1. Material Published in the 1990s
2. Material Published in the 2000s
3. Material Published in the 2010s
Bielecki, Ed. "MASINT: The Oldest 'INT.'" INSCOM Journal, Oct.-Dec. 1997, 12-14.
Includes an outline of the INSCOM MASINT organization.
Broad, William J.
1. "Science Seeking Military's Data From Cold War." New York Times, 23 Jun. 1992, A1, B11.
On 28 May 1992, President Bush "signed a directive that cleared the way for environmentalists to use the nation's spy gear and records." Intelligence collection "platforms" which might provide information in monitoring the global environment include satellites, aircraft, ships, and submarines.
2. "Spy Satellites' Early Role Coming Clear." New York Times, 12 Sep. 1995, B5, B10.
Replays some of the recent Corona revelations, with large photographs to illustrate.
3. "U.S. Will Deploy Its Spy Satellites on Nature Mission." New York Times, 27 Nov. 1995, A1, A14 (N).
A new program "is directing spy satellites to study about two dozen ecologically sensitive sites around the world. Ultimately, it is to monitor about 500 sites.... The data will be archived for future generations of scientists and will remain secret for now to conceal the abilities of the nation's reconnaissance systems." Scientists involved in the project note that "spy satellites are better than civilian remote-sensing craft, like Landsat or Spot, which orbit the earth for the United States and France respectively.... For the fiscal year 1996, the Administration requested $17.6 million for the environmental work, and appropriations conferees allotted $15 million."
Hermann, Robert J. "Advancing Technology: Collateral Effects on Intelligence." American Intelligence Journal 15, no. 2 (Autumn-Winter 1994): 8-11.
Hermann describes what he calls "a very important new management challenge: the integration of the use of ... 'national' systems into the real-time operation of combat forces.... This management challenge ... is fundamentally a military force configuration issue. The objective is to create a force configuration which can access, assimilate and exploit real-time information."
The author also argues that "the information we need [today] is not dominated by what we have come to call 'intelligence'.... For the new problems, we need information, not just 'intelligence'.... This does not mean that intelligence from denied sources will not be needed or valuable.... A full understanding of any problem will need the addition of intelligence, but it will often not be the dominant source. The most powerful information combination will be the effective exploitation of open source information coupled with intelligence obtained from special sources and methods."
Clark comment: This was an early salvo in Washington's "intelligence wars," that is, a subtle and low-keyed representative of the arguments to come from within the military segment of the intelligence community which seek to undermine the need for a national-level intelligence coordination capability.
Madsen, Wayne. "Intelligence Agency Threats to Computer Security." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 6, no. 4 (Winter 1993): 413-488.
The article includes a country-by-country listing of the "Computer-Communications Espionage Capabilities of Intelligence and Law Enforcement Agencies" (pp. 446-488).
Poteat, S. Eugene. "Stealth, Countermeasures, and ELINT, 1960-1975." Studies in Intelligence 42, no. 1 (1998): 51-59. [Richelson, Wizards (2002)]
Sakkas, Peter E. "Espionage and Sabotage in the Computer World." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 5, no. 2 (Summer 1991): 155-202.
Sparrow, Malcolm K. "Network Vulnerabilities and Strategic Intelligence in Law Enforcement." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 5, no. 3 (Fall 1991): 255-274.
Wiley, Richard G. Electronic Intelligence: The Analysis of Radar Signals. 2d ed. Norwood, MA: Artech House, 1993. [Surveillant 3.4/5]
Clark, Robert M. The Technical Collection of Intelligence. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009.
Peake, Studies 55.2 (Jun. 2011), notes that the author covers "the space-, air-, sea-, and ground-based collection platforms intelligence organizations employ today.... Clark explains what each platform does and how it works.... He does not get into detailed operating procedures, though he does present a list of key management tools for consideration." This "is a fine, fully-documented, understandable, and comprehensive, though not elementary, introduction to a complex intelligence activity."
To Bailey, AIJ 29.1 (2011), this is "an outstanding introductory work on the technical collection of intelligence." It is "well-organized and clearly understandable." Richelson., IJI&C 24.4 (Winter 2011-2012), calls this work "an exceptionally valuable addition to the literature on technical collection because it covers virtually the entire field in a readable and non-technical manner."
