Wolfberg, Adrian. "Communication Patterns between the Briefer and the Policymaker." International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 27, no. 3 (Fall 2014): 509-528.
"Contrary to common belief, acts of transferring knowledge are not context-free, costless, or instantaneous. A complex set of definable communication-related processes is used during the knowledge transfer between the briefer and the policymaker. The most vital of these processes are imbued with important cost/benefit trade-offs with potentially highly signiricant impacts on both briefer and policymaker."
Wolfe, James R. Secret Writing: The Craft of the Cryptographer. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970. [Petersen]
Wolfe, Thomas W. "Obstacle Course for Attachés." Studies in Intelligence 4, no. 3 (Summer 1960): 71-77. In Inside CIA's Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal, 1955-1992, ed. H. Bradford Westerfield, 35-40. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995.
The author discusses his experiences with "obstructive techniques over and above the formal restrictions" as U.S. Air Attaché in the Soviet Union from October 1956 to October 1958.
Wolfert, Ira. American Guerrilla in the Philippines. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1945. New York: Avon Books, 1967. New York: Random House, 1980.
From publisher: "The story of an American officer who stayed behind after Bataan fell.... [H]e quietly organized Filipino resistance. With nothing but nerve, with primitive weapons and home-made equipment, he put together an army. He stuck it out, with all odds against him, until MacArthur returned."
Wolin, Simon, and Robert M. Slusser, eds. The Soviet Secret Police. New York: Praeger, 1957. London: Methuen, 1957. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1964.
Pforzheimer says this is "one of the better books on the Soviet intelligence and security services and a 'core' book essential to further study of the subject."
Wolowicz, George S., "Medical Intelligence: A Case Study of Azerbaijan." Military Intelligence, Jan.-Mar. 1996.
Wolske, J. Alan. "Jack, Judy, Sam, Bobby, Johnny, Frank...: An Investigation into the Alternate History of the CIA-Mafia Collaboration to Assassinate Fidel Castro, 1960-1997." Intelligence and National Security 15, no. 4 (Winter 2000): 104-130.
"If the words of the CIA Inspector General and the Church Committee are to be believed, these assassination efforts were a scatterbrained collection of adventures that were thrown together by a small group of mid-level Agency officials.... I agree that the Inspector General's interpretation of the situation is correct."
1. Dossier Nordpol: Het Englandspiel onder de loep [The Nordpol Case: The Englandspiel under the Microscope]. Amsterdam: Boom, 2003.
Moore, I&NS 19.1, notes that "the German capture and execution of at least 42 agents dropped into the occupied Netherlands by SOE between 1941 and 1943 represents perhaps the greatest British espionage disaster, at least in human terms, of World War II.... The central thesis of this book is that the Engelandspiel was really a deception carried out by the Double Cross or Twenty Committee, designed to convince the Germans that there was a 'Plan for Holland' to organise an underground army in preparation for an invasion."
2. "Remarks Concerning a Research Note on The Dutch Affair," Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 3 (Jun. 2006): 459-466.
The reference in the title of this article is to M.R.D. Foot, "Research Note: The Dutch Affair," Intelligence and National Security 20, no. 2 (Jun. 2005): 341-343. Wolters takes issue with Foot's (and the official) position that SOE's dropping of more than 40 agents into the lap of the German security forces in the Netherlands in 1942-1943 involved incompetence, not perfidy. Wolters argues for "a 'purposeful policy' by some British authority, other than Dutch Section SOE, bearing on the deployment of Dutch agents like 'shock troops'.... Such a policy ... was [aimed at] keeping as many German troops as possible in the West in 1942 to relieve the Russian front."
Wolton, Thierry. Le KGB en France. Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1986.
Womack, Sarah. "Fears over Spy Committee that Never Meets." Telegraph (London), 3 Nov. 2000. [http://www.telegraph.co.uk]
A report from Parliament's Intelligence and Security Committee on 2 November 2000 "warned of the soaring costs of the new GCHQ building"; "called for the greater use of psychological testing of recruits to the intelligence agencies to identify 'adverse character traits'"; "suggest[ed] 'fingerprint technology' to prevent classified information being accessed on stolen Whitehall laptops"; and "rebuked Mr Blair for failing to take a more direct approach to the work of the intelligence agencies. A high-level ministerial committee chaired by the Prime Minister, which sets the intelligence gathering priorities for MI6 and GCHQ, had never met since Labour came to power, the committee said. It had dealt with all its work in correspondence between ministers."
Wong, Edward. "New Iraq Agency to Hunt Rebels." New York Times, 31 Jan. 2004. [http://www.nytimes.com]
Iraqi and American officials said on 30 January 2004 that "[t]he Iraqi authorities, with the help of American intelligence agencies, are creating an intelligence service that will focus on rooting out guerrilla fighters," especially those from outside Iraq. "The service will employ some former agents of Saddam Hussein's security apparatus and will probably receive financing from the American government, the officials said." The CIA "is taking the lead in helping put together the new service, American officials said."
Wonus, M. C. "The Case of the SS-6." Studies in Intelligence 13, no. 1 (Winter 1969): 25-31. [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol13no1/html/v13i1a03p_0001.htm]
"The author argues that the intelligence community badly misunderstood the propellant system of the Soviet space rocket booster, the SS-6, because analysts engaged in mirror imaging, assuming wrongly the applicability of US design criteria."
Return to W Table of Contents
Return to Alphabetical Table of Contents