Culture and Components

Directorate of Intelligence

K - O

Significant materials relevant to the Directorate of Intelligence can also be found in the "Analysis" files.

See also the material on Sherman Kent, "widely recognized as the single most influential contributor to the analytic doctrine and tradecraft practiced in CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence." Jack Davis, "Sherman Kent’s Final Thoughts on Analyst-Policymaker Relations," Occasional Papers 2, no. 3 (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Jun. 2003).

Kovar, Richard. "Mr. Current Intelligence: An Interview with Richard Lehman." Studies in Intelligence 9 (Summer 2000): 51-63.

In an interview conducted 28 February 1998, Lehman, former D/OCI and C/NIC, among other positions, "recalls the challenges associated with briefing DCI Allen Dulles, recounts how the PICL [later PDB] was born, summarizes how the Agency got to know Presidents-elect Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan, and gives his candid assessment of the famous A Team/B Team exercise."

Kuhns, Woodrow. "The Beginning of Intelligence Analysis in CIA: The Office of Reports and Estimates: CIA's First Center for Analysis." Studies in Intelligence 51, no. 2 (2007): 27-45. [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol51no2/the-beginning-of-intelligence-analysis-in-cia.html]

ORE grew out of the Central Reports Staff, created in the CIG in 1946, and continued until late 1950. It was replaced by the Office of National Estimates, the Office of Research and Reports, and the Office of Current Intelligence.

Loeb, Vernon. "CIA Goes Deep Into Analysis." Washington Post, 4 May 2000, A23. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

The CIA's new Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis "is designed to give new employees a rigorous, 26-week overview of intelligence analysis, from trade craft to ethics.... Frans Bax, a veteran Far East analyst and former assistant professor at the University of Virginia, has been named the school's first dean." The CIA has also created a new career track, known as the Senior Analytic Service (SAS), in March 2000. The SAS positions "bring additional compensation, more professional freedom and greater opportunity for promotion."

Loeb, Vernon. "A Sleight Lesson in Intelligence: Top CIA Analyst Limns His Trade With a Trick." Washington Post, 23 Dec. 1999, A19. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

This article represents the lightweight remnants from an interview session with DDI (since July 1997) John E. McLaughlin, focusing on his hobby of magic and briefly on the importance of the President's Daily Brief. An earlier piece, apparently from the same interview session, carried on Loeb's Washington Post web page, "IntelligenCIA: Inside Information," 13 Dec. 1999, is more substantive -- and more worthwhile -- in its discussion of DI activities today.

Lumpkin, John J. "CIA's Top Analyst Informs President." Newsday, 3 No. 2002. [http://www. newsday.com]

Report of interview with DDI Jami Miscik on the occasion of the DI's 50th anniversary.

Marrin, Stephen.

1. "CIA's Kent School: Improving Training for New Analysts." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 16, no. 4 (Winter 2003-2004): 609-637.

This is a judicious overview of the CIA's Career Analyst Program (CAP), located within the Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis. The author does not overreach and promise better intelligence analysis as a direct result of this training, but instead carefully notes the cognitive and institutional impediments to such improvements. Nevertheless, he sees the CAP and the Kent School moving in the right direction.

2. "The CIA's Kent School: A Step in the Right Direction." Intelligencer 11, no. 2 (Winter 2000): 55-57.

"The establishment of the Kent School is a substantial step towards creating [Sherman] Kent's vision of intelligence as a profession.... A 'CIA University' ... would go even farther towards providing the DI ... with the knowledge to build effective business practices."

Marrin, Stephen. "Improving CIA Analysis by Overcoming Institutional Obstacles." In Bringing Intelligence About: Practitioners Reflect on Best Practices, ed. Russell G. Swenson, 40-59. Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 2003.

According to the author, this article "looks at how institutional practices can prevent full utilization of lessons learned in training, education, or other knowledge-building endeavors. For case studies [he] use[s] the dissolution of CIA's Office of Leadership Analysis and the changing emphasis on current versus long-term intelligence, and in the end argue[s] that organizational and procedural modifications may be necessary in order to take full advantage of an individual analyst's expertise. Specifically, [he] recommend[s] that CIA re-constitute its Office of Current Intelligence and Office of Research and Reports to take advantage of an individual analyst's cognitive strengths."

Medina, Carmen A. "What to Do When Traditional Models Fail: The Coming Revolution in Intelligence Analysis." Studies in Intelligence 46, no. 3 (2002): 23-28.

"The DI's tradecraft model was developed during the 1960s and 1970s and optimized against the characteristics of that period." Today, intelligence analysts must be prepared to operate in "an era of information abundance, wellconnected policymakers, and non-traditional issues." The focus needs to be "on customer requirements, collaborative work, and less formal products."

Steven R. Ward, "Evolution Beats Revolution in Analysis," Studies in Intelligence 46, no. 3 (2002): 29-36, offers "counterpoint" to Medina's thoughts. Ward suggests that Medina's critique "fails to take into account the wide variety of consumers that the DI serves, ranging from the Executive Branch and the Congress to the military and foreign intelligence partners.... [M]ore proof needs to be shown that the traditional model has failed and that significant change, much less a revolution, in the DI is needed."

Miller, Greg. "CIA to Station More Analysts Overseas as Part of Its Strategy." Washington Post, 30 Apr. 2010, A18. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"The CIA's overseas expansion since Sept. 11, 2001, has mainly been evident on the operations side." But the agency also has been sending more analysts abroad, "in what officials described as a major shift in how the agency trains and deploys its analysts." The number of analysts overseas "is expected to grow under a plan unveiled this week by CIA Director Leon Panetta. In a speech to the agency workforce, Panetta said there would be 'more co-location of analysts and operators at home and abroad' over the next five years, and that the fusion of the two 'has been key to victories in counterterrorism and counterproliferation.'"

Nielsen, Nathan. "The National Intelligence Daily." Studies in Intelligence 20, no. 1 (Spring 1976): 39-51.

On 10 January 1974, the CIA replaced the booklet Central Intelligence Bulletin (CIB) with the newspaper format National Intelligence Daily (NID). The new format was DCI Colby's initiative. OCI's road to production was at times challenging.

Overton, David W. "The DI 10 Years after Reorganization." Studies in Intelligence 36, no. 5 (1992): 45-54.

The author uses October 1981 as the breakpoint between the "old DI" and the "new DI.," that is, a DI "reorganized along regional rather than functional lines.... In hindsight, it is hard to imagine that the challenging situations we were forced to deal with in 1980s...-- or those we face in the 1990s --... could be adequately addressed without a reorganization like the one we underwent."

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