1. "Diplomacy, Military Intelligence, and Espionage." In Defense and Diplomacy, 61-77. New York: King's Crown Press, 1956. [Petersen]
2. The Military Attaché. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967.
Pforzheimer: "An excellent treatment ... [which] discusses both the history of the service attaché and his functions, past and present."
Vaillancourt, John P. "Edward Bancroft (@ Edwd. Edwards), Estimable Spy." Studies in Intelligence 5, no. 1 (Winter 1961): A53-A67.
Edward Bancroft, a British agent, worked as private secretary to Benjamin Franklin and Silas Dean, American commissioners in Paris.
Vaïsse, Maurice, ed. Il n'est point de secrets que le temps révèle. [There are no secrets at all that time does not reveal] Panazol: LaVauzelle, 1998.
Kahn, I&NS 23.2 (Apr. 2008), remarks on the breadth of this collection, reaching from the Normans to modern times.
Valcourt, Richard R. "Controlling U.S. Hired Hands." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 2, no. 2 (1988): 163-178.
Ends don't justify the means if the means include using drug dealers, gangsters, and the like.
Valcourt, Richard R. "Misplaced Loyalties: The Pollards and 'Friends.'"International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 3, no. 3 (1990): 425-431.
Review essay of Blitzer's Territory of Lies.
Valentine, Douglas. The Phoenix Program: A Shattering Account of the Most Ambitious and Closely-Guarded Operation of the Vietnam War. New York: Morrow, 1990. New York: Avon Books, 1992. [pb]
Surveillant 1.2 says that "Valentine seeks to 'lay bare the bloody conclusion of this misbegotten program.'" To Brown, FILS 12.3, The Phoenix Program is a "compendium of disinformation, selective testimony, and outright fabrication in which facts are routinely bent to conform to the author's theories.... [T]he shoddy scholarship, dubious sources, and outright distortions that characterize this book raise serious questions about the author's intent."
For Wirtz, I&NS 7.2, the work reflects "the standard critique of American policy towards Southeast Asia offered by 'anti-war' activists." The reviewer finds it "difficult to believe that anyone ... would still cite Moscow's Nove Vremya ... as a credible source regarding the abuses perpetrated by Phoenix." NameBase takes another tack, noting that "Valentine spent four years researching this name-intensive book, and managed to interview over 100 Phoenix participants. If post-Vietnam America had ever looked into a mirror, this book might have become a bestseller. Instead it was published just as the Gulf War allowed us to resume business as usual, and went virtually unnoticed."
Valentine, Ian. Station 43: Audley End House and SOE's Polish Section. Stroud, UK: Sutton, 2006. [pb]
Harrison, I&NS 21.6 (Dec. 2006), finds that this work "offers an interesting and informative account of an important SOE station." The training was harsh and the missions dangerous. "Out of the 316 Audley End trainees who were parachuted into Poland, 108 lost their lives."
Valentine, James A. [LCDR/USCG] "Transparency: The Seventh Principle of MOOTW." Defense Intelligence Journal 16, no. 2 (2007): 75-86.
Secrecy is getting harder to maintain. In Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), "[t]he most effective way to deal with environmental transparency is not through tighter information and perception control, but through a superior model of open information and perception management," that is, through a new principle of intentional transparency.
Valeriano, Napoleon D., and Charles T.R. Bohannan. Counter-Guerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2006.
Valero, Larry A. "An Impressive Record: The American Joint Intelligence Committee and Estimates of the Soviet Union, 1945-1947." Studies in Intelligence 9 (Summer 2000): 65-80.
This is an excellent introduction to one of the least known of U.S. intelligence organizations during and immediately after World War II. Although the focus of the article is on JIC's early estimates regarding the USSR for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, broader coverage of JIC formation and operation provide a useful and interesting background.
[Analysis/Estimates; GenPostwar/Gen; GenPostwar/40s/Gen][c]
Valero, Larry. "The Role of American Intelligence in the Global Economy." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 8, no. 3 (Fall 1995): 359-362.
This article is linked with Galvan, "The Role of American Intelligence in the Global Economy," IJI&C 8.3/353-357. Galvan argues the "Pro" side and Valero the "Con" side with regard to the use of U.S. intelligence for business and industrial spying.
Valero, Larry. "'We Need Our New OSS, Our New General Donovan...': The Public Discourse over American Intelligence, 1944-53." Intelligence and National Security 18, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 91-118.
"The great amount of publicity surrounding American intelligence during the early postwar period clearly illustrates the challenges associated with the practice of intelligence in a democratic society.... Ironically, it was this same public awareness, first initiated by William Donovan, which was such a strong galvinizing force behind the successful effort to establish a postwar intelligence system in the first place."
[Vallandigham, Clement L.] The Record of Hon. C.L. Vallandigham on Abolition, the Union, and the Civil War. Columbus, OH: Walter, 1863.
This is a collection of the speeches and writings of the best known of Ohio's Copperheads; they do not address intelligence issues.
Vallandigham, Edward N. "Clement L. Vallandigham -- Copperhead." Putnam's Monthly 2 (1907): 590-599.
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