Dakin, Douglas. The Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 1897-1913. Salonika, Greece: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1966.
Constantinides: "Dakin gives particulars on the intelligence, assassination, and support networks set up by the Greek side to fight the Bulgarians and the Comitadjis for control of Macedonia.... The excellent Greek system for penetrating and bribing Turkish governmental and police authorities is pictured as part of the unified, well-planned effort."
Dimitrakis, Panagiotis. Greek Military Intelligence and the Crescent: Estimating the Turkish Threat -- Crises, Leadership and Strategic Analyses 1974-1996. Plymouth, UK: University of Plymouth Press, 2010.
From "Foreword": This work extends "the study of contemporary intelligence and crisis management into the Aegean, providing a unique account of how Greek policymakers forged their assessments of the Turkish threat during a tense two decades.... He draws on the conceptual literature on intelligence and surprise attack,... and uses it as a template against which to evaluate the performance of successive Greek governments.... [W]hile the familiar dilemmas concerning the relationship between intelligence and policy may take on distinctive forms in quite different political cultures[,] in many respects they are all too recognisable."
Dimitrakis has a Website at: http://www.pdimitrakis.com/.
Dimitrakis, Panagiotis. "Greek Military Intelligence and the Italian Threat, 1934-1940." Journal of Intelligence History 7, no. 1 (Summer 2007): 1-29. [http://www.intelligence-history.org/jih/7-1.html]
From 1934, "Greek generals and their staffs identified Italy as the most serious threat to Greek national security.... The Italian invasion of Greece in October 1940 was not a surprise but an anticipated hostile act Greek strategists had forecast." Nevertheless, the head of the Greek administration, Ioannis Metaxas, "chose not to mobilize on time and to call-up the reservists [Army General Staff chief Maj. Gen. Alexandros] Papagos had requested in the period of spring 1939-summer 1940." He "believed that a general mobilization prior to the actual Italian attack could have serious diplomatic and financial repercussions for Greece and could provoke Rome....
"The Greek Army did not have 'all the time in the world' for defence preparations, but at least it was not surprised. The machinery for call-up of conscripts was in place waiting Metaxas' and King George's II signing of the relevant royal warrants on 28 October early morning. In addition, since almost 1938, their staff officers had been operating under a war mentality."
Dimitrakis, Panagiotis. "Greek Military Intelligence and the Turkish 'Threat' During the 1987 Aegean Crisis." Journal of Modern Greek Studies 25 (2007): 99-127.
The author argues that "during the 1987 crisis, Turkish armed forces did not constitute an imminent threat to Greece despite the hostile rhetoric of Ankara. Greek military intelligence was able to confirm Turkish passivity and inform Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou not to expect any Turkish hostile act over the Aegean Sea continental shelf before the Greeks might have taken precipitous action."
Dimitrakis, Panagiotis. "Intelligence for Crisis Management: The Case of the January 1996 Greek-Turkish Crisis." European Security 17, no. 4 (Dec. 2008): 455-493.
From abstract: "[T]he author assesses the role of Greek military intelligence" during the January 1996 Greek-Turkish crisis over the sovereignty status of two Southeast Aegean islets. He "shows that during the crisis hours of 31 January 1996, the lack of tactical intelligence on Turkish deployment had a direct impact on the assessment of the operational status of the Greek armed forces and on the planned crisis response."
Nomikos, John M. "Terrorism, Media, and Intelligence in Greece: Capturing the 17 November Group." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 20, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 65-78.
"Throughout the first phase of domestic terrorism [1974-1989], the ... Greek elites" failed "to acknowledge the seriousness ... of the terrorist threat and the need to tackle it drastically." The assassination in September 1989 of the first Greek politician to be killed by the 17 November group "marked the end of the tolerance of terrorism by both the political establishment and the general public." After 1999, with the Olympic Games 2004 scheduled for Athens, the Greek government began to demonstrate "a dedication and ... sense of urgancy to deal with the terrorist threat."
Papakhelas, Alexis. "Newly-Released CIA Records Shed Light on Events Leading Up to Greece's 1967 Coup" To Vima (Athens), 17 Aug. 2002, A6-A7.
FBIS document number: FBIS-WEU-2002-0818. Translated text available at http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v16.
U.S. Department of State. Office of the Historian. Gen. ed., David S. Patterson. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968. Vol. XVI. Cyprus; Greece; Turkey. Ed., James E. Miller. Washington, DC: GPO, 1999. [http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v16]
U.S. Department of State. Office of the Historian. Gen. ed., Edward C. Keefer. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976. Volume XXIX. Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 19691972. Eds., James E. Miller, Douglas E. Selvage, and Laurie Van Hook. Washington, DC: GPO, 2007. [http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v29]
From "Preface": "The coverage of this volume is split almost equally between Eastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean [i.e., Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey].... The second chapter [of the Eastern Europe section] is ... a general one. It deals with U.S. Government policy and the bureaucratic debate about -- and ultimately, the decision on how to fund -- Radio Free Europe ... and Radio Liberty."
Varouhakis, Miron. "Greek Intelligence and the Capture of PKK Leader Abdullah Ocalan in 1999." Studies in Intelligence 53, no. 1 (Extracts, Mar. 2009): 11-17.
The effort of the Greek National Intelligence Agency (EYP) to transfer Ocalan from Greece to Kenya to avoid his capture by Turkish authorities "ended in a debacle and strained its relations with the United States, Turkey, and other nations."
Wittner, Lawrence S. American Intervention in Greece, 1943 to 1949. Columbia Contemporary American History Series. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982.
Kuniholm, JAH 69.3 (Dec. 1982), notes that the author "believes that U.S. intervention, motivated by a concern for protecting petroleum resources in the Middle East, was both unjustified and ineffective.... Wittner's judgments, however, while thought-provoking and insightful, are nonetheless problematic." His identification with the Left leads him to minimize complex internal and external factors that conflict with his political views.
For Smith, FA 62 (Summer 1982), "[t]his book deals primarily with the American role in Greece after the declaration of the Truman Doctrine.... In 1949 most Americans were euphoric about the results of this policy. Today many must share the author's conclusion that in the long run 'American policy toward Greece ended in shambles.'"
Xydis, Stephen G. "Coups and Countercoups in Greece 1967-1973 (with Postscript)." Political Science Quarterly 89, no. 3 (Fall 1974): 507-538.
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