M - Z

Miller, Abraham H., and Nicholas Damask. "Thinking About Intelligence After the Fall of Communism." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 6, no. 3 (Fall 1993): 257-269.

"The inappropriate emphasis on prediction as a standard of scientific judgment is built on a false sense of science.... [T]he original mission of the CIA to provide intelligence about other nations' threats to U.S. national security is as relevant now as it ever was. Diluting that mission by providing fewer resources at the same time that the role of the agency is being expanded is an obvious mistake that will not be rectified by reorganization."

Pincus, Walter. "20 Years of Back Channels Between Intelligence Agencies." Washington Post, 21 Sep. 1999, A3. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"For more than 20 years, the CIA and Russian intelligence agencies have had a back-channel relationship, much like the one U.S. officials are now using to reduce the number of Russian agents in this country."

Pipes, Richard. "What To Do About the CIA." Commentary 99, no. 3 (Mar. 1995): 36-43.

"President Truman created a central intelligence organization to collect and analyze information obtained by the government's separate intelligence services." But the CIA is neither the largest nor the most expensive of the country's intelligence agencies. "Thus, even if the CIA were abolished, a huge and costly intelligence apparatus would remain: Lost would be an organ capable of bringing together the evidence obtained by the different services." Pipes argues that the CIA's shortcomings are not organizational, but rather intellectual and political, in nature.

Among his other conclusions, Pipes argues that "a central intelligence agency is indispensable ... [to] provide the President with disinterested assessments.... A CIA reduced in size and properly staffed, willing to rely more than heretofore on open sources and human informants, and allowed to operate free of political interference, should be in a position to render decision-makers invaluable advice."

Powell, Bill. Treason: How a Russian Spy Led an American Journalist to a U.S. Double Agent. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002.

According to Peake, Studies 47.1 (2003), this book concerns GRU Col. Vyacheslav Baranov arrested by Russian authorities in 1992 as a U.S. agent, sent to a labor camp in 1994, and paroled in 1997. Was it Ames, Hanssen, or a third mole who betrayed him? Chapman, IJI&C 17.2, finds so many strange and nonconnecting things wrong with this account that one wonders why he seems to accept it as truthful.

Powers, Thomas. "The Truth About the CIA." New York Review of Books 40, no. 9 (13 May 1993): 49-55. Chapter 20, "The Bottom Line," in Intelligence Wars: American Secret History from Hitler to Al-Qaeda, 295-320. Rev. & exp. ed. New York: New York Review of Books, 2004.

The author looks at the "secret cold war" through the work of a number of writers: Persico, Casey (1990); Perry, Eclipse (1992); Yousaf, Bear Trap (1992); Bower, Red Web (1989); Lamphere and Shachtman, The FBI-KGB War (1986); Mangold, Cold Warrior (1991); Wise, Molehunt (1992); Blake, No Other Choice (1990); Newton, The Cambridge Spies (1991); Schecter and Deriabin, The Spy Who Saved the World (1993); Kessler, Moscow Station (1989); Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency (1990); Montague, General Walter Bedell Smith (1992); Hersh, The Old Boys (1992); and Richelson, American Espionage and the Soviet Target (1987) and America's Secret Eyes in Space (1990).

Clark comment: Beyond the silly and misleading title, there is little to complain about in this article. Powers has executed a tour de force analysis of the "secret war concealed within the cold war." He incorporates into his narrative references which place within a broader context the contributions by a number of books to understanding "the secret war waged against the intelligence services of the Soviet Union and its allied states." In this war, "the CIA was to the Western effort as the US Army was to the Allied landing in Normandy in 1944, first among equals and the source of men and money."

Powers concludes that the "happy outcome" of the Cold War probably "depended heavily" on the U.S. intelligence effort. But this contribution differed from the World War II effort of obtaining the information necessary to victory. Rather, "what American intelligence contributed to the outcome was ... the confidence that we knew what the Soviets were up to."

Riley, Patrick R. "CIA and Its Discontents." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 11, no. 3 (Fall 1998): 255-269.

