Yo - Yz


Yoder, Edwin M., Jr. Joe Alsop's Cold War: A Study of Journalistic Influence and Intrigue. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995.

Brinkley, WPNWE, 8-14 May 1995, says that "Yoder's engaging and perceptive book describes Alsop in his prime, from roughly the end of World War II to the early 1960s.... [I]t makes clear why Alsop was simultaneously so respected and so reviled -- and why he perhaps deserved to be both.... Yoder is appropriately skeptical of Alsop's many flaws and eccentricities.... But this is an affectionate and admiring portrait nonetheless.... Yoder conveys both his strengths and weaknesses with the clear eyes of a good reporter and the sensitivity of a true friend." Warren, Surveillant 4.4/5, concurs in this judgment, calling Joe Alsop's Cold War "a charming book about the distinctly uncharming Joe Alsop."

[GenPostwar/50s/Gen & 60s/Gen]

Yonhap News Agency. "Incoming Gov't to Rebuild Role of Intelligence Service." 5 Jan. 2008. [http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr]

Officials from the presidential transition team said on 5 January 2008 that "[t]he incoming government plans to transform the country's intelligence service into a world-class spy agency that can aid national decision-making.... Rep. Chin Soo-hee, who heads the transition team's political affairs panel,... said that the stature of the NIS will be upgraded under the new administration, so the NIS can join the ranks of other first-rate intelligence services like the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency."


Yonhap News Agency. "Opposition Party Demands Sacking Intelligence Chief ." 15 Jul. 2007. [http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr]

On 15 July 2007, South Korea's main opposition party "demanded an apology from President Roh Moo-hyun over the accessing of real estate records of a leading presidential contender by the national intelligence agency." The party "also called upon Roh to sack Kim Man-bok, chief of the National Intelligence Service (NIS), claiming the NIS operated a task force to monitor the political activities of Lee Myung-bak, the former Seoul mayor, over the past three years."


Yoo Cheong-mo. "Roh Accepts Disgraced Spy Chief's Resignation." Yonhap News Agency, 11 Feb. 2008. [http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr]

On 11 February 2008, South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun "accepted the resignation of spy agency chief Kim Man-bok, who has been accused of leaking classified inter-Korean documents to the media, presidential spokesperson Cheon Ho-seon said."


York, Bryon. "Deep in Deutch." The American Spectator, Jul.-Aug. 2000, 26-31.

Deutch may yet face criminal charges for his mishandling of classified materials.


York, Herbert F., and G. Allen Greb. "Strategic Reconnaissance." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 33, no. 4 (Apr. 1977): 33-41.


York, Neil L. "Clandestine Aid and the American Revolutionary War Effort: A Re-Examination." Military Affairs 43, no. 1 (1979): 26-30.

The author concludes that clandestine aid, especially from France, was critical to the success of the revolutionary cause.


Yoshikawa, Takeo, and Norman Stanford. "Top Secret Assignment." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 86, no. 12 (Dec. 1960): 27-39.

Tells the story of a Japanese ensign's espionage assignment in Hawaii prior to the Pearl Harbor attack.


Yost, Graham. The CIA. New York: Facts on File, 1989.

Surveillant 1.5 finds this to be a "fascinating account of the use of surveillance technology in the context of the East-West struggle." Although it is "[o]riented toward younger readers," it is still "suitable as an illustrated introduction for non-technically oriented adults."


Yost, Graham. Spy-Tech: The Fascinating Tools of the Espionage Trade -- What, How, and Who Uses Them. New York: Facts on File, 1985.

Wilcox: "Ranges from guns to spy satellites."


Yost, Peter. "Judge Rules CIA Volume on Cuban Invasion Can Remain under Wraps." Associated Press, 11 May 2012. [http://www.ap.org]

U.S. District Judge Gladys Kessler has ruled that the fifth volume of the CIA's three-decade-old history on the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, entitled the 'CIA's Internal Investigations of the Bay of Pigs Operations,' "can remain shrouded in secrecy because it is a draft, not a finished product." The CIA argued that the volume "represented a proposal by a subordinate member of the history staff that was rejected by the chief historian as containing significant deficiencies."



Youngblood, Rufus W. 20 Years in the Secret Service: My Life with Five Presidents. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1973.


