McKee, W. J. "The Reports Officer: Issues of Quality." Studies in Intelligence 27, no. 1 (Spring 1983): 11-18. In Inside CIA's Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal, 1955-1992, ed. H. Bradford Westerfield, 108-117. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995.
"Within CIA's Directorate of Operations, the reports officers constitute the substantive corps which follows intelligence developments in Headquarters and in the field and provides collection guidance, targeting advice, and specific requirements for activities of the Directorate designed to collect information. Reports officers evaluate and disseminate information the Directorate acquires, provide substantive support to Directorate components, and serve as principal intermediaries between collectors and consumers. Their central purpose is to maintain standards of value and objectivity in the Directorate's information product." (p. 108) Within this context, the author explores the issues of "quality promotion and quality control." These involve matters of judgment and, therefore, are controversial.
Moran, Lindsay. Blowing My Cover: My Life as a CIA Spy. New York: Putnam, 2005.
According to Albion, Washington Post, 16 Jan. 2005, the author "lifts the lid on her cloak-and-dagger adventures from 1998 to 2003, when she underwent an education in espionage and then put her new skills to work in Macedonia.... Moran provides an unusually candid glimpse into the operational training and culture of America's clandestine services.... But this glimpse is intensely personal and takes place within the familiar story of a young woman's journey toward emotional fulfillment."
Shane, NYT, 15 Mar. 2005, finds that the author's memoir is a "breez[y] read, with lots of detail about her love life.... Martha Sutherland, who spent 18 years with the agency..., was outraged that [the] book recounts clandestine service training in detail." However, Moran "noted that everything in her book was cleared by the agency." Nolan, IJI&C 22.1 (Spring 2009), comments that the author's story "is actually a cautionary tale about following a fantasy.... Moran unintentionally reveals that she does not enjoy beiing a small part of a larger effort.... Her descriptions of the CIA's personnel border on the mean-spirited and self-aggrandizing."
For Hedley, Studies 49.3 (2005), this book "illustrates how a clever ex-employee can capitalize on the CIAs undeniable mystique. One looks in vain for a serious message in her one-dimensional put-down of the Agency's operational training." However, "for a general readership she is a facile writer who comes across as a breezy romantic.... Moran's cheeky style and brisk prose makes for a good read."
1. The Clandestine Service of the Central Intelligence Agency. McLean, VA: Association of Former Intelligence Officers, 1983.
This is a brief, relatively general monograph by a former CIA officer.
2. "The Clandestine Service of the Central Intelligence Agency." American Intelligence Journal 14, no. 1 (Autumn-Winter 1993): 81-85.
Excerpted from AFIO monograph.
New York Times. "Facing Ouster, the Chief of Spies at C.I.A. Announces Retirement." 3 May 1995, A13 (N).
Hugh E. Price, CIA DDO since January 1994, announced his retirement on 2 May 1995.
Pavitt, James. "Change and the CIA." Washington Post, 6 Aug. 2004, A19. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
In this Op-Ed piece, the newly retired DDO argues that "we must avoid a rush to change for the sake of change.... If we rush to implement sweeping change, especially at a time when the threats to America are as great or greater than they have been at any time since Sept. 11, we may do more harm than good.... That we need to do intelligence better is not in question. But we need to act thoughtfully and not harm U.S. national security in some vain effort to perfect the country's intelligence capabilities. Intelligence can never be perfect."
Pavitt also notes that "[t]he post-Cold War 'peace dividend' resulted in a 30 percent decline in funding for the CIA's Directorate of Operations ... and a personnel downsizing of nearly 20 percent."
Pechan, Bruce L. "The Collector's Role in Evaluation." Studies in Intelligence 5, no. 3 (Summer 1961): 37-47. In Inside CIA's Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal, 1955-1992, ed. H. Bradford Westerfield, 99-107. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995.
The field collector is already performing, for his own purposes, a number of evaluative activities, and should be a part of the process of producing an in-depth or definitive Evaluation (with a capital "E") of the significance of the information collected.