The author looks at some of the questioning of the CIA's, especially the DO's, ability to do its job. He concludes: "The CIA is the world's premier intelligence organization.... Contrary to what its latest critics claim, the agency is not on the ropes.... What is needed is clear national direction on foreign intelligence priorities, coupled with a cool, deliberate, and balanced approach to the problem of abuse prevention within the Clandestine Service."

Risen, James. "K.G.B. Told Tall Tales About Dallas, Book Says." New York Times, 12 Sep. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

According to a new book by Christopher Andrew, based on files supplied to British intelligence by defecting KGB archivist Vasili Mitrokhin, the KGB "took several steps designed to link the CIA to the [John F.] Kennedy assassination."

These activities included "forging a letter from Lee Harvey Oswald to a CIA officer, E. Howard Hunt, asking for information 'before any steps are taken by me or anyone else'.... The Oswald letter was supposed to have been written about two weeks before Kennedy was gunned down in Dallas ..., but was actually created by the KGB in the mid-1970s.... The letter was then passed anonymously to three conspiracy buffs and entered circulation in the United States when it was picked up by one writer of self-published assassination books.... [A] congressional panel that re-investigated the Kennedy assassination in the late 1970s later concluded that the letter was probably a forgery."

Risen, James. "Russia Helped U.S. on Nuclear Spying Inside North Korea." New York Times, 20 Jan. 2003. [http://www.nytimes.com]

In the 1990s, "Russian intelligence officers ... placed nuclear monitors provided by the C.I.A. inside the Russian Embassy in ... Pyongyang, to try to detect telltale signs of activity from the North Korean nuclear weapons program. The C.I.A. trained officers from the S.V.R. ... in the operation of the American equipment, and the Russians then shared their findings with the Americans. The joint operation has since ended."

Russell, Richard L. "CIA: A Cold War Relic?" International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 8, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 11-20.

The author concludes that the CIA occupies a "unique niche" and should be looking for new ways to carry out its business. Essentially, Russell presents a small number of mild suggestions as to the direction CIA "reform" should take. This is not a particularly insightful presentation, although it might be of some interest to nonspecialists.

Slatkin, Nora. "Women in CIA." CIRA Newsletter 21, no. 3 (Fall 1996): 3- 7.

Snider, L. Britt. Sharing Secrets with Lawmakers: Congress as a User of Intelligence. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1997.

The trend toward large-scale sharing of intelligence with Congress began in the mid-1970s, accelerated with the establishment of the oversight committees in both Houses, and has grown steadily since 1992.

Strickland, Frank. "The Early Evolution of the Predator Drone." Studies in Intelligence 57, no. 1 (Mar. 2013): 1-6.

"The history of one government project, the GNAT 750, and its rapid evolution into today's Predator UAV demonstrates that fiscal austerity can be an innovator's opportunity."

Sulick, Michael J. "As the USSR Collapsed: A CIA Officer in Lithuania." Studies in Intelligence 50, no. 2 (2006): 1-11.

The author is the former ADDO and Chief/SE/DO. As the Soviet Union began to implode and the communist governments in Eastern Europe began to fall, Milt Bearden, Chief of the CIA's Soviet and East European Division (SE), "moved quickly to forge relationships with these former Soviet Bloc adversaries.... As the bastion of communism was about to fall in Moscow, Bearden was eager to continue engaging old enemies -- and potential new friends -- only this time on what had been Soviet territory.... [I]n the last week of August 1991, just a week after the failure of the coup attempt in Moscow, I embarked on one of the most thrilling and rewarding trips of my CIA career."

Walters, Vernon A. [LTGEN/USA(Ret.)], and Robert M. Gates. "Dedicating the Berlin Wall Monument." Studies in Intelligence 36, no. 5 (1992): 39-43.

Remarks made 18 December 1992 by former DDCI Walters and DCI Gates at a ceremony dedicating the CIA's Berlin Wall Monument.

Ambassador Walters: "It requires a special kind of dedication to work here, and it is particularly appropriate that this piece of the wall be erected on the grounds of this Agency, which for 45 years successfully manned the watch on the battlements of freedom."

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