebes, Cees. "Operation 'Piet': The Joseph Sidney Petersen Jr. Spy Case, a Dutch 'Mole' Inside the National Security Agency." Intelligence and National Security 23, no. 4 (Aug. 2008): 488-535.

Arrested in 1954, Petersen had been working for the Dutch for over 10 years.

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