Tamnes, Rolf. The United States and the Cold War in the High North. Albershot & Oslo: Dartmouth & Ad Notam, 1991.
Gleditsch, I&NS 7.2, says that this book on the U.S.-Norwegian bilateral security relationship is "professionally written and produced, with extremely detailed notes and a valuable bibliography."
Urban, Mark. "The Magnum Force." Telegraph (London), 1 Sep. 1996. [http://www. telegraph.co.uk]
The British decision "to part-pay for an American spy satellite came after the ... failure of an attempt to go it alone with an electronic snoop in space -- Zircon.... By the mid-Eighties the inequalities in the GCHQ-NSA relationship was causing real alarm....
"Zircon would be a geosynchronous satellite that would sit over the Soviet Union, feeding information direct to Whitehall. The vision was to survive from 1983, when initial studies began, to the autumn of 1986.... It was cost that doomed Zircon.... In 1987 GCHQ's entire annual budget was about £350 million. The cost to the UK of owning and maintaining a single satellite would have added about £100 million a year in perpetuity.... Ministers ... opted to buy American....
"The complex arrangements were agreed in a super-secret memorandum of understanding between the US and British governments which, it is thought, was signed in the latter part of 1988. One of the satellites would have a metaphorical Union flag on the side, but Britain could also consider itself part-owner of all of them. The UK would also have the right to 'task' any of the three satellites, but the 'British' satellite would never be delivered to the UK and the highly-sensitive technology within it remained within the NSA's security system. The NSA could also override GCHQ, even in tasking the craft."
Walsh, James Igoe. The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010.
Hanley, Proceedings 136.3 (Mar. 2010), is unimpressed by this work that seeks to examine "intelligence sharing among nation states from the perspective of the social scientist.... For starters, the issues raised ... have been dealt with at length by the executive and legislative branches." The author does not mention Executive Order 12333, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act of 2004, "or other critical policy and legal documents." This book "doen't add anything substantial to th[e] conversation" about the most effective ways and means of accomplishing the "universally understood ends of intelligence."
For Webb, Studies 54.4 (Dec. 2010), the author "offers a timely way to rethink what drives intelligence-sharing relationships." Walsh puts forward "an argument on intelligence sharing that stresses state interests rather than trust alone.... His most thought provoking analysis is in cases where state interest in sharing intelligence and worries about unreliable partners are both high, much like the US-Pakistan relationship as seen by some today."
Phythian, Perspectives on Politics 8.4 (Dec. 2010), sees this "tightly argued book" proposing a solution to the problem of international intelligence sharing "based on an application of the principles of relational contracting, a branch of transaction cost economics.... [T]his is an interesting, distinctive, and bold proposal," but there are problems contained in an approach that accepts the existence of dominant and subordinant states. To Lefebvre, I&NS 26.2&3 (Apr.-Jun. 2011), this is "a solid theoretical contribution to the field of intelligence studies."
Warner, Michael. "Intelligence Transformation and Intelligence Liaison." SAIS Review 24, no. 1 (Winter-Spring 2004): 77-89.
West, Nigel. [Rupert Allason] GCHQ: The Secret Wireless War, 1900-1986. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1986. The SIGINT Secrets: The Signals Intelligence War, 1900 to Today. New York: Morrow, 1988.
According to Petersen, this book "[t]reats the British experience, with substantial collateral information on U.S. intelligence." McGinnis, Cryptolog, Summer 1996, says West provides an "exhaustive history" of the British effort. In addition, "[p]ost war COMINT collaboration among the Allies is covered in detail.... The book is highly recommended as an anthology of what has happened in the COMINT business in this century."
Sexton argues that "West relies on others and offers little that is new or original." Peake, AIJ 15.1/91, seems in accord with that judgment but adds that West, nonetheless, makes a contribution by bringing together material from various other sources "in one coherent presentation." Going off on a real tear against West, O'Halpin, I&NS 2.4, finds "many ... questionable statements and errors of fact in GCHQ, " and declares the book to be "simply an unreliable synopsis of what is already available."
Westerfield, H. Bradford. "America and the World of Intelligence Liaison." Intelligence and National Security 11, no. 3 (Jul. 1996): 523-560.
"Post-Cold War national security requirements are plastically amorphous and ambiguous.... Much of diplomacy can be open and conciliatory; but ... this is only one sector of a conceptual spectrum of policy instruments that also ranges further through increasingly secret diplomacy, clandestine intelligence collection, counterintelligence, and covert action; these are elements of a 'secret international relations' sector, and they each utilize liaison; together (liaison included) they all conceptually flow yet further to merge with a sector of military preparedness and possible war."
Wippl, Joseph W. "Intelligence Exchange Through InterIntel." International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 25, no. 1 (Spring 2012): 1-18.
"The future will entail much more multilateral operational and analytic intelligence exchange." Therefore, why not a multilateral intelligence exchange?
Wirtz, James J. "Constraints on Intelligence Collaboration: The Domestic Dimension." International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 6, no 1 (Spring 1993): 85-99.
Lowenthal sees this article as a "balanced discussion of the benefits and risks for U.S. intelligence in collaborating with foreign intelligence services." This same title appears in Defense Analysis 8, no. 3 (1992): 247-259.
See Scott D. Breckenridge's response in "Reader's Forum," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 6, no. 2 (Summer 1993), pp. 229-237: This "commentary ... as to what past lessons should have relevance to consideration of the pending restructuring of the government's intelligence system is far off the mark."
See also, Wirtz' answer, pp. 237-239: "Breckenridge failed to understand my argument.... [T]he political mood within the United States ... largely drove political judgments of CIA 'misconduct'.... [R]espect for the law will only protect [CIA managers] from legal prosecution, not political prosecution. The latter phenomenon has proved to be more damaging."
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