J - Q

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. A Life in Intelligence: The Richard Helms Collection, at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/historical-collection-publications/richard-helms-collection/index.html.

"This collection of material by and about Richard Helms as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and Ambassador to Iran" is comprised of "documents, historical works, essays, interviews, photographs, and video." It offers "an unprecedented wide-ranging look at the man and his career" ... [f]rom mid-1966, when he became DCI, to late 1976, when he left Iran."


U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Office of Scientific Intelligence: The Original Wizards of Langley, at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/historical-collection-publications/the-original-wizards-of-langley/index.html.

OSI "was created in 1949 ... by expanding the Scientific Intelligence Branch of the Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE) and combining it with the Nuclear Energy Group of the Office of Special Operations (OSO)." In 1980, "it was merged with the Office of Weapons Intelligence (OWI) ... to form the Office of Scientific and Weapons Research."


U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Center for the Study of Intelligence. Ed. Nicholas Dujmovic. "Oral History: Reflections of DCI[s] Colby and Helms on the CIA’s 'Time of Troubles.'" Studies in Intelligence 51, no. 3 (2007): 11-28. [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol51no3/index.html]

"Colby and Helms were interviewed on 15 March and 2 February 1988, respectively, as part of an effort by the Center for the Study of Intelligence to compile the perspectives of former Agency leaders on what has often been termed the CIA’s 'Time of Troubles' in the 1970s. The perspectives of these two officials, different in several respects, illustrate the dilemmas a secret intelligence agency faces in serving a democracy."

[CIA/70s/Investigations; CIA/DCIs/Colby & Helms]

[U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. OSS Reports to the White House]

"Among the William J. Donovan papers are five volumes entitled OSS Reports to the White House contaning carbons of memoranda predominantly transmitting or paraphrasing intelligence reports for the President's personal attention.... [T]he bulk of the[ reports] are unedited reporting from individual case officers on subjects of particular importance or of particular interest to President Roosevelt." Studies 7, no. 2 (Spring 1963), 73.

1. "Memorandum for the President: Boston Series." Studies in Intelligence 9, no. 1 (Winter 1965): 81-90.

"Series of OSS field reports..., including assessment by Allen Dulles in April 1944, stationed in Switzerland, that according to well-placed sources German diplomatic and governmental morale was collapsing."

2. "Memorandum for the President: From Peter to Tito." Studies in Intelligence 9, no. 2 (Spring 1965): 53-84.

"Highly placed OSS officers record in dispatches the two-year process by which Tito and Stalin duped Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Yugoslav government in exile into facilitating the establishment of a Communist dictatorship in Belgrade."

3. "Memoranda for the President: Japanese Feelers." Studies in Intelligence 9, no. 3 (Summer 1965): 33-50.

"Dispatches from Allen Dulles and other US contacts detail the efforts of a Japanese peace group to end the Pacific war."

4. "Memoranda for the President: OSS-NKVD Liaison." Studies in Intelligence 7, no. 3 (Summer 1963): 63-74.

"Memos ... regarding possible wartime collaboration between OSS and the Soviet intelligence services (especially NKVD)."

5. "Memoranda for the President: Sunrise." Studies in Intelligence 7, no. 2 (Spring 1963): 73-98.

"Here a collection of reports from Allen Dulles, OSS agent in Bern Switzerland, on arrangements for surrender of the German army in Northern Italy in 1945."


U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Penetrating the Iron Curtain: Resolving the Missile Gap with Technology, at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/historical-collection-publications/resolving-the-missile-gap-with-technology/index.html.

"With few well-placed human sources inside the Soviet Union, it was only with the CIA's development of, what can only be called, timely technological wizardry -- the U-2 aircraft and Corona Satellite reconnaissance program -- that breakthroughs occurred in gaining valuable, game-changing intelligence. Coupled with the innovative use of aerial and satellite photography and other technical collection programs, the efforts began to produce solid, national intelligence."


U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Preparing U.S. Intelligence for the Information Age: Coping With the Information Overload. Washington, DC: 1993.

Surveillant 3.2/3: "The Scientific and Technical Committee (STIC) Open-Source Subcommittee ... believes there is an urgent need to develop automated tools for coping with information overload. The report gives an awareness of the extent of the problem."

[Analysis/T&M; OpenSource/Gen]

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. President Carter and the Role of Intelligence in the Camp David Accords, at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/historical-collection-publications/president-carter-and-the-camp-david-accords/index.html.

"This collection consists of more than 250 previously classified documents, totaling over 1,400 pages, including some 150 that are being released for the first time.  These documents cover the period from January 1977 through March 1979 and were produced by the CIA to support the Carter administration’s diplomatic efforts leading up to President Carter’s negotiations with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin at Camp David in September 1978. The declassified documents detail diplomatic developments from the Arab peace offensive and President Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem through the regionwide aftermath of Camp David."

[CIA/70s/Gen; GenPostwar/70s/Gen]

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. President Nixon and the Role of Intelligence in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/historical-collection-publications/arab-israeli-war/index.html.

A collection of documents highlighting "the causes and consequences of US Intelligence Community's (IC) failure to foresee the October 1973 ... Yom Kippur War.... Prior to October 6, the CIA concluded that the Arabs would not attack.... Directorate of Intelligence (DI) analysts believed that Arab military inferiority would militate against an attack on Israel. DI analysis did not explore the possibility that leaders might go to war -- even at the risk of losing -- to pursue political objectives."

[Analysis/Warning; CIA/70s/Gen]

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Public Affairs Staff. "Press Release: CIA Director Porter J. Goss Names New Deputy Director for Science and Technology." 12 Aug. 2005. [https://www.cia.gov]

On 12 August 2005, "CIA Director Porter J. Goss announced the selection of Stephanie L. O'Sullivan as Deputy Director for Science and Technology. O'Sullivan had served as Associate Deputy Director for Science and Technology since June 2003."

[CIA/00s/05/Gen; CIA/Components/DS&T]

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. "[Press Release:] CIA Statement on 'Legacy of Ashes.'"  6 Aug. 2007. [https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/legacy-of-ashes.html]

In a rare event, the CIA has chosen to respond publicly to Tim Weiner's Legacy of Ashes (2007). Among other criticisms, the press release states that the author "paints far too dark a picture of the agency's past. Backed by selective citations, sweeping assertions, and a fascination with the negative, Weiner overlooks, minimizes, or distorts agency achievements." The statement notes that the book "is marked by errors great and small," and provides an "incomplete[] catalogue" of some of the errors. In the end, Weiner's "bias overwhelm[ed] his scholarship."

The Agency statement is reprinted in AFIO WIN 31-07 (13 Aug. 2007).

[CIA/00s/07; as review under Weiner, Legacy]

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Office of Public Affairs. "Profiles in Leadership." Sep. 2013.

Brief "profiles" accompanied by pictures of the 23 leaders who have directed the CIA and its predecessors from 1941 to 2012.


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