Materials arranged chronologically.
Dozier, Kimberly. "AP Exclusive: Building a Network to Hit Militants." Associated Press, 5 Jan. 2011. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"The Obama administration has ramped up its secret war on terror groups with a new military targeting center to oversee the growing use of special operations strikes against suspected militants in hot spots around the world, according to current and former U.S. officials. Run by the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command, the new center would be a significant step in streamlining targeting operations previously scattered among U.S. and battlefields abroad and giving elite military officials closer access to Washington decision-makers and counterterror experts, the officials said."
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman, and Susan M. Collins, Ranking Member. "'A Ticking Time Bomb': Counterterrorism Lessons from the U.S. Government's Failure to Prevent the Fort Hood Attack." 3 Feb. 2011. Available at: http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/Fort_Hood/FortHoodReport.pdf.
From "Executive Summary": "Our basic conclusion is as follows: Although neither DoD nor the FBI had specific information concerning the time, place, or nature of the [5 November 2009] attack, they collectively had sufficient information to have detected [Army Maj. Nidal Malik] Hasan's radicalization to violent Islamist extremism but failed both to understand and to act on it. Our investigation found specific and systemic failures in the government's handling of the Hasan case and raises additional concerns about what may be broader systemic issues....
"[O]ur investigation finds that the Fort Hood attack is an indicator that the current status of the FBI's transfonnation to become intelligence-driven is incomplete and that the FBI faces internal challenges -- which may include cultural barriers -- that can frustrate the on-going institutional reforms. The FBI needs to accelerate its transformation....
"Since 9/1 1, the FBI has increased its intelligence focus by creating a Directorate of Intelligence and Field Intelligence Groups in the field offices and hiring thousands of new and better qualified analysts. However, the FBI must ensure that these analysts are effectively utilized, including that they achieve significant stature in the FBI....
"In the Hasan case, the JTTF [FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force] model did not live up to the FBI's strong vision of JTTFs as an effective interagency information-sharing and operational coordination mechanism. JTTFs have been expanded significantly since 9/11 and are now the principal domestic federal operational arm for counterterrorism investigations and intelligence collection.... However, the specific handling of the Hasan case, and systemic disputes between DoD and the FBI concerning JTTFs which remain unresolved, raise concerns that the JTTF model requires additional review and improvement in order for JTTFs to function as effectively as our nation requires."
Waterman, Shaun. "U.S. Central Command 'Friending' the Enemy in Psychological War -- Software Helps Crack Terror Cells." Washington Times, 1 Mar. 2011. [http://www.washingtontimes.com]
According to documents and U.S. officials, the Tampa-based U.S. Central Command "recently bought a special computer program that troops use to create multiple fake identities on the Internet. The military uses the fictitious identities to infiltrate groups and in some cases spread disinformation among extremist organizations such as al Qaeda and the Taliban with the goal of disrupting their operations."
Lamb, Christopher J., and Evan Munsing. Secret Weapon: High-value Target Teams as an Organizational Innovation. Strategic Perspectives, No. 4. Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University Press, Mar. 2011.
"[T]hree innovations -- net-worked-based targeting, fusion of intelligence and operations, and counterterrorist-counterinsurgency integration -- required unprecedented collaboration between diverse departments and agencies and between SOF and conventional forces. Together, these innovations set the stage for the dramatic reversal of the security situation in Iraq in 2007.... Both the interagency high-value target teams and the interagency approach eventually embraced by conventional forces demonstrate that how the national security system is organized for complex missions matters greatly.... When the high-value target teams and integrated conventional force commands collaborated tactically, they produced quick and powerful results."
Ranieri, Thomas F. "Adapting U.S. Military Intelligence to Network Warfare." American Intelligence Journal 29, no. 1 (2011): 37-46.
"One of the most vital steps to a new approach toward warfare must be a reformation of the U.S. military intelligence paradigm. Military intelligence must adopt a ground-level, decentralized approach, which emphasizes seamless integration into all military action and takes a full spectrum approach to intelligence gathering and dissemination."
Ignatius, David. "The Blurring of CIA and Military." Washington Post, 1 Jun. 2011. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"One consequence of the early 'war on terror' years was that the lines between CIA and military activities got blurred. The Pentagon moved into clandestine areas that had traditionally been the province of the CIA. Special Forces began operating secretly abroad in ways that worried the CIA, the State Department and foreign governments. The Obama administration is finishing an effort to redraw those lines more carefully."
Bumiller, Elisabeth. "Soldier, Thinker, Hunter, Spy: Drawing a Bead on Al Qaeda." New York Times, 3 Sep. 2011. [http://www.nytimes.com]
The focus here is Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Michael G. Vickers, who "has risen to become one of the top counterterrorism officials in Washington."
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