McGinnis, G.P. "Commercial Intelligence." Cryptolog 15 [probably 14], no. 4 (Summer 1993): 1, 17.
Melvern, Linda, Nick Anning, and David Hebditch. Techno-Bandits: How the Soviets Are Stealing America's High-Tech Future. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1984.
Pforzheimer: This "is the first really good ... book ... that has become available to the general public on the problem of illegal technology transfer in support of the military and industrial development of the Communist nations.... [The authors] have done their homework well."
Moor, R. Carl, Jr. "Strategic Economic Intelligence." Military Review 56, no. 10 (1976): 47-51. [Petersen]
Oliver, Kay. "Analyzing Economic Espionage." Studies in Intelligence 36, no. 1 (Spring 1992): 23-27.
Pincus, Walter. "A Fly on a Foreign Wall Might Help the Bottom Line: Should the CIA Leak Intelligence to U.S. Firms?" Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 13-19 Mar. 1995, 32.
Quoting "present and former intelligence officials," Pincus says that the recent spying flap in France "is part of the agency's clandestine economic intelligence gathering in friendly countries that has been going on for years.... Now, though, key members of Congress [including Senators Spector of Pennsylvania and Kerrey of Nebraska] have been trying to get the CIA to share with U.S. corporations the economic and commercial intelligence it has gathered."
Porteous, Samuel D.
1. "Economic/Commercial Interests and the World's Intelligence Services: A Canadian Perspective." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 8, no. 3 (Fall 1995): 275-306.
Porteous points to announced U.S., British, Australian, and South African "intentions to increase intelligence community involvement in pursuit of economic and commercial interests.... In this environment, Canada would benefit from a high-level, thorough, and coordinated review of the proper role of its intelligence services in protecting and pursuing Canadian economic and commercial interests."
The author includes three "case studies": "Provision of Economic Intelligence to Government Policy and Decisionmakers: PROMIS Software Example," "Intelligence Service Provision of Economic Intelligence and Related Services of More Direct Interest to Commercial Actors: Korea," and "The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the CIA: Intelligence Activity with a Substantial Impact on Commercial Interests."
2. "Economic and Commercial Interests and Intelligence Services." In Economic Intelligence and National Security, ed. Evan H. Potter, 79-127. Ottawa: Carlton University Press, 1998.
3. "Economic Espionage: Issues Arising from Increased Government Involvement with the Private Sector." Intelligence and National Security 9, no. 4 (Oct. 1994): 735-752.
The author suggests there may be a theoretical case for the use of economic espionage as part of a country's strategic trade policy.
4. "Economic Espionage: New Target for CSIS." Canadian Business Review 20, no. 4 (Winter 1993).
5. "Looking Out For Economic Interests: An Increased Role for Intelligence." Washington Quarterly 19, no. 4 (Autumn 1996): 191-204.
ProQuest: The author "examines the role of intelligence services in supporting governments' economic and commercial well-being." Many countries "have indicated that they are or will be more actively using their intelligence resources" in this way.
6. "The Threat from Transnational Crime: An Intelligence Perspective." Commentary, Winter 1996, 1-7.
Poteat, S. Eugene. "The Downside of Globalization: The Surge in Economic and Industrial Espionage." Intelligencer 15, no. 2 (Fall/Winter 2006-2007): 11-17.
"Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a virtual feeding frenzy of economic and industrial espionage by other nations -- both friend and foe alike -- to steal America's trade secrets and intellectual property to gain economic and competitive advantage."
Potter, Evan H. "The System of Economic Intelligence Gathering in Canada." In Economic Intelligence and National Security, ed. Evan H. Potter, 21-77. Ottawa: Carlton University Press, 1998.
Potter, Evan H., ed. Economic Intelligence and National Security. Ottawa: Carlton University Press, 1998.
Sanger, David E.
1. "U.S. Won't Admit or Explain Its Trade Espionage to Japan." New York Times, 28 Oct. 1995, A4.
