Will - Wim


Willan, Philip. Puppet Masters: The Political Use of Terrorism in Italy. London: Constable, 1991.

In an excess of obeisance to conspiracy hype, Bull, I&NS 7.4, finds this book to be "an excellent analysis of the state and security services' role in terrorism." Willan's thesis is that "the American and Italian secret services ... colluded with right-wing terrorism and manipulated left-wing terrorism as a means of ... keeping out of power the largest communist party in the west." However, the author "does ... not prove this thesis unequivocally but he offers sufficient evidence for its possible validity."

[OtherCountries/Italy; Terrorism]

Willbanks, James H. A Raid Too Far: Operation Lam Son 719 and Vietnamization in Laos. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2014.

Hanson, Military Review (Jan.-Feb. 2015), sees this as "well-researched and engaging." The book provides "meticulous tactical and operational details and analysis of the corps-level attack by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) on North Vietnamese military installations inside Laos in early 1971." The author "uses Lam Son 719 as a vehicle to expound on the successes and failures of President Richard Nixon's policy of Vietnamization as a whole."


Willbanks, James H. The Tet Offensive: A Concise History. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006.

Hawkins, Military Review (Jul.-Aug. 2007), calls this work a "short, well-written, and helpful reference." The author "ably encapsulates the campaign's most salient features for those unfamiliar with Tet 1968.... Given his position as a military historian on the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College faculty," it is not surprising that Willbanks "betrays a vein of institutional bias that runs throughout the work."


Willens, Howard P. History Will Prove Us Right: Inside the Warren Commission Report on the Assassination of John F. Kennedy. New York: Overlook, 2013.

Chapman, IJI&C 27.3 (Fall 2014), argues that despite the author's contention that the Warren Commission got it right, the "Commission's probe was not a brilliant investigation. In fact, it was hardly an investigation."


Willert, Arthur. The Road to Safety: A Study in Anglo-American Relations. London: Verschoyle, 1952. New York: Praeger, 1953.

Williams, A-J

Williams, K-Z

Williamson, Charles A. "Special Operations Intelligence." American Intelligence Journal 11, no. 3 (1990): 15-17.


Williamson, Christine E. "The Air Force Office of Special Investigations: Postured for the Future." Air & Space Power Journal 19, no. 2 (Summer 2005). [http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil]

Since its beginning in 1948, the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI): "has kept commanders, whether at home or deployed abroad, apprised of threat information that could adversely affect the mission or safety of Air Force personnel. Today, the command has become substantially more integrated into joint ventures as well as law-enforcement and intelligence communities in order to maintain a global perspective and protect Air Force resources in an ever-evolving threat environment."


Willis, Amy. "Top Level British Secrets 'Compromised by Canadian Spy.'" Telegraph (London), 25 Jul. 2012. [http://www.telegraph.co.uk]

"Jeffrey Paul Delisle, a naval intelligence officer, has been charged with selling a vast trove of top secret information between July 2007 and January 2012. Authorities are investigating whether the foreign entities involved may be Russian diplomats, following the recall of four envoys from Ottawa. Moscow has denied any links despite the diplomats having been recalled before their postings had been completed."

[Canada/10s; Russia/10s/12; UK/PostCW/12]

Willis, Henry H., Genevieve Lester, and Gregory F. Treverton. "Information Sharing for Infrastructure Risk Management: Barriers and Solutions." Intelligence and National Security 24, no. 3 (Jun. 2009): 339-365.

From "Abstract": "While infrastructure protection is usually viewed as a public responsibility, infrastructure risk management actually requires a high degree of cooperation between the public and private sectors, particularly in the sharing of information about risks to infrastructure.... While the US government has established many mechanisms for sharing information, barriers remain that inhibit both the private and public partners from obtaining the information needed to protect infrastructure."


Willis, Jeffrey R. The Wehrmacht Propaganda Branch: German Military Propaganda and Censorship during World War II. Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms, 1976. [Wilcox]


Willoughby, Charles A. Shanghai Conspiracy: The Sorge Spy Ring. New York: Dutton, 1952. Sorge: Soviet Master Spy. London: William Kimber, 1952.

Clark comment: This book is based on a report compiled by Willoughby's staff (he was MacArthur's intelligence chief, 1941-1951) in Japan. Constantinides says that Deakin and Storry, The Case of Richard Sorge, is "far superior." Bath, NIPQ 20.1, notes that this work relies "in the main on captured Japanese police records of the investigation, interrogation -- apparently without torture or undue pressure -- and confessions of the conspirators."


Willoughby, Charles A., comp. The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines 1941-1945. New York: Vantage: 1972.

Willoughby served as MacArthur's intelligence chief, 1941-1951.


Willrich, Mason, and Theodore B. Taylor. Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1974.

Written over 30 years ago, this work sounded a clear warning for a number of the concerns that have come more directly to the fore with the end of the Cold War. In fact, Quester, PSQ 90.1, made the point well when he opened his review with the statement that, "This may turn out to have been a landmark book." The authors argue that there is a serious risk of nuclear materials being stolen and weapons assembled and used by criminal or fanatical political groups. I doubt that the "What to do after a theft?" question is any closer to being answered today than it was when Willrich and Taylor wrote this book.


Wills, Clair. That Neutral Island: A Cultural History of Ireland during the Second World War. Cambridge: Belknap, 2007.

White and Riley, Irish Studies in International Affairs 19 (2008), note that the author "is very understanding of the Irish position as an imperfect but effective national strategy. However, she is not devoid of criticism. She admits that neutrality allowed the government to consolidate a considerable amount of power, but even this served to keep dissent under control and helped forge a sense of civic responsibility among citizens."


Wills, Gerry. Bomb Power: The Modern Presidency and the National Security State. New York: Penguin, 2010.

Finel, Proceedings 136.3 (Mar. 2010), concludes that this work's flaws "undermine what could have been a fascinating book." The author "is most effective in dissecting U.S. government secrecy." However, "in his eagerness to tie together a multitude of threads,... Wills develops a monocasual and linear argument that does not do justice to the complexity of the issues he seeks to explore." The "central conceit" of Bomb Power "represents a fundamental interpretive overreach that undermines the project."



Wilton, Terry L. [LTCDR/USN (Ret.)] "My View of Operation Eagleclaw." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 23, no. 4 (Sep. 2007): 26-27.

The author was the intelligence officer for an EA-6B Prowler squadron deployed aboard the USS Nimitz.


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