A - K

Bar-Joseph, Uri. "The Professional Ethics of Intelligence Analysis." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 24, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 22-43.

The author argues for "the institutionalization of truth as the ultimate norm in intelligence reports and estimates by making it a central piece of intelligence professional ethics."

Beebe, Sarah Miller, and George S. Beebe. "Understanding the Non-Linear Event: A Framework for Complex Systems Analysis." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 25, no.3 (Fall 2012): 508-528.

The authors suggest that "[e]xamination of the events leading up to and following Ukraine's 'Orange Revolution' provides an illustrative example of the problems that can ensue when analysts use trend projections to forecast outcomes in cases involving complex systems."

Breckinridge, James G. "Designing Effective Teaching and Learning Environments for a New Generation of Analysts." International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 23, no. 2 (Summer 2010): 307-323.

"The IC looks to academic institutions to assist with the preliminary preparations of aspiring analysts. If these institutions are to be effective, evaluation standards and measures of effectiveness, as established by the IC, should be fully integrated into the academic curricula."

Builta, Jeffrey A., and Eric N. Heller. "Reflections on 10 Years of Counterterrorism Analysis." Studies in Intelligence 55, no. 3 (Sep. 2011): 1-12.

Over the past 10 years, the U.S. Counterterrorism (CT) community "has restructured and implemented new processes to optimize the CT effort." However, the authors' experiences suggest that "the group of issues" discussed in this article "will endure as the prime drivers of effectiveness in the CT community."

Dozier, Kimberly. "General-Turned-Spy-Chief Gives Military Greater Role in CIA Analysis of Afghan War." Associated Press, 14 Oct. 2011. []

According to U.S. officials, D/CIA David Petraeus "has ordered his intelligence analysts to give greater weight to the opinions of troops in the fight.... CIA analysts now will consult with battlefield commanders earlier in the process as they help create elements of a National Intelligence Estimate on the course of the war, to more fully include the military's take on the conflict.... Critics of the change say allowing the military more pushback will have a chilling effect on the analysts' ability to give the war a failing grade, a senior intelligence official said."

Fingar, Thomas. Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011.

Clark comment: The author was the first DDNI for Analysis and Chair of the NIC from May 2005 through December 2008. Peake, Studies 56.1 (Mar. 2012) and Intelligencer 19.2 (Summer-Fall 2012), finds that the author "provides an overall view that compares the conditions of Cold War nation-state analysis with those of today's, in which dynamic situations often involve nonstate actors. Fingar ponders 'the constraints, challenges and opportunities' today's analysts are likely to confront in their careers, illustrating his points with anecdotes from his own experience." This "valuable book ... puts the analyst's role in perspective."

George, Roger Zane. "Beyond Analytic Tradecraft." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 23, no.2 (Summer 2010): 296-306.

"[M]ore needs to be done than improving tradecraft to make CIA analysis more relevant, insightful, and respected. The recent attention to analytic rigor is not misplaced, but it is not a silver bullet.... CIA analysis must ... be constantly improving through education, collaboration, and outreach to those who may bring entirely different perspectives to an intelligence issue."

Hatch, Scott J. "Managing the 'Reliability Cycle': An Alternative Approach to Thinking About Intelligence Failure." Studies in Intelligence 57, no. 2 (Jun. 2013): 29-37.

"[B]y seeing the analytical process in a more integrated and holistic way we can develop a better sense of where discrete actions fit into the process and how they may affect other aspects of the process and its outcomes."

Heazle, Michael. "Policy Lessons from Iraq on Managing Uncertainty in Intelligence Assessment: Why the Strategic/Tactical Distinction Matters." Intelligence and National Security 25, no. 3 (Jun. 2010): 290-308.

"[A]lmost every inquiry/commission" into the 9/11 and Iraq policy failures "has focused on the question of why the intelligence was wrong, rather than the question of why the policy makers chose some information/analysis over others as justification for the decisions they made."

Herbert, Matthew. "The Motley of Intelligence Analysis: Getting over the Idea of a Professional Model." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 26, no. 4 (Winter 2013-2014): 652-665.

"[I]ntelligence analysis is not sisceptible to a precise definition." The author "argue[s] for dropping the search for a single, apt model" and for cultivating "cognitive diversity."

Immerman, Richard H. "Transforming Analysis: The Intelligence Community's Best Kept Secret." Intelligence and National Security 26, no. 2 & 3 (Apr.-Jun. 2011): 159-181.

Abstract: "This article argues that analytic practices and processes within the US intelligence community have undergone far more fundamental reform than the public or scholarly communities recognize. It identifies the dimensions of this 'Analytic Transformation' and explains the reasons for optimism about the future."

Jensen, Carl J. "The Intelligence Officer Training Corps: An ROTC-Style Program for the IC." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 24, no. 4 (Winter 2011-2012): 733-746.

The focus here "is limited to establishing a professional analytical entry-level cadre; this is not to imply that a broader approach, encompassing the entire intelligence function, should not be considered." (p. 746/fn. 16)

Johnson, Jeannie L., and Matthew T. Berrett. "Cultural Topography: A New Research Tool for Intelligence Analysis." Studies in Intelligence 55, no. 2 (Jun. 2011): 1-22. []

The authors introduce a process they call "Cultural Mapping." This "process, or methodology, is designed to isolate and assess cultural factors at play on issues of intelligence interest and to distinguish the degree to which those factors influence decisionmaking and outcomes."

Kajdasz, James E. "A Demonstration of the Benefits of Aggregation in an Analytic Task." International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 27, no. 4 (Winter 2014): 752-763.

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