2. and Tim Weiner. "Emerging Role for the C.I.A.: Economic Spy." New York Times, 15 Oct. 1995, 1.
During the "negotiations with Japan last spring," U.S. "trade officials were accompanied everywhere by a small team of intelligence officers." Each morning, they gave U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor and his aides inside information gathered" by the CIA's Tokyo station and NSA's electronic eavesdropping equipment, "sifted by C.I.A. analysts in Washington."
Seib, Gerald F. "Some Urge CIA to Go Further in Gathering Economic Intelligence." Wall Street Journal, 4 Aug. 1992, A1.
Trim, Peter R.J.
1. "The Company-Intelligence Interface and National Security." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 13, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 204-214.
Trim suggests that the new international economic order may result "in the intelligence activities of companies and government agencies" sharing information.
2. "Public and Private Sector Cooperation in Countering Cyberterrorism." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 16, no. 4 (Winter 2003-2004): 594-608.
"A framework needs to be developed so that organizations from both the public and private sectors can work together in order to ensure that appropriate use is made of most governments' limited resources."
Tuck, Jay. High-Tech Espionage: How the KGB Smuggles NATO's Strategic Secrets to Moscow. New York: St. Martin's, 1986. London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1986.
Milivojevic, I&NS 2.2, calls High-Tech Espionage "a useful, though not definitive, survey." It is somewhat strange, however, that Tuck has chosen to focus on the KGB when the GRU's budget for foreign-technology acquisition is "many times larger" than the KGB's. For Macpherson. I&NS 3.1, "Tuck lays the groundwork for a fuller understanding of the crucial role of economic intelligence and counter-intelligence in modern strategic assessments."
Tucker, Darren S. "The Federal Government's War on Economic Espionage." University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 18, no. 3 (Fall 1997): 1109-1152. [Calder]
Valero, Larry. "The Role of American Intelligence in the Global Economy." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 8, no. 3 (Fall 1995): 359-362.
This article is linked with Galvan, "The Role of American Intelligence in the Global Economy," IJI&C 8.3/353-357. Galvan argues the "Pro" side and Valero the "Con" side with regard to the use of U.S. intelligence for business and industrial spying.
Warner, William T. "Economic Espionage: A Bad Idea." Periscope 18, no. 5 (1993): 1-2. Reprinted from The National Law Journal, 12 Apr. 1993, 13, 14.
Weiner, Tim. "C.I.A. Faces Issue of Economic Spying." New York Times, 23 Feb. 1995, A4 (N).
Discussion within context of brouhaha with French over expulsion of CIA officers engaged in economic espionage in France.
Williams, Robert H. "Economic Spying by Foes, Friends Gains Momentum." Signal, Jul. 1992, 56 ff. [http://www.us.net/signal]
Windrem, Robert (prod.). "U.S. Steps Up Commercial Spying." MSNBC News, 7 May 2000. [http://www.msnbc.com]
"Newly unearthed documents, mostly letters from the CIA to Congress, lay out evidence of an intensive intelligence effort to help U.S. corporations win contracts overseas. The documents ... appear to confirm reports that America's electronic eavesdropping apparatus was involved in commercial espionage."
Wright, Jeffery W. "Intelligence and Economic Security." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 5, no. 2 (Summer 1991): 203-221.
Zelikow, Philip. "American Economic Intelligence: Past Practice and Future Principles." Intelligence and National Security 12, no. 1 (Jan. 1997): 164-177.
The author gives a brief survey of the organization of economic intelligence gathering from 1776 to the present, with the focus on how that activity has been organized and carried out within the CIA since 1949. He recommends that the government "should take full advantage of the enlarged, more sophisticated flow of outside information and avoid duplicating tasks already performed adequately by others." At the same time, Zelikow recognizes that "the government does have some unique responsibilities in the collection and preparation of economic intelligence."
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