Alvarez, David. "Left
in the Dust: Italian Signals Intelligence, 1915-1943." International
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 14, no. 3 (Fall 2001):
388-408. Alvarez, David. "Left
in the Dust: Italian Signals Intelligence, 1915-1943." International
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 14, no. 3 (Fall 2001):
388-408.
The Italians began their cryptanalytic efforts in the fall of 1915, and by the last year of the war (1918) were enjoying some successes. In the interwar period, signals intelligence "contributed significantly to Rome's diplomacy and military operations" in the Ethiopian crisis. But "Rome's services failed to adapt to the new cryptologic world created" by World War II and "were left in the dust" of the services that participated in the "organizational and technological revolution" that began in the 1930s and was accelerated by the war.
Frank,
Willard C. "Politico-Military Deception at Sea in the Spanish Civil
War, 1936-39." Intelligence and National Security 5, no. 3 (Jul.
1990): 84-112.
In a contest with the two sides roughly balanced in fighting power, "[s]upply was the key to victory, and most of it had to come by sea." The focus here is on two aspects of deception: "(1) deception and maritime arms traffic and (2) clandestine naval intervention." The author finds that "German deception was the most successful of all, both in the supply effort and in clandestine submarine warfare, the result of favorable conditions, intense care and good luck."
Maffei, Riccardo. "L'ombra della GPU a Roma. Lo spionaggio sovietico nell'Italia fascista attraverso le carte di polizia (1926-38)." Nuova Storia Contemporanea 15, no. 2 (Mar.-Apr. 2011): 25-52.
Mallett, Robert. "The Anschluss Question in Italian Defence Policy, 1933-37." Intelligence and National Security 19, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 680-694.
Abstract: This "essay argues that only with Ethiopia conquered, and the Axis relationship a prominent feature of fascist policy, was it possible for Mussolini to consider Italian accession to a full Austro-German union. At that point military planning and intelligence work no longer considered the likelihood of an Italo-German armed clash over Austria."
Sullivan, Brian R.
"From Little Brother to Senior Partner: Fascist Italian Perceptions
of the Nazis and Hitler's Regime, 1930-1936." Intelligence and National
Security 13, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 85-108.
From abstract: "[A]fter the Nazi putsch in Vienna, Mussolini joined the West against Germany.... Mussolini [later] abandoned Austria to get Hitler's support [in Ethiopia]. The Axis became Nazi-dominated."
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