Strategic Warning:

Surprise, Intelligence Failures, and Indications and Warning Intelligence

O - R

Oehler, Gordon. "Warning and Detection." In The New Terror: Facing the Threat of Biological and Chemical Weapons, eds. Sidney Drell, Abraham D. Sofaer, and George D. Wilson. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, 1999.

Parker, Charles F., and Eric K. Stern. "Blindsided? September 11 and the Origins of Strategic Surprise." Political Psychology 23, no. 3 (2002).

Patton, Thomas J. "The Monitoring of War Indicators." Studies in Intelligence 3, no. 1 (Winter 1959): 55-68.

The author outlines "the organization and procedures for advance strategic warning which have evolved in the United States." At present, they are "[f]ar from perfected and [are] still evolving." He then discusses "the four aspects of indications intelligence...: mental attitude, doctrine, the development of techniques, and organization."

Porch, Douglas, and James J. Wirtz. "Surprise and Intelligence Failure." Strategic Insights 1, no. 7 (Sep. 2002). []

"[F]or reasons those who study intelligence failure will find familiar, 9/11 fits very much into the norm of surprise caused by a breakdown of intelligence warning."

Posner, Richard A. Preventing Surprise Attacks: Intelligence Reform in the Wake of 9/11. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005.

Peake, Studies 49.4 (2005), comments that "[b]eyond the thoughtful analysis and practical suggestions," this book "makes a fine text for a course on national intelligence. It covers the basic topics, is thoroughly documented with open sources ... and is short enough to please any student." This is "[a] very valuable addition to the literature." For DKR, AFIO WIN 16-05 (19 Apr. 2005), the author has presented "[a] shrewd and challenging appraisal of what effective reform requires." Posner believes that "by creating a DNI, and so adding one more rung to the ladder of command, less information will reach the top than before."

To Bruns, DIJ 16.1 (2007), Posner's work is "much more thoughtfully and elegantly argued" than the 9/11 Commission report. In addition, the author "convincingly argues that the report's conclusions are not well supported." Winn, Parameters, Summer 2006, calls this "a rewarding read that is worth re-reading." The author "draws into question both the soundness of the [9/11] commission's analysis and the Intelligence Reform Act itself -- the implication being that 'the organization' was to blame for the faulty analysis." Posner's "concern is that a top-heavy, Rube Goldberg-style reorganization may increase rather than reduce the dangers that face us."

Lowenthal, IAFIE News 1, no. 2 (Winter 2008), notes that the author's premise "is simple: the 9/11 Report singled out management flaws as enabling the attack on the U.S. to take place; why then, does the same Report conclude that organizational change is necessary? Posner explores this divide ... by carefully reviewing the various themes believed to have enabled the attacks ... and juxtaposing them" against the Report's recommendations, "primarily the creation of a DNI. He concludes that these organizational changes represent flawed logic."

Ramsey, Diane M., and Mark S. Boerner. "A Study in Indications Methodology." Studies in Intelligence 7, no. 3 (Summer 1963): 75-94.

Discusses "an experiment in quantitative differentiation of indicator patterns." The authors recommend further analysis and a broadening the research elements. Quibble, Studies 7.4 (Fall 1963), points to a logical inconsistency in one of the authors' interpretations of a graphic representation. The authors, Studies 7.4 (Fall 1963), acknowledge the problem, as well as two other inconsistencies.

Rowan, Richard W. Terror in Our Time: The Secret Service of Surprise Attack. New York: Longmans, Green, 1941.

Russell, Richard L. "Intelligence Failures: The Wrong Model for the War on Terror." Policy Review 123 (Feb.-Mar. 2004): 61-72.

Return to Strategic Warning Table of Contents

Return to Analysis Table of Contents