Palmer, Elizabeth A. "Conferees Agree on Bigger Role for FBI in Spy Cases." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 24 Sep. 1994, 2706.
House and Senate conferees completed work on the fiscal 1995 intelligence authorization bill on 22 September 1994. The conference committee "decided to clip the wings of the CIA, effectively placing the FBI in charge of all counterespionage investigations.... In return for the House's agreement to the FBI provision, Senate conferees dropped their objections to a satellite project backed by House members."
Pattakos, Pat. "Operations Security." NMIA Newsletter 10, no. 3 (1995): 7-8.
Current U.S. government security policy stresses risk management approaches: "In brief -- security risk avoidance is out and security risk management is in." The author relates the concept and process of Operations Security (OPSEC) to the security risk management paradigm.
Periscope. Editors. "Joint Security Commission." 19, no. 2 (1994): 3-4.
Excerpts from the Executive Summary of Report of Joint Security Commission, submitted 28 February 1994 to Defense Secretary Perry and DCI Woolsey. The report identifies a need to "balance the risk of loss or damage against the costs of countermeasures...," that is, to use a risk management approach. It recommends the "creation of a uniform cost-accounting methodology and tracking system for security resources expended..., common standards for adjudications [in personnel security] and a joint investigative service to standardize background investigations..., [and] formation of a single organization ... responsible for the creation of security policies and overseeing the coherent implementation of those policies across the Defense and Intelligence Communities."
Pincus, Walter. "U.S. Cracking Down on Chinese Designs on Nuclear Data." Washington Post, 17 Feb. 1999, A7. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
Following the acquisition four years ago of a top-secret Chinese nuclear weapons document from the late 1980s, which showed designs similar to those of the U.S. Trident missile warhead, a major "FBI counterespionage investigation that continues today" was launched. In addition, the Clinton administration a year ago instituted "stepped up counterintelligence at nuclear laboratories" run by the Energy Department.
Pressley, Sue Anne. "10 Arrested on Charges of Spying for Cuba: Military Facilities Targeted, FBI Alleges." Washington Post, 15 Sep. 1998, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
Ten people allegedly operating as a Cuban spy ring "have been arrested and accused of collecting information on U.S. military installations and anti-Castro groups in Florida, federal officials announced [on 15 September 1998]. The arrests, carried out [on 12 September 1998], ended the most extensive espionage effort involving Cuban agents ever uncovered here, U.S. Attorney Thomas E. Scott said."
Clark comment: The number of arrests in this case eventually reached 14. In March 2000, Amarylis Silverio Santos and her husband, Joseph Santos, along with several others of the group, pleaded guilty to "charges of acting as unregistered agents of a foreign government." John Elvin, "Jail Time for Cuban Spies," Insight on the News, 6 Mar. 2000.
Rafalko, Frank J., ed.
1. A Counterintelligence Reader: American Revolution to World War II, Volume One. Washington, DC: NACIC, 1998.
2. A Counterintelligence Reader: World War II, Volume Two. Washington, DC: NACIC, 1998.
3. A Counterintelligence Reader: Post-World War II to Closing the 20th Century, Volume Three. Washington, DC: NACIC, 1998.
Clark comment: These three volumes provide almost 900 pages of information on counterintelligence covering the entire span of U.S. history. Many cases mentioned have not previously been discussed widely.
4. A Counterintelligence Reader: American Revolution into the New Millenium, Volume Four.Washington, DC: NACIC, .
From "Preface": "We have taken material from official government documents, indictments from several espionage cases, and articles written by professors, scholars and counterintelligence officers. We have abridged some selections while trying not to change the sense of the original but we have not altered the original usage of the English language.... At the end of each chapter is a selected bibliography.... The reader is not all-inclusive and people may disagree with our selections, but at least we hope to have provided sufficient material to entice our colleagues to do further research."
All four volumes are available at: http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps54742/counterintelligencereader/ci/docs/ and http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/docs/index.html.
Sessions, William S.
1. "Counterintelligence Challenges in a Changing World." FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, Sep. 1991, 1-4.
Proquest: "Improved diplomatic relations do not necessarily decrease the foreign intelligence threat.... The need for a heightened awareness by all US citizens is examined."
2. "The Evolving Threat. Meeting the Counter-intelligence Challenges of the 1990s: A Strategic Issue Facing Our Nation." American Intelligence Journal 10, no. 2 (1989): 19-23.
Silver, Daniel B. "Intelligence and Counterintelligence." In National Security Law, eds. John Norton Moore, et al, 913-938. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1990.
Smith, Esmond D. [CAPT/USN (Ret)] "Security and the Ames Case: An Assessment." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 11, no. 4 (Oct. 1995): 4-8.
"The Ames case shows us that the CIA, like all large organizations, is subject to bureaucratic inertia, unbelievable inefficiencies, and poor management." The author is not convinced that talk of regrouping and reorganization is meaningful, and points to the Navy's lack of significant change in attitudes following the Walker, Pollard, and Lonetree cases.
Strong, J. Thompson. "Tilting with Machiavelli: Fighting Competitive Espionage in the 1990s." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 7, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 161-174.
"Counter-C.E. is the ultimate bottom line issue."
Tauscher, Ellen O. "Stop the Spies." Washington Post, 1 Jun. 1999, A15.
Representative Tauscher (D-CA) argues that the revelations about PRC spying at U.S. nuclear labs indicates a "systemic failure of our counterintelligence operation. It has lacked centralization and did not adequately address emerging threats in the post-Cold War paradigm. Our intelligence agencies also have failed to embrace new technologies. Just as our national labs lead the world in state-of-the-art technology, so too must our counterintelligence agencies lead the world in surveillance and verification measures."
U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. S. 2726 to Improve U.S. Counterintelligence Measures: Hearings Before the Select Committee on Intelligence. 101st Cong., 2d sess., 23 May and 12 July 1990.
U.S. National Counterintelligence Center (NACIC). "Annual Report to Congress: Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage." NMIA Newsletter 11, no. 2 (1996): 24-29.
Included among the "key judgments" are: "Contributors noted little new in the origin of the threat, collection targets, or methods used in effecting economic collection and industrial espionage.... [I]ndividuals, corporations, or government entities associated with at least 12 countries are assessed to be actively targeting US proprietary economic information and critical technologies.... Foreign collection continues to focus on economic and S&T information and products.."
U.S. National Counterintelligence Center (NACIC). "National Counterintelligence Center -- New Publication." NMIA Newsletter 11, no. 1 (1996): 15-22.
Reprint of inaugural issue of NACIC's Counterintelligence News and Developments (CIND). Includes letter from the Director/NACIC, Michael J. Waguespack, defining the purpose of the publication: "to meet the information needs of US private industry by communicating important, yet unclassified information on the threat posed by foreign countries against US interests."
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