Weis - Weiz


Weise, Selene H.C. The Good Soldier: The Story of a Southwest Pacific Signal Corps WAC. Shippensburg, PA: White Mane, 1999.

Kruh, Cryptologia 24.2, finds that the author "offers a unique perspective as a member of the Women's Army Corps (WAC) who served overseas with the Signal Corps."

[Women/WWII; WWII/FEPac]

Weisenbloom, Mark. "Teaching Defense Intelligence Organization." Defense Intelligence Journal 1, no. 1 (Spring 1992): 95-104.

[MI/Trng; RefMats/Teaching]

Weiser, Benjamin.

Weisman, Jonathan. "Iraq's Alleged Al-Qaeda Ties Were Disputed Before War: Links Were Cited to Justify U.S. Invasion, Report Says." Washington Post, 9 Sep. 2006, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

A report released by the SSCI on 8 September 2006 "revealed that U.S. intelligence analysts were strongly disputing the alleged links between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda while senior Bush administration officials were publicly asserting those links to justify invading Iraq." Another report "said exiles from the Iraqi National Congress (INC) tried to influence U.S. policy by providing, through defectors, false information on Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons capabilities. After skeptical analysts warned that the group had been penetrated by hostile intelligence services, including Iran's, a 2002 White House directive ordered that U.S. funding for the INC be continued." See also, Mark Mazzetti, "C.I.A. Said to Find No Hussein Link to Terror Chief," New York Times, 9 Sep. 2006.

[CIA/00s/06/Gen; GenPostCW/00s/06/WMD; Terrorism/00s/06]

Weiss, Charles. "Communicating Uncertainty in Intelligence and Other Professions." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 21, no 1 (Spring 2008): 57-85.

"Reluctance to address uncertainty directly and precisely is deeply rooted in the Intelligence Community, as it is in many expert communities.... Whether the intense scrutiny that has followed the debacle over the failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq will force the IC to ... adopt a more explicit approach to explaining the uncertainty that inevitably accompanies its interpretations of data and its predictions[] remains to be seen."


Weiss, Gus W. "Cold War Reminiscences: Super-Computer Games." Intelligencer 13, no. 2 (Winter-Spring 2003): 57-60.

The author served at the White House during the early to mid-1970s, "contending with trade, intelligence, and technology issues, including technology transfer policy for détente."


Weiss, Gus W.

1. "The Farewell Dossier: Duping the Soviets." Studies in Intelligence 35, no. 9 (1996): 121-128.

"Farewell" was Col. Vladimir I. Vetrov, who was assigned to evaluate the work of Directorate T of the KGB's First Chief Directorate. Directorate T and Line X, its operating arm, had the responsibility for intelligence collection against the R&D programs of the Western countries. Farewell began working for French intelligence in 1981, and supplied information, which was passed to the United States, on the personnel, "goals, achievements, and unfilled objectives" of the Soviet collection program. The CIA, FBI, and Defense Department, then, devised a program to introduce "modified products" into the Line X collection channels. The author concludes that Farewell's "contribution led to the collapse of a crucial collection program at just the time the Soviet military needed it, and it resulted in a forceful and effective NATO effort to protect its technology."

2. "The Farewell Dossier: Strategic Deception in the Cold War." Intelligencer 11, no. 2 (Winter 2000): 23-28.

A version of the above article.


Weiss, Gus W. "The Life and Death of Cosmos 954." Intelligencer 13, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 2002): 66-71.

The former Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Space Policy (1975-1980) tells the story of the NSC-directed Operation MORNING LIGHT. The issue that the group formed up in late 1997 to deal with was the decay in the orbit of Cosmos 954 and the presence of a live nuclear reactor on the Soviet satellite. This is a nicely capsulated article on a high-level problem-solving exercise.


Weiss, Murray. The Man Who Warned America: The Life and Death of John O'Neill, the FBI's Embattered Counterterrorism Warrior. New York: HarperCollins, 2003.

Peake, Studies 48.3 (2004), comments that Weiss' approach "does more than tell the story of John O'Neill's career. It also gives a look at the FBI and the way it functions, its traditions, its rigid rules that often result in self-inflicted wounds, and the reasons why it was something less than an efficient counterterrorist organ."


Weiss, Philip. "The Quiet Coup. U.S. v. Morison: A Victory for Secret Government." Harper's 279 (Sep. 1989): 54-65. [Petersen]


Weiss, Stefan. "Wilheim Steiber, August Schluga von Rastenfeld und Otto von Bismarck." Francia 31 (2004): 87-112.

Kahn, I&NS 23.2 (Apr. 2008), identifies this as a "detailed, revelatory article about Schluga," the Austrian baron "whose information contributed to Prussia's victory over France in 1870."


Weiss, Thomas G., ed. Collective Security in a Changing World. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993.

According to Forsberg, MISR/Supplement to ISQ 38, Supp. 1, this book "explores the normative and legal bases for collective security.... The recent burst of 'micronationalism' thus counterpoises the modern right of people to self-determination against the traditional territorial integrity of states." This is a "timely, broad-ranging primer."


Weissman, Stephen R. American Foreign Policy in the Congo 1960–1964. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974.


Weissman, Stephen R. "CIA Covert Action in Zaire and Angola: Patterns and Consequences." Political Science Quarterly 94, no 2 (Summer 1979): 263- 286.

Lowenthal finds this article useful "for showing the wide range" that CIA covert actions can take. The author argues that the type of covert operations seen in Africa were pretty much the same as those being used elsewhere in the world.

[CA/Africa/Angola & Congo]

Weissman, Stephen R. "An Extraordinary Rendition." Intelligence and National Security 25, no 2 (Apr. 2010): 198-222.

The author argues that "the US Government shared direct responsibilty for Lumumba's murder along with the Congo and Belgium."


Weissman, Stephen R. "What Really Happened in Congo: The CIA, the Murder of Lumumba, and the Rise of Mobutu." Foreign Affairs 93, no. 4 (Jul.-Aug. 2014): 14-24.

The author argues that "the CIA engaged in pervasive political meddling and paramilitary action between 1960 and 1968 to ensure that the country retained a pro-Western government and to help its pathetic military on the battlefield." His effort to tie CIA station chief Larry Devlin more directly to the murder of Patrice Lumumba is based on flimsy wording such as "Devlin may have..." and "if Washington had been..., it might well have...." Weissman's speculation on what Lumumba might have done seems empty.

See "Who Lost Congo? The Consequences of Covert Action," Foreign Affairs 94, no. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 2015): 169-173, in which Herman J. Cohen, "From Colony to Chaos," 169-170; Charles G. Cogan, "In Defence of Devlin," 170-171; and Stephen R. Weissman, "Weissman Replies," 171-173, debate Weissman's article.


Weitz, Margaret Collins. Sisters in the Resistance: The Women's War to Free France. New YorK: John Wiley, 1995.

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