2. War on Terrorism
3. Independent Commission on 9/11 Attacks
4. Congressional Investigation of Pre-Iraq War Intelligence
5. Independent Commission and WMD Debate
6. Intelligence Reform Act of 2004
Materials presented in chronological order.
Herman, Michael. "Intelligence's Future: Learning From the Past." Journal of Intelligence History 3, no. 2 (Winter 2003). [http://www.intelligence-history.org/jih/previous.html]
From abstract: "The British political crisis in 2004 over the government's 'dossier' on Iraqi WMD ... illustrates the problems of intelligence's new public profile. It also points to the lessons to be learned from its assessment failures on this subject. These point towards establishing a European assessment machinery, a kind of Brussels Joint Intelligence Committee; and also towards encouraging intelligence professionalism everywhere."
Nolte, William. "Keeping Pace with the Revolution in Military Affairs: Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Challenge to Intelligence." Studies in Intelligence 48, no. 1 (2004): 1-10.
Building on the RMA, Operation Iraqi Freedom was an "organizational and operation success, enabled by technology." DoD and the military services "demonstrated an extraordinary ability to function in ways that should lead to a significant rethinking of many stereotypes." Other components of U.S. national security, including intelligence, either "must develop apace with the RMA" or "suffer the risk" that they "will be unable to contribute to -- or even compete with -- defense organizations in the making of national security decisions."
Watts, Larry L. "Intelligence Reform in Europe's Emerging Democracies: Conflicting Paradigms, Dissimilar Contexts." Studies in Intelligence 48, no. 1 (2004): 11-25.
"Despite less than ideal results, many of the central and eastern European states have expended significant time and resources on vetting and lustration, making headway in this difficult area.... In other cases, reliable vetting still awaits the longer-term development of embedded institutions and established procedures."
CNN. "U.N. Inspector: I Also Was Bugged." 27 Feb. 2004. [http://www.cnn.com]
Former U.N. chief weapons inspector Richard Butler said on 27 February 2004 that "while he was in charge of investigating Iraq's weapons programs in the late 1990s, he was forced to meet his contacts in New York's Central Park because the telephones in his office at U.N. headquarters were insecure.... Butler told Australian radio he believed he was being bugged by at least four of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, adding, 'I don't know what the Chinese were doing.'"
Priest, Dana, and Colum Lynch. "Spying Much Denied but Done a Lot at U.N., Experts Say." Washington Post. 27 Feb. 2004, A14. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
According to UN diplomats and U.S. intelligence experts, "the United Nations has been a magnet for spies" from its very beginning. "The tapping of phone lines and the planting of microphones in U.N. offices are common enough that the organization employs a team of debuggers ... to routinely sweep offices and respond to requests from nations that suspect their officials are being monitored."
Milbank, Dana, and Mike Allen. "Bush Weighs Overhaul of Intelligence Services; Aides Say He Will Await 9/11 Panel's Suggestions." Washington Post, 13 Apr. 2004. A3. [http://www. washingtonpost.com]
President Bush said on 12 April 2004 "that he is contemplating a major overhaul of the nation's intelligence services.... Bush ... said that 'now may be a time to revamp and reform our intelligence services.' Aides said he is likely to wait for recommendations, scheduled for this summer, from the independent commission investigating the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001."
Taylor, Stuart, Jr. "Save Some Blame for Courts that Created the 'Wall.'" National Journal, 17 Apr. 2004, 1161-1162.
The "wall" of the article's title is "the thicket of legal rules restricting coordination between intelligence agents and criminal investigators.... The wall was one of many pre-PATRIOT Act surveillance rules adopted during the post-Nixon, post-J. Edgar Hoover era.... These rules were not responsible for all, or even most, of the government failures that left us exposed to 9/11. But they do help explain some of those failures."
Kessler, Ronald. "Another Spy Agency? No Way." USA Today, 21 Apr. 2004, 11a.
Creating a domestic intelligence agency similar to Britain's MI5 "would erect yet another barrier to sharing information. What is needed is not more bureaucracies but more information about evolving plots in the first place.... While minor structural changes could be made, the basic architecture of the FBI and CIA is sound."
Frank, Mitch. "4 Dots American Intelligence Failed to Connect." Time, 26 Apr. 2004, 30-31.
Ramzi Yousef/al-Qaeda conspiracy in Manila to blow up airplanes; meeting in Malaysia between two 9/11 hijackers; Phoenix agent Kenneth Williams' memo to the FBI; Zacarias Moussaoui flight training.
Burger, Timothy J., and Douglas Waller. "Closing in on Tenet: The Senate May Deliver a Harsh Assesment of the CIA Director." Time, 22 May 2004. [http://www.time.com]
"The senate intelligence committee is getting closer to delivering a scathing report on the CIA's prewar intelligence on Iraq.... The panel last week sent Tenet the several-hundred-page report -- minus its conclusions -- for a declassification review."
Associated Press. "Boehlert Takes Helm of [House] Intelligence Panel." 12 Aug. 2004, A10. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
Republican leaders in Congress have asked Rep. Sherwood L. Boehlert (R-NY) "to serve temporarily as chairman of the House intelligence panel," following the resignation of Rep. Porter J. Goss (R-FL), nominated on 10 August 2004 to be Director of Central Intelligence.
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