Priest, Dana. "CIA Plans to Shift Work to Denver: Domestic Division Would Be Moved." Washington Post, 6 May 2005, A21. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
The CIA has plans to move its National Resources Division, "which is responsible for operations and recruitment in the United States, from the CIA's Langley headquarters to Denver." According to intelligence and law enforcement officials, the move is "designed to promote innovation.... The main function of the domestic division, which has stations in many major U.S. cities, is to conduct voluntary debriefings of U.S. citizens who travel overseas for work or to visit relatives, and to recruit foreign students, diplomats and businesspeople to become CIA assets when they return to their countries."
Priest, Dana. "FBI Pushes to Expand Domain Into CIA's Intelligence Gathering: Common Ground Not Yet Reached on Agency Roles in U.S." Washington Post, 6 Feb. 2005, A10. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III is pushing to rewrite the rules under which the CIA and FBI have operated domestically for decades and to assert what he views as the FBI's proper authority over all domestic intelligence gathering.... [F]or decades, the CIA has been allowed under U.S. law to recruit foreign officials, business executives and students living in or visiting the United States to spy for the agency when they return home. CIA case officers working in the National Resources Division, which has stations in major U.S. cities, routinely debrief, on a voluntary basis, U.S. business executives and others who work overseas."
Reuters. "CIA to Lose Deputy for Operations." Washington Post, 5 Jun. 2004, A4. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
The CIA announced on 4 June 2004 that Deputy Director for Operations James L. Pavitt will soon retire after five years in the position. The statement said that Pavitt decided to retire about a month ago, and his departure is not related to DCI George J. Tenet's resignation, announced on 3 June 2004. Stephen Kappes, deputy operations chief since 2002, will succeed Pavitt when he retires.
Romano, George. "Coexistence and Covert Collection." Studies in Intelligence 2, no. 2 (Spring 1958): 53-58.
"In this world of competitive coexistence our diplomats, our propaganda specialists, and our intelligence officers must suit their methods to the changing opportunities and obstacles of the moment. One of the present opportunities for intelligence collection lies in the increase of contact between Soviet and American citizens."
Roy, H.K. [pseudonym] "Betrayal in the Balkans." Intelligencer 12, no. 1 (Summer 2001): 45-51.
This is the first-person account of a CIA clandestine services officer's serious travails in Sarajevo in mid-1995. He was there "to provide intelligence on the military situation in Bosnia, and on Bosnian Serb military targets and capabilities, in advance of the expected NATO intervention." He was betrayed by the Bosnian government to Iranian intelligence and forced to leave Sarajevo quickly to avoid being kidnapped and/or killed.
Royden, Barry G. "CIA and National HUMINT: Preparing for the 21st Century." Defense Intelligence Journal 6, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 15-22.
This is largely boiler plate, churned out by a career CIA officer on the faculty at the Joint Military Intelligence College. He urges that the Defense HUMINT Service (DHS) "be viewed as complementing rather than competing with" the CIA's Directorate of Operations, a view that probably fits the hopes (or reflects the fears) of senior CIA managers.
Russell, Richard L. "A Weak Pillar for American National Security: The CIA's Dismal Performance against WMD Threats" Intelligence and National Security 20, no. 3 (Sep. 2005): 466-485.
The author argues that "the CIA has habitually failed to accurately gauge WMD programs.... These intelligence failings were due in large measure to poor human intelligence collection and shoddy analysis, areas that cannot be remedied [simply] by the creation of the DNI.... The establishment of the DNI ... unconstructively adds to the already bureaucratically bloated intelligence community." In addition, the creation of new intelligence centers for terrorism and proliferation further "bloats the intelligence community's bureaucracy and does nothing to increase competency in human intelligence collection or analysis."
Rustmann, Frederick W., Jr. "Debunking the CIA Case Officer Myth." Periscope 25, nos. 1 & 2 (2002): 1, 30.
The author debunks those reformers who call for case officers who can operate with native ease and cover in foreign environments: "[M]ost people simply don't understand the intelligence business -- in particular the difference between case officers and agents.... [O]n the one hand we have the case officer, who must fit into the U.S. diplomatic environment at home and abroad and who has total loyalty to the U.S., and on the other hand we have the principal agent, who is a trusted native of a particular foreign country who can be trained and vetted to the extent that he can be given the responsibilty to perform specific compartmented tasks within an operational and cultural environment totally familiar to him."
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