Office of the Director of National Intelligence. An Overview of the United States Intelligence Community. Washington, DC: 2007. [http://www.odni.gov/who_what/061222_DNIHandbook_Final.pdf]
Office of the Director of National Intelligence. An Overview of the United States Intelligence Community. Washington, DC: 2007. [http://www.odni.gov/who_what/061222_DNIHandbook_Final.pdf]
Although this 31-page "DNI Handbook" carries a 2007 date, it was completed and cleared for release in December 2006. These are one-to-four-page official statements about the 17 components of the U.S. Intelligence Community.
O'Hern, Steven K. The Intelligence Wars: Lessons from Baghdad. Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2009.
Hanley, Proceedings 135.6 (Jun. 2009), finds that this work's "governing idea ... is that our obsessive faith in gadgets and, collaterally, our view of intelligence as principally a technical activity justify a reckless under-appreciation of human intelligence." The book has some flaws, "among them a willingness to assume that current strategic priorities will remain so.... Nevertheless, O'Hern is on target in regard to the specific reforms that will make our intelligence agencies perform their invaluable services with greater skill."
The author's contention that HUMINT is underutilized and underresourced resonates with Bebber, NIPQ 26.2 (Jun. 2010). However, "there are several factors ... that make HUMINT less reliable than [O'Hern] would have us believe." Beyond that, he "has done a great service by providing the perspective of an intelligence officer recently returned from the field." Peake, Studies 54.4 (Dec. 2010), and Intelligencer 18.2 (Winter-Spring 2011), notes that O'Hern makes "a very strong case for an improved HUMINT counterinsurgency program."
Price, A&SPJ 26.3 (Fall 2011), notes the author's background in the Air Force's Office of Special Investigations and his 6 months in 2005 leading the Strategic Counterintelligence Directorate (SCID) of Multi-National Force-Iraq. "When the book discusses HUMINT tradecraft and demonstrates such techniques via personal experiences or anecdotes, it is an engaging, often educational, read." Unfortunately, O'Hern "wastes too many pages either regurgitating 'generational warfare' myths or railing against issues often better addressed in professional journals."
Otis, Pauletta. "The Intelligence Community Gets 'Religion.'" American Intelligence Journal 24 (2006): 57-65.
"Religion and religious factors have not been a priority concern for the intelligence community.... [T]]he penalty for this historic neglect is that the intelligence community (IC) has been unprepared for collection, analysis, research and reporting on religion as related to global and national security.... The intelligence community is now 'getting serious' about the complex relationship between religion and security."
Paseman, Floyd L. "Private Military Companies: Mercenaries By Any Name." Intelligencer 15, no. 2 (Fall/Winter 2006-2007): 23-27.
The title of this article points to the author's main theme: "My contention is that not only should th[e] temptation to use 'private military companies' (PMCs) to 'outsource war' be resisted, but also that the facade" of PMCs "needs to be exposed for what they really are -- mercenaries by any name."
Paulson, Terrance M., ed. Intelligence Issues and Developments. Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 2008.
Peake, Studies 54.4 (Dec. 2010), and Intelligencer 18.2 (Winter-Spring 2011), notes that the eight chapters here are excerpts from congressional research reports. Although the book "may be of value as a 'one-stop' introduction for readers new" to its subjects, the "commentary on developments is thin, more descriptive than analytical, and many topics ... are omitted. For real depth, further reading is essential."
Peters, Ralph. "The Case for Human Intelligence: Our Addiction to Technology Is Our Greatest Weakness." Armed Forces Journal 142 (Jul. 2005): 24-26.
Petersen, J. K. Understanding Surveillance Technologies: Spy Devices, Privacy, History, & Applications. Rev. & exp. ed. Boca Raton: Auerbach, 2007.
According to Peake, Studies 51.4 (2007), this work "is intended as a college-level guide for those working in law enforcement, forensics, military surveillance, covert operations, counterintelligence, and journalism and politics. It is well-illustrated, and, though there are no endnotes, each chapter has many references. A very valuable reference."
Petro, James B. "Intelligence Support to the Life Science Community: Mitigating Threats from Bioterrorism." Studies in Intelligence 48, no. 3 (2004): 57-68.
The author offers an overview of the debate "about the potential openly published research findings have to enable BW or bioterrorism..., and it summarizes the most recent discussions among bioscience researchers. In addition, it offers some options the Intelligence Community (IC) can consider to help the life science community continue its work effectively, while safeguarding national security." (footnote omitted)
Pfiffner, James P., and Mark Phythian, eds. Intelligence and National Security Policymaking on Iraq: British and American Perspectives. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008.
