COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

General

Material Published Prior to 1970

Arango, Carlos Revilla.

1. Insurgent Counterintelligence." Studies in Intelligence 12, no. 1 (Winter 1968): 39-53.

An "insurgent organization's counterintelligence and security program must meet not only the threat posed by established governmental authority but that represented by competitive dissident groups, by the unilateral interests of third-country sponsors, sympathizers, and foes, and by disaffected members of its own organization."

2. "Counterintelligence vs. Insurgency." Studies in Intelligence 12, no. 2 (Spring 1968): 65-81.

"A carefully worked-out counterintelligence program" by an established governmental authority "is most undramatic even when effective. It entails hard work and the amassing of good records. It is drudgery. It produces no miracles. But if unencumbered by a short-sighted policy from its superiors, it can provide respite for mending the social and economic fabric of the state."

Burnham, James. Web of Subversion: Underground Networks in the U.S. Government. New York: John Day, 1954.

Cate, Charles V. "Counterintelligence for National Security." Studies in Intelligence 2, no. 4 (Fall 1958): 87-92.

Keying off Sherman Kent's tripartite scheme for considering intelligence matters, the author discusses counterintelligence as knowledge, activity, and organization.

Dimmer, John P., Jr. "Observations on the Double Agent." Studies in Intelligence 6, no. 1 (Winter 1962): 57-72. In Inside CIA's Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal, 1955-1992, ed. H. Bradford Westerfield, 437-449. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995.

Dimmer closes his article with some "Do's and Don'ts" of running double-agent operations.

Geschwind, C. N. "Wanted: An Integrated Counter-intelligence." Studies in Intelligence 7, no. 3 (Summer 1963): 15-37.

U.S. counterintelligence "forces are so compartmented that they do not register their aggregate inability to deal with the world-wide coordinated enemy attack." The author uses the "German theater" to make his points. He concludes that "[t]he primary cause of our infirmity is governmental inattention to the course, significance, and necessities of the covert war." As a solution, Geschwind proposes "the separation of intelligence and covert war functions and the establishment of a covert war organization."

Matschulat, Austin B. "Coordination and Cooperation in Counterintelligence." Studies in Intelligence 13, no. 2 (Spring 1969): 25-36.

"Basic principles and some new challenges to CI."

Morros, Boris. My Ten Years as a Counterspy. New York: Viking, 1959.

According to Pforzheimer, Studies 6.2 (Spring 1962), Morros was first an agent for Soviet intelligence and then worked for 10 years as a double agent for the FBI.

Pinto, Oreste. Spy-Catcher. London: Werner Laurie, 1952. New York: Harper, 1952.

Constantinides writes that Pinto's reputation as a counterintelligence expert has suffered because of the accusations he leveled against Dutch resistance leader Christiaan Lindemans, known as King Kong. Most of this book, however, "is a short handbook on military counterintelligence, with interrogation and interrogation techniques as the centerpieces." Reviewers at the time called it "superior, factual, and objective."

Seth, Ronald. Unmasked: The Story of Soviet Espionage. New York: Hawthorne, 1965.

Wilcox: Russian spying 1917-1960, including countermeasures against it.

Schisgall, Oscar. "Our Defense Secrets Are for Sale Cheap." Look, 27 Aug. 1963, 78-80.

Petersen: "Sensitive material in the public domain."

Stanton, George. "Defense Against Communist Interrogation Organizations." Studies in Intelligence 13, no. 4 (Fall 1969): 71-101. In Westerfield, H. Bradford, ed. Inside CIA's Private World: DeclassifiedArticles from the Agency's Internal Journal, 1955-1992. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995, pp. 415-436.

This article constitutes a cogent manual on how to resist interrogation by counterintellignce organizations.

Wasemiller, A. C. "The Anatomy of Counterintelligence." Studies in Intelligence 13, no. 1 (Winter 1969): 9-24.

"Describes the basic elements of a potential national counterintelligence (CI) organization: CI goals, structure, fundamentals, functions, domestic and foreign liaison, technical skills, security, reporting and records keeping, and its legal basis."

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