Ward, Edward R. "Using Deception Techniques." Infantry 83 (Sep.-Oct. 1993): 35- 36. [Seymour] Ward, Edward R. "Using Deception Techniques." Infantry 83 (Sep.-Oct. 1993): 35- 36. [Seymour]
[MI/Deception]
Ward, James R. "The Activities of Detachment 101 of the OSS." Special Warfare,
Oct. 1993, 14-21.
[WWII/OSS/CBIOps]
Ward, Lorraine, and Kathrine Erwin with Yoshinobu Oshiro. Reflections of Honor: The Untold Story of a Nisei Spy. Mãnoa: University of Hawaii at Mãnoa, 2014.
Peake, Studies 58.2 (Jun.2014), notes that this is the story of Arthur Komori, who served as an NCO in the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) and its predecessor organization before, during, and after World War II. It "is a powerful tale of loyalty and professionalism under precedent-setting conditions."
[WWII/FEPac/Nisei]
Ward, Michael. Greek Assignments: SOE 1943-1948 UNSCOB. Athens: Lycabettus Press, 1992.
[UK/WWII/Med & Services/SOE]
Ward, Robert E. "The Inside Story of the Pearl Harbor Plan." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 77 (Dec. 1951): 1271-1283.
Japanese planning and preparation for the Pearl Harbor attack.
[WWII/PearlHarbor]
Ward, Steven R. "Evolution Beats Revolution in Analysis," Studies in Intelligence 46, no. 3 (2002): 29-36.
The author offers "counterpoint" to Carmen A. Medina, "What to Do When Traditional Models Fail: The Coming Revolution in Intelligence Analysis," Studies in Intelligence 46, no. 3 (2002): 23-28. Medina argues: "The DI's tradecraft model was developed during the 1960s and 1970s and optimized against the characteristics of that period." Today, intelligence analysts must be prepared to operate in "an era of information abundance, wellconnected policymakers, and non-traditional issues." The focus needs to be "on customer requirements, collaborative work, and less formal products."
Ward, on the other hand, suggests that Medina's critique "fails to take into account the wide variety of consumers that the DI serves, ranging from the Executive Branch and the Congress to the military and foreign intelligence partners.... [M]ore proof needs to be shown that the traditional model has failed and that significant change, much less a revolution, in the DI is needed."
[Analysis/Critiques; CIA/C&C/DI]
Wark, David L. "The Definition of Some Estimative Expressions." Studies in Intelligence 8, no. 4 (Fall 1964): 67-80.
"Survey shows general agreement on the meaning of 'probable' and some equivalents, elsewhere much disagreement."
[Analysis/Est]
Warman, Roberta M. "The Erosion of Foreign Office Influence in the Making of Foreign Policy, 1916-1918." Historical Journal 15, no. 1 (Mar. 1972): 133-159.
Calder notes that the article "[i]ncludes discussion of the role of the Military Intelligence Division and the Political Intelligence Bureau."
[WWI/UK]
Warner, Dennis, and Peggy Warner. "HMAS Canberra -- the U.S. Cover-up." Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, Aug-Sep. 1992, 8-10.
According to Sexton, the authors maintain that "U.S. naval commanders misinterpreted Signal Intelligence that could have saved HMAS Canberra and three American cruisers lost in the Battle of Savo Island."
[WWII/FE/Pac/Battles]
Warner, John S. "CIA Turns to the Federal Courts to Help Protect Its Secrets." In In the Name of Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Walter Pforzheimer, eds. Hayden B. Peake and Samuel Halpern, 513-536. Washington, DC: NIBC Press, 1994.
The former CIA General Counsel, who retired in 1976, discusses the Marchetti and Snepp cases.
[Overviews/Legal/Gen][c]
Warner, John S. "National Security and the First Amendment." In The First Amendment and National Security, ed. Paul Stephen. Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1984.
Halperin v. Central Intelligence Agency, 629 F.2d 144 (DC Cir. 1980): Halperin sought in an FOIA request disclosure of legal bills paid to private attorneys by the CIA. The Agency claimed exemption under section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act which makes the DCI responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods. Halperin argued that this violated the "statement and account clause" of the U.S. Constitution (Article I, Section 9, Clause 7). Judge Wilkey concluded for the Court that "the Statement and Account Clause does not create a judicially enforceable standard for the required disclosure of expenditures for intelligence activities." In addition, this "is a non-justiciable political question. Courts therefore have no jurisdiction to decide whether, when, and in what detail intelligence expenditures must be disclosed."
[Overviews/Legal/Topics]
Warner, John S. "The Watchdog Committee Question." Studies in Intelligence 10, no. 3 (Summer 1966): 31-41.