Peake, Studies 54.1 (Mar. 2010), finds that this is an "uncommonly fine selection of 13 articles and supporting documents dealing with the key issues and personalities involved.... The tone of the book is positive, which is not to say that one will agree with every assertion." The book's subtitle is misleading, since it does not mention "the Australian experience that is nicely formulated in a chapter by Professor Rodney Tiffen of the University of Sydney. But overall, this is an excellent book that analyzes, objectively and dispassionately, some of the worst experiences of intelligence professionals and decision makers."
Posner, Richard A. Uncertain Shield: The U.S. Intelligence System in the Throes of Reform. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006.
Clark comment: It is not necessary to agree with every conclusion that Judge Posner reaches in Uncertain Shield to appreciate and respect the intellectual vigor behind his analysis. He sweeps widely across multiple disciplines -- from organizational theory, to economics, to mathematics, to constitutional analysis -- to show how wrong the 9/11 and WMD commissions were in their analyses and conclusions and how wrongheaded the rush to pass the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 really was.
Moskowitz, Studies 50.3 (Sep. 2006), says that the author "brings a fresh and welcome perspective to hoary intelligence issues,... but it is [his] intelligence and common sense that keeps you reading." Posner's "book is full of telling judgments about the process, the people, and the sheer ignorance that brought us the reorganization of the Intelligence Community in 2005."
For Reveron, DIJ 15.1 (2006), much of Posner's criticism of the FBI is flawed and/or out of date. The reviewer argues that Posner's research "better reflects the pre-9/11 or Louis Freeh FBI than today's FBI.... Things have been changing at the FBI, and Posner does not capture these changes in his critique."
Richelson, IJI&C 20.2 (Summer 2007), seems to feel that the author has failed to develop fully too many of the cases he presents to buttress his arguments. However, Posner presents "a challenging look at the problems facing U.S. intelligence ... without a simple reliance on conventional wisdom and preconceived notions about how to deal with those problems."
Another IJI&C reviewer, Chapman, IJI&C 20.2 (Summer 2007), sees Uncertain Shield as "a wild ride." The reviewer sides with Posner in his defense of the CIA on the 9/11 issue, but believes "Posner's defense of the pre-Iraq war intelligence ... flies against the wind." Chapman finds the idea of a possible domestic intelligence agency "a slippery road to travel." And putting such an agency under the Department of Homeland Security, as Posner suggests, would be "one more agency under" a DHS "that's [already] so obese it can't move."
Lowenthal, IAFIE News 1, no. 2 (Winter 2008), calls this "a guide on 'how to' appraise what is happening, make a prognosis on where the process is going, consider various aspects that might be encountered along the way, and offer constructive well poised input." At times, however, the work "suffers from bouts of convolutions -- undoubtedly reflective of the difficulties in analyzing 'how to' do something."
Poteat, S. Eugene. "The Use and Abuse of Intelligence: An Intelligence Provider's Perspective." Diplomacy and Statecraft 11 (2000): 1-16.
Pritchard, Matthew C., and Michael S. Goodman. "Intelligence: The Loss of Innocence." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 22, no. 1 (Spring 2009): 147-164.
"Knowledge and imagination normally nourish each other, but the intelligence discipline has yet to capture this critical interplay. The profession thereby fails to harness a symbiotic tension habitually exploited by great thinkers in all fields."
Quinn, James
L., Jr. "Staffing the Intelligence Community: The Pros and Cons of
an Intelligence Reserve." International Journal of Intelligence
and Counterintelligence 13, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 160-170.
"Before an effective [civilian] IC reserve can be created, numerous issues must be resolved, including centralization, scope, training, and counterintelligence. Most importantly, costs must be resolved before final decisions can be made."
Rathmell, Andrew. "Towards Postmodern Intelligence." Intelligence and National Security 17, no. 3 (Autumn 2002): 87-104.
"While the concept of postmodern Intelligence may not, by itself, adequately characterise all facets of the contemporary Intelligence environment, the term does provide a valuable conceptual framework within which change can be managed and Intelligence sources and methods can be adapted to a new era."
Richelson, Jeffrey T. "The Office That Never Was: The Failed Creation of the National Applications Office." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 24, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 65-118.
"Numerous potential explanations for the failure to establish the National Applications Office are possible. Certainly, the attempt to make requests from law enforcement for data from classified satellites routine ... was a key factor.... [T]he comments from some of the witnesses at the September 2007 hearings, remarks made by members of Congress, and the concerns raised by representatives of privacy and civil liberties groups indicated that fears of current or future satellite capabilities and their ability to invade private areas ... extended beyond individuals who obsess about black helicopters."
Ritter, Scott. Iraq Confidential: The Untold Story of the Intelligence Conspiracy to Undermine the UN and Overthrow Saddam Hussein. New York: Nation Books, 2005.
Peake, Studies 50.2 (2006), comments that "Ritter’s story of the problems experienced by the inspection team is interesting but not new. His depiction of the primacy of his role in the events is surprising and unlikely to be accepted by others familiar with the situation.... Iraq Confidential should be read with caution."
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