Goodman, Michael S. "Jones' Paradigm: The How, Why, and Wherefore of Scientific Intelligence." Intelligence and National Security 24, no. 2 (Apr. 2009): 236-256.
The reference in the title is, of course, to R.V. Jones. From abstract: "This article sets out the main components of scientific intelligence, seeking to explore how scientific intelligence has been defined, how it operates, and contemplates the key issues involved."
Goodman, Michael S. Spying on the Nuclear Bear: Anglo-American Intelligence and the Soviet Bomb. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007.
Radchenko, H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews (Oct. 2008) [http://www.h-net.org], says that this book "offers a close-up look at the operation of British (and to some extent, U. S.) atomic intelligence in the early years of the Cold War.... [It] is full of fascinating details about some ... little-known monitoring programs, which entailed the operation [of] a large number of stations around the world, regular air sampling, radio interception, and a host of other tricks." However, the work "is missing some of the essential analysis which would help us connect the history of British atomic intelligence with the bigger picture of the early years of the Cold War."
For Peake, Studies 54.1 (Mar. 2010), Goodman's presentation on "the impact of the [Soviet] espionage cases should be assessed with caution," as "Soviet atomic espionage [had been brought] to a halt by the end of the 1940s." However, his contributions on "the technical sources of intelligence are on point." Greenberg, NCWR 62.4 (Autumn 2009), believes that the author "has produced a definitive work,... a landmark effort in its devotion to prodigious research and commitment to truthful inquiry." To Schecter, I&NS 26.4 (Aug. 2011), this is "a deeply researched and thoughtful analysis." However, there is a need for "more and better-organized operational detail."
Johnston, Lily E. "Language, Culture, and Cooperation in Scientific and Technical Intelligence." Studies in Intelligence 52, no. 2 (Jun. 2008): 1-10.
The old methods of S&T intelligence "are no longer enough to monitor the global S&T environment for disruptive applications."
Richelson, Jeffrey T. "The Technical Collection of Intelligence." In Handbook of Intelligence Studies, ed. Loch K. Johnson, 105-117. London: Routledge, 2007.
Wheelon, Albert D. "Technology and Intelligence." Intelligencer 14, no. 2 (Winter-Spring 2005): 51-57. Reprinted from Technology in Society 26, nos. 2-3 (Apr.-Aug. 2004): 245-255.
This article "focuses on the way in which a combination of technical collection systems and scientific analysis contributed decisively to the solution of three important Cold War problems: Soviet ballistic missile programs, the Soviet space program, and Soviet missile defense systems. In doing so, it suggests the similarity of intelligence activities to scientific research. It also notes the long-running collaboration of civilian scientists and engineers with the intelligence community."
Baggott, Jim. Atomic: The First War of Physics and the Secret History of the Atom Bomb 19391949. New York: Pegasus Books, 2010.
Peake, Studies 55.2 (Jun. 2011), says that this book "doesn't identify anything new.... The sources are all secondary, and errors made elsewhere are repeated here." It is nothing more than "a good summary of an oft-told story." This sentiment is shared by Dobbs, NYT, 7 May 2010, who notes that "[r]eaders familiar with the standard works on the subject will find little that is new or particularly startling" here. The author "has mastered the existing literature but done little original research." Nonetheless, this is "an excellent introduction to a vast and complicated topic."
For Brown, Telegraph (London), 16 Apr. 2009, this work is "thorough and accessible." Malloy, I&NS 27.4 (Aug. 2012), finds this work to be "an unabashedly popular and synthetic history with a premium on story telling over analytical depth.... Those particularly interested in the intelligence and espionage aspects of this story ... have better options."
Foryst, Carole A. "TechNet: To Improve the IC's Science and Technology Pursuits." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 24, no. 3 (Fall 2011): 510-533.
The IC "has lagged in harnessing the innovative possibilities of utilizing S&T information integration in supporting its own research and development (R&D) missions."
Spinardi, Graham. "Science, Technology, and the Cold War: The Military Uses of the Jodrell Bank Radio Telescope." Cold War History 6, no. 3 (2006): 279-300.
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