Writing in the mid-1960s, the author correctly concluded that the possibility of a congessional joint committee on intelligence was problematical at best. "The Administration's position will undoubtedly continue to be in opposition.... Further, the leadership in the Congress will continue to oppose the idea. With this opposition and without the support of a significant number of ... members [of Congress], it is difficult to see a joint comiittee proposal getting serious consideration in the foreseeable future."
[Oversight/To90s]
Warner, John S. "Where Secrecy Is Essential." In Extracts from Studies in Intelligence to Commemorate the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 45-64 . Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, Sep. 1987.
This is "essential" reading on the subject of legality of secrecy in government.
[Overviews/Legal/Gen]
Warner, Philip. The Special Air Service. London: HarperCollins, 1985. London: Time Warner Books, 1987.
[UK/WWII/Services/SAS]
Warner, Philip. The Special Boat Squadron. London : Sphere, 1983.
[UK/WWII/Services/SBS]
Warner, Philip.
1. Secret Forces of World War II. Chicago: Scarborough House, 1991. Secret Forces of World War II. Illustrated. Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Books, 2004.
Surveillant 1.5 calls this a "breezy history of many of the secret military actions of the Second World War that should not be missed. This is more hors d'oeuvres, not a main course." A Publisher's Weekly (via Amazon.com) reviewer sees this as a "cursory review" that "is disappointingly short on details, personalities and drama."
2. World War II: The Untold Story. London: The Bodley Head, 1988.
According to Surveillant 1.1, the military historian author "tells of intelligence triumphs and failures, and with crypto stories skillfully woven into the narrative to make this a realistic and accurate short account of total war."
[WWII/Gen]
Warner, Roger.
1. Back Fire: The CIA's Secret War in Laos and Its Link to the War in Vietnam. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995.
According to Uhl, WPNWE, 16-22 Oct. 1995, Back Fire is "a useful, if somewhat anecdotal, contribution to the literature on the U.S. 'secret war' in Laos, which is rooted substantially in the recollections of former CIA operatives who were there.... Warner's extensive profiles of many of the agency's old hands in Laos reveal them to have been idealists ... [who] imagined they could beat the Communists at their own game by winning hearts and minds."
Surveillant 4.3 recommends Back Fire, noting that "Warner shows how the secret war in Laos was connected to Vietnam, and how Vietnam was central to the shifting alliances of Cold War geopolitical rivals." McGehee (from alt.politics.org.cia), comments that Back Fire shows "the inside of this major covert operation, describe[s] the varied CIA personnel involved and to some extent detail[s] the consequences of the secret operations of the CIA."
To Finney, WIR 14.6, this book "is easy to read and well cushioned with personality sketches, photographs, and some useful maps.... As an engagingly superficial account of the Laos war, Back Fire has its good points. For a serious account of the entire war, the reader would do better with Kenneth Conboy's Shadow War."
2. Shooting at the Moon: The Story of America's Clandestine War in Laos. South Royalton, VT: Steerforth Press, 1996. [pb]
Tovar, CIRA Newsletter 22.2, notes that this is a "slightly modified version" of Back Fire. Warner's book is "highly readable," but "reiterates old charges made by other writers." In particular, the "depiction of [Ted] Shackley follows the David Corn stereotype, but is less vicious.... There seems to be an underlying assumption ... that Ted Shackley was a power unto himself in Laos. That is not so.... There is no way the chief of station could have controlled the course of events without the ambassador's full concurrence and without Washington's endorsement." The author's "coverage of the ground war in 1970-1972 is weak.... On the war in south Laos, his coverage is sound but skimpy." A similar review by Tovar appears in IJI&C 10.3.
For Prados, Journal of Conflict Studies 18.1 (Spring 1998), this work "is a skillfully woven and nicely executed history of an important part of America's war in Southeast Asia. Its principal weaknesses are two. First, the Hmong secret army is treated as almost the totality of the Laotian struggle.... Second, the Hmong operation itself is presented in a unidimensional way, as if the paramilitary project were simply a matter of CIA mobilization and requisite money and weapons."
[CIA/Laos]
Warner, William T. "Economic Espionage: A Bad Idea." Periscope 18, no. 5 (1993):
1-2. Reprinted from The National Law Journal, 12 Apr. 1993, 13, 14.
[GenPostwar/Econ/Govt][c]
Warner, William T. "International Technology Transfer and Economic Espionage." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 7, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 143-160.
Focus is primarily on Russian targeting of U.S. technology, secondarily on the French effort.
[Russia/From89][c]
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