Yousaf, Mohammed, and Mark Adkin.

1. The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story. London Leo Cooper, 1992.

Powers, NYRB (13 May 1993) and Intelligence Wars (2004), 295-320, finds that the tension of managing the war in Afghanistan "is well described" in this book.

2. Afghanistan -- The Bear Trap: The Defeat of a Superpower. Havertown, PA: Casemate, 2001.

According to Cohen, FA 81.2 (Mar.-Apr. 2002), this book "is the memoir of the Pakistani brigadier general who masterminded the equipping and training of the Afghan mujahideen in their struggle against the Soviets in the 1980s." He tells a "fascinating and believable tale."


Yu, Maochun. "Chinese Codebreakers, 1927-45." Intelligence and National Security 14, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 201-213.

The author surveys KMT Sigint efforts, including the early work of T.V. Soong's nephew, Y.C. Wen (Wen Yuqing); Tai Li's radio intelligence activities against the Japanese; Yardley's advanced training of Chinese cryptanalysts; the activities of SACO; and efforts toward international cooperation in Sigint with the British and Americans. He concludes that interservice rivalries among the Nationalist forces and "fundamental distrust and suspicion" between the British and the Chinese "obviated the strategic value of China's codebreaking skills to the Allied war effort."


Yu, Maochun.

1. "OSS in China -- New Information About an Old Role." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 7, no. 1 (Spring 1994): 75-96.

"Newly-available Chinese and English documents ... furnish a key to understanding the extraordinary harshness with which OSS was treated by the [Nationalist] Chinese. OSS's embryonic tie with the British cost Donovan dearly in China.... [Yet,] relations between British and American intelligence in wartime China were never without mutual animosity." Also, the ineffectiveness of U.S. intelligence operations in China was affected by "the extraordinary ... competition for turf in the China theater among the American intelligence branches themselves.... The richness of the [OSS operational] files indicates that ... OSS was by no means a failure in the China theater.... The central question of command also plagued U.S.-China cooperation."

2. OSS in China: Prelude to Cold War. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996.

Yager, WIR 16.2, says that the author has told his interesting story well. However, Yu's "interpretations of events and his evaluations of personalities will not be accepted by all readers." In addition, there is an "occasional assertion of generalizations that go beyond the historical evidence." But the author "correctly sees the competing goals of the major actors in wartime China as constraining and complicating possibilities for cooperation.... He does not pay much attention, however, to what various parties actually did in the intelligence field."

Similarly, Leary, JAH 84.2, notes that "missing from the book is a treatment of what OSS accomplished in China," especially against Japan, the primary intelligence target. Nonetheless, Yu provides "an authoritative account of OSS's organizational structure in all its complexity."

Iriye, History 26.1, refers to Yu's "massive research in U.S. and Chinese sources," and to the author's telling of his "fascinating story ... in clear prose." Kruh, Cryptologia 23.1, says that this "well written and thoroughly researched book ... opens a curtain on the intrigue and discord among the multitude of organizations in the theatre."

For Del Bianco, Parameters 28 (Summer 1998), this book is "easily the most comprehensive examination to date of OSS activities in China during World War II." Yu makes a "straightforward presentation of nationalistic rivalries and service parochialism that constantly thwarted OSS operations in the theater.... The most serious concern is the perception of occasional overreliance on official source material, not only to describe OSS activities in China, but as the exclusive criteria to interpret why or how certain events did or did not transpire."


Yuferova, Yadviga, and Maksim Makarychev. "Whom Can We Trust? The Head of Russia's Most Classified Department, Foreign Intelligence Service Director Col. Gen. Sergey Nikolayevich Lebedev, Answers Rossiyskaya Gazeta's Questions." Rossiyskaya Gazeta [in Russian], 20 Dec. 2002, 6-7. [http://www.fas.org/irp/world/russia/svr/rg122002.html]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Sergey Nikolayevich Lebedev has climbed all rungs on the intelligence ladder -- from operations officer [operupolnomochennyy] to head of the Foreign Intelligence Service [SVR].... He was appointed director of the SVR 20 May 2000 by Russian Federation presidential edict."


Yurechko, John. "The Day Stalin Died: American Plans for Exploiting the Soviet Succession Crisis of 1953." Journal of Strategic Studies 3 (May 1980): 44-73.


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