See also, "The ALSOS Mission and Heisenberg"
Aarons, Mark, and John Loftus. Unholy Trinity: How the Vatican's Nazi Networks Betrayed Western Intelligence to the Soviets. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991. 1993. [pb] Ratlines: How the Vatican's Nazi Networks Betrayed Western Intelligence to the Soviets. London: Heinemann, 1991. London: Mandarin, 1991. [pb]
According to Surveillant 1.6, the authors claim not just that there was an effort by the Vatican to smuggle Nazis out of Europe but that the effort was infiltrated by the KGB. NameBase says that the authors present "the most comprehensive account yet" of "the role of the Vatican 'Ratlines' in Nazi smuggling, and the involvement of Soviet intelligence in manipulating these events. Pope Pius XII and Giovanni Montini (later Pope Paul VI) were involved in a massive obstruction of justice, sheltered by U.S. intelligence officers who had plans to use ex-Nazis in the war against Communism."
McGinnis, Cryptolog 14.1, notes that the authors present a "largely revisionist view of history." Cain, I&NS 7.4, seems to buy into the authors' thesis that some of these Nazi survivors were "incorporat[ed] into US intelligence." Surveillant 2.2 notes that the "authors, somehow, tie Nixon and Bush in with the rescuing of fascist fugitives and war criminals."
Bar-Zohar, Michel. The Hunt for German Scientists. London: Arthur Barker, 1967.
Beasley, Norman. "The Capture of the German Rocket Secrets." American Legion Magazine, Oct. 1963. [Petersen]
Bower, Tom. The Paperclip Conspiracy: The Battle for the Spoils and Secrets of Nazi Germany. London: Michael Joseph, 1987.
Breitman, Richard, and others.
1. Breitman, Richard, and Norman J.W. Goda. Hitler's Shadow: Nazi War Criminals, U.S. Intelligence, and the Cold War. Washington, DC: National Archives, 2010. [http://www.archives.gov/iwg/reports/hitlers-shadow.pdf]
From "Introduction": This report "serves as an addendum to U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis [see below]; it draws upon additional documents declassified since then." The recent declassifications from the CIA included "documents from pre-existing files as well as entirely new CIA files, totaling more than 1,100 files in all.... A much larger collection came from the Army. In the early postwar years, the Army had the largest U.S. intelligence and counterintelligence organizations in Europe; it also led the search for Nazi war criminals." Even after the CIA was established in 1947, "the Army remained a critical factor in intelligence work in central Europe."
2. Breitman, Richard, Norman J.W. Goda, Timothy Naftali, and Robert Wolfe. U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis. Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Administration, 2004. Rev. ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
According to Peake, Studies 49.2 (2005), this work contains 15 articles written by six historians. The contributors use "an impressive mix of secondary and newly released primary sources," and "expand our knowledge on espionage and the holocaust." They deal "with collaborators, and the use of war criminals like Wilhelm Hottl by the Armys Counterintelligence Corps (CIC)." Their documentation supports the conclusion that "some use of Nazis for intelligence purposes did occur." However, "their contemporary perspective ignores the circumstances of the time," leaving readers "wondering about the historical context and priorities that led the politicians and intelligence officers directly involved to make the choices they did."
Friedman, I&NS 20.2 (Jun. 2005), notes that this "collection is not intended for beginners, nor to provide an overview of the issues. These chapters are designed to advance the knowledge of specialists already familiar with the historiography."
For Pendas, H-German, H-Net Reviews, Jun. 2006 [http://www.h-net.org], this "volume is characterized even more than most multi-authored books by the lack of a central narrative or argument.... [It] is driven more by its source material than by any overarching theoretical or historiographical concerns." It "is a book that most readers will likely want to consult for specific questions, rather than for any general conclusions. The fact that, unlike many multi-authored volumes, this one contains an extensive and thorough index is particularly useful in this regard."
Charles Lane, "Book Details U.S. Protection of Former Nazi Officials," Washington Post, 14 May 2004, A2, reports that this book "A book, U.S. Intelligence and the Nazisis based on 240,000 pages of FBI records, 419 CIA files on individuals and 3,000 pages of U.S. Army information detailing the Army's postwar relationship with former officers of the German Wehrmacht's intelligence service."
Critchfield, James H. Partners at the Creation: The Men Behind Postwar Germany's Defense and Intelligence Establishments. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003.
Fitzpatrick, CIRA Newsletter 28.4, designates Partners at the Creation as "an easily read and important work of history." It is "important because it delineates the thinking and the actions taken by U.S. officials." The author's memoir refutes allegations that the CIA used Nazi war criminals after the war, and "shows both the benefits and drawbacks of working with the Gehlen Group to create a modern new Germany capable of becoming a strong ally of the United States." This "is not a cloak and dagger spy book. Rather, it is filled with the intellectual and diplomatic minutiae which is the real life of intelligence officers."
For Bath, NIPQ 20.1, the author "adds significantly to our knowledge" in the areas of the formation of the postwar German intelligence service and the rebirth of the German army. "These are interesting stories, well told." Goulden, Washington Times, 29 Feb. 2004, and Intelligencer 14.1, notes that "Critchfield carried out another mission perhaps even more important than caring for Gehlen -- the shaping of the intelligence and military structure of a democratic Federal Republic that took its place in NATO." The author "tells a good intelligence story and gives insight into how 'diplomacy' functioned during the Cold War."
Peake, Studies 48.3 (2004), says that this book "is an important contribution from a member of the 'Greatest Generation.'" Critchfield emphasizes "the political, operational, and organizational problems he encountered [in Germany] and in Washington." To Hutchinson, IJI&C 17.4 (Winter 2004-2005), the author "adds significantly to the public knowledge of postwar Germany." He tells his story "without excessive detail" and "provides valuable details about the general development of a democratic Germany, along with more specific insights to the defense and intelligence establishments."
In a Review Essay, Naftali, FA 83.4 (Jul.-Aug. 2004), asserts that the cost of working with Gehlen and similar individuals is too high. In FA 83.6 (Nov.-Dec. 2004), former BND President (1985-1990) Hans-Georg Wieck (pp. 138-139) and Critchfield deputy (see below) Clarence W. Schmitz (pp. 139-140) take issue with that argument; Naftali replies at pp. 140-141.
See Clarence W. Schmitz, "Comments on the Book, Partners at the Creation by James H Critchfield and on Other Related Subjects," CIRA Newsletter 29, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 35-38. Schmitz was on Critchfield's staff at Pullach from 1949 to 1954 and was his deputy for operations from 1952 to 1954. From 1954 to 1957, he was in charge of the Headquarters component that supported the Gehlen operation. And from 1957 to 1964, Schmitz was in Bonn in charge of liaison with the Federal Office for Protection of the Constitution (BfV). He believes that "[a] book dealing with this particular subject could have been written only by Critchfield."
Paehler, H-German, H-Net Reviews, Nov. 2005 [http://www.h-net.org], finds that this work "derives much of its originality from the author's prominent place in the development and inside information and knowledge available to him.... [It] is a worthwhile read for historians and those interested in intelligence history alike." However, "Critchfield's memoirs suffer from a few problems, some of which afflict the genre in general and some of which are rather unique to this particular defense of CIA policies some fifty-five years ago and, to some extent, the defining years of Critchfield's own life. Thus, the account has to be approached with some caution."
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