VOA News. "Pakistan Extends Term of Spy Chief." 12 Mar. 2011. [http://www.voanews.com]
VOA News. "Pakistan Extends Term of Spy Chief." 12 Mar. 2011. [http://www.voanews.com]
Pakistani Defense Minister Ahmad Mukhtar told reporters on 12 March 2011 that "the government will extend the term of Lieutenant General Ahmad Shuja Pasha at the Inter Services Intelligence agency" (ISI). See Masood Salman, "Spy Chief's Tenure Is Extended in Pakistan," New York Times, 2 Apr. 2011.
[OtherCountries/Pakistan]
Voelz, Glenn J. "Contractors and Intelligence: The Private Sector in the Intelligence Community." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 22, no. 4 (Winter 2009): 586-613.
"[T]he time has arrived for the government to move beyond viewing its commercial augmentation as an ad hoc resource without having clear strategies and policy for its use. The IC must instead adopt a doctrinal approach with improved management protocols and procedural safeguards in order to better integrate commercial augmentation into total workforce planning."
[GenPostCW/00s/Gen]
Vogel, Steve. "Charting a Military Course: After Cartographic Consolidation, Mapping Agency Is Aiding Forces in the Balkans." Washington Post, 9 May 1999, A21. [http://www. washingtonpost.com]
NIMA sits in a "secluded defense compound near MacArthur Boulevard and the Potomac River.... About 3,000 employees work in the Bethesda compound.... NIMA [also] has 1,000 employees in several other facilities throughout the Washington area, including the District, Reston, Fort Belvoir and Chantilly. Some of the agency's most sensitive work is done inside Building 213 [home of the former NPIC] at the Washington Navy Yard, where analysts study imagery collected by satellites.... NIMA, commanded by a three-star Army general, is a hybrid, both an intelligence agency and a combat support agency for the Pentagon."
[MI/NIMA/90s]
Vogel, Steve, and John Mintz. "Translator Accused of Spying: U.S. Airman Worked With Guantanamo Detainees." Washington Post, 24 Sep. 2003, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
According to officials on 23 September 2003, Senior Airman Ahmad I. Halabi, "[a] U.S. Air Force translator who worked with al Qaeda and Taliban detainees at the Guantanamo Bay prison[,] has been charged with spying for Syria." Military authorities allege that Halabi "attempted to deliver sensitive information to Syria, including more than 180 notes from prisoners, a map of the installation, the movement of military aircraft to and from the base, intelligence documents and the names and cellblock numbers of captives at the prison in Cuba." See also, Rowan Scarborough and Steve Miller, "Airman Accused of Terror Spying," Washington Times, 24 Sep. 2003 and Eric Schmitt, "Airman Is Charged as Spy for Syria at Guantanamo Camp," New York Times, 24 Sep. 2003.
[SpyCases/U.S./Gitmo]
Vogel, Steve, and Walter Pincus. "Weather Obstructing Survey of Missile Strike Site." Washington Post, 8 Feb. 2002, A17. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
Gen. Tommy R. Franks, head of the U.S. Central Command, said on 7 February 2002 that "[b]ad weather is preventing U.S. military forces from surveying the site of a CIA-launched missile strike in eastern Afghanistan to verify whether a senior al Qaeda leader and other members of the terrorist network were killed." The attack on 4 February 2002 near Zhawar Kili "was launched by an armed Predator surveillance drone operated by the CIA. The Predator had ... followed for two days a convoy of suburban utility vehicles.... [T]he vehicles were parked at a previously known al Qaeda camp and the officers noticed a group, protected by security personnel.... With no U.S. fighter aircraft in the vicinity, the CIA officers fired a Hellfire missile at the group."
[Terrorism/02/War]
Vogel, Thomas T., Jr., and Matt Moffett. "Hostage Crisis Tarnishes Peru Spymaster." Wall Street Journal, 28 Jan. 1997, A12.
ProQuest: Peru's victory over the Shining Path guerrillas "has been compromised" by the hostage situation at Japan's Embassy in Lima. "Many Peruvians are blaming [Vladimiro] Montesinos and an intelligence apparatus that became increasingly distracted from its duties by infighting and alleged dirty tricks."
[LA/Peru]
Volck, Adalbert J. The Work of Adalbert
Johann Volck. Baltimore, MD: George McCullough Anderson, 1970. [Petersen]
[CivWar/Conf/Related]
Volckmann, Russell W. We Remained: Three Years Behind the Enemy Lines in the Philippines. New York: Norton, 1954.
"When Bataan fell in 1942 [Col. Russell W. Volckmann] took to the hills and organized one of the best guerrilla teams in the Philippines. By the time the U.S. forces came back, Volckmann and his band had already cleared the Japs from a large portion of northwestern Luzon's mountains. Throughout the Luzon campaign Volckmann and his Ilocanos ... worked on their own within the planning orbit of Lieut. General Walter Krueger's Sixth Army. With air support they ... kept the Japanese nervously watching on every side." Time, "Volckmann's Guerrillas," 2 Jul. 1945. See also, Guardia, American Guerrilla (2010).
[WWII/FEPac/Philippines]
Volmer,
Louis. "East Europe's Espionage and Terrorism Maze." International
Freedom Review 4, no. 1 (1990): 5-28. [Petersen]
[Terrorism]
Volodarsky, Boris. The KGB's Poison Factory: From Lenin to Litvinenko. Minneapolis, MN: Zenith, 2010.
According to Peake, Studies 54.2 (Jun. 2010) and Intelligencer 18.1 (Fall-Winter 2010), the author provides "some background on the origins of the laboratory that produced the KGB's assassination weapons and poison." However, "the primary thrust of the book is on the case of former KGB/FSB officer Alexander Litvinenko, who was poisoned in London with a dose of polonium" in 2006. The book "has major flaws," including some poor editing, a disjointed chapter arrangement, and gratuitous personal digressions. The reviewer suggests that "[a] well-sourced second edition would remove what is now just a veneer of legitimacy."
[UK/PostCW/Gen; Russia/10s/Books]
Volpe, Kevin [LTCDR/USN] "Staying on Station." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 135, no. 2 (Feb. 2009): 42-47.
"The limited, remote, and protracted nature of IW [irregular warfare] requires continuous and persistent reconnaissance, mobility, and fire support for dispersed ground forces, a capability that aircraft carriers cannot currently provide."
[MI/Navy/SpecOps; MI/SpecOps/Counterinsurgency]
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