GENERAL POST-WORLD WAR II

The Cold War

C - F

 

Carafano, James Jay. "Mobilizing Europe's Stateless: America's Plan for a Cold War Army." Journal of Cold War Studies 1, no.2 (1999). [http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~hpcws/carafano.pdf]

The idea of creating a Volunteer Freedom Corps of "combat battalions from displaced European ethnic and nationalist forces ... was first broached during the Truman administration, but it gained much greater impetus after the election in 1952 of Dwight Eisenhower.... The reaction of the European governments, however, was distinctly negative. They feared that the proposed Corps would destabilize the intricate ethnic and interstate relationships that had been rebuilt in Europe after 1945. European suspicion of the Corps finally convinced Eisenhower to abandon the initiative."

Carafano, James Jay. Waltzing into the Cold War: The Struggle for Occupied Austria. College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 2002.

Brown, I&NS 19.1, notes that the author believes that U.S. Forces, Austria (USFA) "misused intelligence to bolster the case for viewing the Soviet Union as a threat to American interests in Austria." However, in the end, the author does not supply satisfactory support for his assertion.

Cookridge, E.H. Spy Trade. London: Hodder, 1971.

Chambers: "An examination of East-West spy exchanges. Cookridge is critical, but seems to avoid the ethical dilemma."

Cowley, Robert, ed. The Cold War: A Military History. New York: Random House, 2005.

Wilson, Proceedings 132.3 (Mar. 2006), sees this as a "first-rate collection of essays.... [S]ome of the finest writers and historians... discuss the relevance of ... important episodes and conflicts" during the Cold War.

Cradock, Percy [Sir]. Know Your Enemy: How the Joint Intelligence Committee Saw the World. London: John Murray, 2002.

Addison, History Today, 52.7, finds that the author, a former JIC chairman, "has written a sober and persuasive analysis" of the JIC's "less than infallible performance during a number of post-war crises.... But the Cold War is the main theme and, as he demonstrates, the JIC's advice was consistently sane and a calming influence during periods of tension."

For Unsinger, NIPQ 19.1/2, this "[i]nteresting and enlightening" book is "thoroughly researched and well-written." Similarly, Cohen, FA 81.3 (May-Jun. 2002), declares Know Your Enemy "interesting and thoughtful.... The author's discussion of the relationship between intelligence estimates and policymaking is particularly well done." To Morrison, I&NS 17.4, Cradock had "one of the finest analytical minds ever applied in the UK to the problems of intelligence." The chapter in this book on "Intelligence and Policy" is "essential reading for any student or practitioner of intelligence, and especially for those who have unrealistic ideas of what intelligence can achieve."

West, IJI&C 16.1, notes that "Cradock's treatment of the JIC's declassified files is excellent and largely fair," but "he strays when reaching beyond the Cabinet Office to areas where his personal experience is limited.... The tone is mildly critical of politicians, perhaps even slightly anti-American, and emphatically self-congratulatory about the JIC structure."

Craig, Campbell, and Sergey Radchenko. The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War. New Haven, CT: Yale Unoversity Press, 2008.

According to Freedman, FA 88.1 (Jan.-Feb. 2009), the authors "argue that without the bomb, it might have been possible for the United States and the Soviet Union to pursue a cooperative relationship.... Unfortunately, the evidence for this in the book is less than compelling, especially from the Soviet side." Grant, I&NS 26.2&# (Apr.-Jun. 2011), sees this as "an illuminating contribution to the historiography of the unravelling of the wartime alliance..., but more importantly it is convincing in its portrayal of a process which ensured that said unravelling became actual antagonism."

Defty, Andrew. "'Close and Continuous Liaison': British Anti-Communist Propaganda and Cooperation with the United States, 1950-51." Intelligence and National Security 17, no. 4 (Winter 2002): 100-130.

The author asserts that "the extent of cooperation between Britain and America in the field of anti-Communist propaganda was far greater than has previously been appreciated." The British Foreign Office's Information Research Department (IRD) produced "discreet propagenda" targeted on the free world; the CIA's "mighty Wurlitzer" focused on the Soviet Union and the Iron Curtain countries. Thus, "[i]n many respects British and American approaches to anti-Communist propaganda were complementary."

Dobrynin, Anatoly Fedorovich. In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents. New York: Random House, 1995. 1997. [pb]

Kaiser, WPNWE, 25 Sep.-1 Oct. 1995, says that "when he sticks to the subjects he really knows, Dobrynin is a fine analyst and a wonderful raconteur. He has left a record of his life and his times that will enrich Cold War history for as long as anyone cares to read about it." Surveillant 4.4/5 notes that a six-page section (beginning on page 352), entitled "Intelligence Wars," discusses Dobrynin's interaction with the GRU and KGB.

Donovan, Robert J. The Second Victory: The Marshall Plan and the Postwar Revival of Europe. New York: Madison, 1987.

Dulles, Allen W. "The Role of Intelligence in the Cold War." In Peace and War in the Modern Age: Premises, Myths, and Realities, ed. Frank R. Barnett, 205-221. New York: Anchor, 1965.

Dunn, Keith A. "A Conflict of World Views: The Origins of the Cold War." Military Review 57 (Feb. 1977): 14-25.

Feis, Herbert. From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1950. New York: Norton, 1970.

Fischer, Benjamin B. "The Soviet-American War Scare of the 1980s." International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 19, no. 3 (Fall 2006): 480-518.

"The last decade of the Cold War was potentially more perilous than it seemed at the time.... The main reason was a heightened sense of the danger of war. Each side focused on the likelihood of war, and both made extensive military preparations against a possible attack from the other."

Fleming, Denna F. The Cold War and its Origins, 1917-1960. 2 vols. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1961.

Professor Fleming is best known for his "revisionist" interpretation of the development of the Cold War.

Frankel, Benjamin, ed. The Cold War, 1945-91. 3 vols. Detroit, MI: Gale, 1992.

Cold War Connection, "Top Books on the Cold War," http://www.cmu.edu/coldwar/annot.htm, calls this "a highly useful set of reference[] books, which will serve both student and scholar alike." http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usamhi/Bibliographies adds: See especially overview, Vol. 3, pp. 53-100.

Friedman, Norman. The Fifty Year War: Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000.

Wilson, NWCR 56.4, finds that the author presents "a broad look at the conflict between East and West.... Friedman contends that the Cold War was in fact a 'real war' fought in slow motion. It was also a war lost by the Soviet Union for sociopolitical, economic, and ideological reasons.... Friedman presents a new, provocative survey of the Cold War from a joint force perspective while keeping both sides of the Iron Curtain in mind."

Fursenko, Alexander, and Timothy Naftali. Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary. New York: Norton, 2006.

Dobbs, Washington Post, 1 Feb. 2007, notes that this work "is the latest example of a literary collaboration that became possible only with the collapse of the Soviet Union.... But there are pitfalls ... in gaining access to closed archives, and they are clearly on display" in this book. Although the authors "have unearthed many interesting details about the Soviet side of the Cold War," the book is "marred by sloppy research, including mistranslations of Russian documents. The errors are so numerous that it becomes difficult to have much confidence in the authors' uncheckable citations from Soviet archival documents that remain closed to other scholars."

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