The Cold War

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Adams, Jefferson. Strategic Intelligence in the Cold War and Beyond. London and New York: Routledge, 2015.

From publisher: This book "looks at the many events, personalities, and controversies in the field of intelligence and espionage since the end of World War II. A crucial but often neglected topic, strategic intelligence took on added significance during the protracted struggle of the Cold War.... Adams places these important developments in their historical context, taking a global approach." Peake, Studies 59.1 (Mar. 2015), calls this work "a valuable contribution to the intelligence literature."

Aid, Matthew M. "Sins of Omission and Commission: Strategic Cultural Factors and US Intelligence Failures During the Cold War." Intelligence and National Security 26, no. 4 (Aug. 2011): 478-494.

The author believes that he has isolated "a number of underlying 'cultural factors' which historically have inhibited the abilty of American intelligence to properly perform its mission."

Aid, Matthew M., and Cees Wiebes, eds.

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1. "Special Issue on 'Secrets of Signals Intelligence during the Cold War and Beyond.'" Intelligence and National Security 16, no. 1 (Spring 2001): Entire issue.

2. Secrets of Signals Intelligence during the Cold War and Beyond. London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001.

This volume comes out of a conference on "The Importance of Sigint in Western Europe during the Cold War 1945-1999," organized by the Netherlands Intelligence Studies Association (NISA) in Amsterdam in November 1999. ("Preface")

For Jonkers, Intelligencer 13.1, this work is "very useful for understanding the worldwide intelligence world." The editors provide "a series of essays covering the US, British, Canadian, German, French, Danish, Norwegian, Swedish and Dutch SIGINT services and liaison programs." Kruh, Cryptologia 26.2, sees "[t]his excellent book" as providing "an abundance of interesting information." It "should be read leisurely for maximum enjoyment."

Aldrich, Richard J. The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence. London: John Murray, 2001.

From advertisement: "What role did Western secret service play in the Cold War? For British Prime Ministers, secret service helped to sustain post-imperial influence and to protect interests with minimum costs and visibility.... For American Presidents,... secret service allowed the extension of the power of the President over American foreign policy." From This "study reveals that the major British aim in the Cold War was not to contain the Soviet Union, but instead to contain the danger of a hot war provoked by the US Air Force and the CIA."

Deighton, I&NS 17.1, calls this book "a delight to read." The work "is episodic, and only touches on the key moments of [the] period," but the author "combines scholarship with a light touch."

Aldrich, Richard J., Gary Rawnsley, and Ming-Yeh Rawnsley, eds.

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1. "Special Issue on 'The Clandestine Cold War in Asia, 1945-65: Western Intelligence, Propaganda and Special Operations.'" Intelligence and National Security 14, no. 4 (Winter 1999): entire issue.

2. The Clandestine Cold War in Asia, 1945-65: Western Intelligence, Propaganda and Special Operations. Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000.

Kruh, Cryptologia 24.4, comments that "[a]nyone interested in intelligence, propaganda, special operations and security in Asia's Cold War will find this comprehensive account thought-provoking." For Cohen, FA 79.6 (Nov.-Dec. 2000), this is a "dense but fascinating collection of essays.... Not a book for the general reader, but one definitely of interest to students of the subject."

To Knaus, Journal of Cold War Studies 4 (2002), the authors have, for the most part, "done a creditable job of trying to place the covert operations in context by scrutinizing the historical records available to them.... [T]his book can well serve as a valuable guidebook for policy makers when they weigh the potential benefits of using covert intelligence operations and as a manual for those who may be ordered to carry them out."

Andrew, Christopher. "Intelligence and the Cold War: Intelligence and International Relations in the Early Cold War." Review of International Studies 24, no. 3 (1998): 321-330.

Aronsen, Lawrence R., and Martin Kitchen. The Origins of the Cold War in Comparative Perspective: Canadian, American and British Relations with Soviet Union, 1941-1948. London and Toronto: St. Martin's, 1998.

Bacevich, Andrew J., ed. The Long War: A New History of U.S. National Security Policy Since World War II. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.

Halcrow, Proceedings 133.11 (Nov. 2007), calls this work "a remarkable collection of 12 essays ... by the foremost scholars in their field." More negatively, Schifferle, Military Review (May-Jun. 2008), says that The Long War "mainly reprises old ideas and posits conventional partisan disagreements with Bush administration polices in Iraq and in the War on Terror." In addition, the quality of the essays is "extremely uneven"; and this unevenness "keeps this book from being really useful as a source" for anyone interested in these subjects.

Bailey, Roderick. "The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence." Defense and Security Analysis 18, no. 4 (2002): 383-388.

Ball, S.J. The Cold War: An International History, 1947-1991. London: Arnold, 1998.

Shryock, IJI&C 11.4, seems to be amazed by what is lacking in this book: "Ball ... has somehow managed to write a history of the protracted conflict between East and West ... without displaying any particular interest in the myriad activities of the principal combatants' intelligence services.... [I]n an omission that stretches a reviewer's credulity to the limit, he does not even note the existence ... of the Soviet Committee of State Security, the KGB." In another omission, Ball is "oddly disinclined to recognize Eastern Europe as a major theater of war." Even with these lapses, the work represents "a good, brave try" to deal with a difficult subject; it is noteworthy that Ball "reveals no pervasive ideological bias."

Barrass, Gordon S. The Great Cold War: A Journey Through the Hall of Mirrors. Stanford. CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2009.

Goldgeier, I&NS 25.2 (Apr. 2010), notes that Barrass headed the UK Assessments Staff and was a JIC member in the latter years of the Cold War. He "provides a fascinating account of the thinking in the United States, Europe and Russia regarding nuclear strategy and great power competition." This "[w]ell written and accessible" book "is quite impressive in analyzing ... the problems of intelligence." For Goulden, Washington Times, 12 Apr. 2009, and Intelligencer 17.1 (Winter-Spring 2009), this work is "an absolutely brilliant account of how analysts both in and out of our government concluded that the Soviet Union, in many ways, was a Potemkin Village." It is "a major contribution to Cold War history."

Bowie, Robert, and Richard Immerman. Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Aldrich, I&NS 17.1/149/fn.4, says that this work "is interesting on Eisenhower's ambiguous message to his administration on the subject of roll-back."

Bundy, McGeorge. Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years. New York: Random House, 1988. New York: Vintage, 1988. [pb]

Petersen: "Detailed discussion of the missile gap question."

Bungert, Heike, Jan Heitmann, and Michael Wala, eds. Secret Intelligence in the Twentieth Century. Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2003.

Van Nederveen, Air & Space Power Journal, Spring 2004, notes that this work "examines German intelligence structures and policy as well as the attempts of other powers to gather intelligence about German states." Although some of the early essays "cover issues already known to most intelligence researchers,... one also finds real gems dealt with for the first time in print.... What makes this book unique, however, are the post–World War II pieces."

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