P - Z

Palfy, Arpad. "Bridging the Gap between Collection and Analysis: Intelligence Information Processing and Data Governance." International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 28, no. 2 (Summer 2015): 365-376.

Petersen, Martin."What I Learned in 40 Years of Doing Intelligence Analysis for US Foreign Policymakers." Studies in Intelligence 55, no. 1 (Mar. 2011): 13-20.

This article focuses on "three broad topics: understanding the consumer, the importance of a service mentality," and the six things the author "learned in doing and studying intelligence analysis" during his career in the DI.

Prados, John. "Certainties, Doubts, and Imponderables: Levels of Analysis in the Military Balance." Intelligence and National Security 26, no. 6 (Dec. 2011): 778-790.

This essay examines "one aspect of intelligence performance, the importance of assumptions versus data.... On balance, for all the defects in the system American policy-makers during the Cold War were much better off for possessing a sophisticated intelligence community."

Prunckun, Hank [Henry W., Jr]. Handbook of Scientific Methods of Inquiry for Intelligence Analysis. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2010.

For Peake, Studies 54.4 (Dec. 2010), and Intelligencer 18.2 (Winter-Spring 2011), this "is more of a general primer," but the author "falls short when it comes to illustrating how techniques work."

Richards, Julian. The Art and Science of Intelligence Analysis. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Gendron, IJI&C 25.2 (Summer 2012), sees this as "a useful summary about the intelligence process and current thinking on intelligence analysis." Although the book "makes no original contribution to the literature,... [c]omprehensive footnotes direct readers to ... seminal works and provide a useful resource for those who want to probe further." To Peake, Studies 56.2 (Jun. 2012) and Intelligencer 19.2 (Summer-Fall 2012), this is "is a basic primer for anyone concerned about what it takes to become an intelligence analyst. Well documented and clearly written, it is a worthwhile introduction to the topic."

Shane, Scott. "Agents Enjoy Status, but Intelligence Analysts Gain Attentions." New York Times, 27 Mar. 2015, A17. []

As the CIA and FBI "confront an evolving terrorist threat, cyberattacks and other challenges, both are reorganizing in ways intended to empower analysts. That involves the delicate job of meshing the very different cultures of the streetwise agent and the brainy analyst.... The biggest challenge remains at the F.B.I., a traditional law enforcement organization that has struggled since the 2001 terrorist attacks to remake itself as an intelligence agency." A report by the FBI 9/11 Review Commission "found that the bureau 'still does not sufficiently recognize them as a professionalized work force with distinct requirements for investment in training and education.'...

"At the C.I.A., where analysts have had a central role since its founding, they long worked largely apart from the 'operators,' who work in the field overseas recruiting agents. This month, John O. Brennan, the C.I.A. director, announced that analysts and operators would be combined in 10 new 'mission centers,' following the model of the agency's Counterterrorism Center. That may give the analysts greater day-to-day influence on operations. The latest moves continue the steady enhancement of the role of intelligence analysts."

Simon, James M., Jr. "Intelligence Analysis as Practiced by the CIA." International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 26, no. 4 (Winter 2013-2014): 641-651.

Spielmann, Karl. "Strengthening Intelligence Threat Analysis." International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 25, no. 1 (Spring 2012): 19-43.

"Alternative analysis ... is an area where enhanced techniques could be used to better deal with current threats." See also, Karl Spielmann, "Using Enhanced Analytic Techniques for Threat Analysis: A Case Study Illustration," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 27, no. 1 (Spring 2014): 132-155.

Steiner, Barry H. "When Images and Alarm Collide: The Significance of Information Disparity." International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 28, no. 2 (Summer 2015): 319-346.

The author uses "American policy- and intelligence-making in the period leading up to the 1973 Yom Kippur War and to the 1948 Berlin Blockade ... to illustrate coping, under very difficult circumstances, with the clash between a theory of non-belligerant foreign state intentions and alarm about those same intentions."

Stigall, Steven M. "A Strategy Framework for the Intelligence Analyst." Studies in Intelligence 56, no. 3 (Sep. 2012): 59-64. []

"As intelligence officers, we obviously must be keenly aware of the foreign issues we assess and the context of the intelligence we provide to policymakers. It also behooves us to know the strategic context of policymakers themselves -- the cognitive and national security framework they consciously (or simply instinctively) use to make policy."

Vogel, Kathleen M. "The Need for Greater Multidisciplinary, Sociotechnical Analysis: The Bioweapons Case." Studies in Intelligence 57, no. 3 (Sep. 2013): 1-10.

"With a more multidisciplinary approach..., intelligence analysts can develop more accurate and holistic understandings of how biotechnologies develop, spread, and are used."

Walton, Timothy. Challenges in Intelligence Analysis: Lessons from 1300 BCE to the Present. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Peake, Studies 55.2 (Jun. 2011) and Intelligencer 19.1 (Winter-Spring 2012), finds that this book "illustrates historical cases in which analysis was no doubt performed, [but] the details of that analysis -- how it was done, what one really needs to know -- are omitted." In addition, "careless errors" arising from an absence of sourcing is a "major weakness of the book." For Cimino, AIJ 29.1 (2011), "[w]hether you are an intelligence professional, a business or financial analyst, or simply interested in history, this book will grab and hold your attention case after case."

Wastell, Colin A. "Cognitive Predispositions and Intelligence Analyst Reasoning." International Journal of Intelligennce and CounterIntelligence 23, no. 3 (Fall 2010): 449-460.

"Intelligence failures will continue to happen, but greater awareness and procedures for minimizing natural reasoning biases will reduce their occurrence and severity."

Watts, Clint, and John E. Brennan. "Capturing the Potential of Outlier Ideas in the Intelligence Community." Studies in Intelligence 55, no. 4 (Dec. 2011): 1-10.

"If the IC wants to deliberately and systematically counter groupthink and reduce the potential for surprise, it should consider standard methods, like surveys, to elicit and then identify outlier ideas."

Wolfberg, Adrian. "Communication Patterns between the Briefer and the Policymaker." International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 27, no. 3 (Fall 2014): 509-528.

"Contrary to common belief, acts of transferring knowledge are not context-free, costless, or instantaneous. A complex set of definable communication-related processes is used during the knowledge transfer between the briefer and the policymaker. The most vital of these processes are imbued with important cost/benefit trade-offs with potentially highly signiricant impacts on both briefer and policymaker."

Yarhi-Milo, Keren. Knowing the Adversary: Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions in International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014.

According to Ikenberry, FA 94.2 (Mar.-Apr. 2015), "this masterful study shows that policymakers and intelligence analysts tend to emphasize different kinds of information in making their assessments.... [T]he book enriches the debate over the best way for policymakers and analysts to filter the vast pools of information they gather about rivals."

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