Stej - Steq

Stempel, John D. "Covert Action and Diplomacy." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 20, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 122-135.

The author provides an overview of the emergence of the links between diplomacy and intelligence, specifically covert action in its multiple forms. It is likely that future U.S. Presidents will continue to use covert action in furtherance of their national security goals, but they need "to keep in mind the pitfalls and problems connected with such activities."


Stempel, John D. "The Impact of Religion on Intelligence." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 18, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 280-295.

Without rejecting the need for organizational reform, the author suggests that a greater understanding of the role of religion by those responsible for meeting intelligence, diplomatic, or military needs might make such reform "less critical."


Stempel, John D. "Error, Folly, and Policy Intelligence." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 12, no. 3 (Fall 1999): 267-281.

Stempel defines folly as "the persistence of error to produce a result, usually adverse, which fails to accomplish the desired goals and eventually leads to disaster for those persisting in it." His examples include Pearl Harbor, the Battle of the Bulge, the Iranian Revolution, the Gulf War, the American Revolution, American involvement in Vietnam, and contemporary U.S. relations with the Middle East."


Stemple, John D. Inside the Iranian Revolution. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1981.


Stengers, J. "Enigma, the French, the Poles and the British, 1931-1940." In The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century, eds. Christopher Andrew and David Dilks, 126-137. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1984.

[OtherCountries/Poland/Enigma; UK/WWII/Ultra]

Stenton, Michael. Radio London and Resistance in Occupied Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

From publisher: "This is a study of British political imagination in a period when Britain still acted as a great power in control of her own decisions. The experience of near-defeat, however, left decision-makers with dilemmas about rhetoric and ideology as much as policy. Their refusal to resolve these dilemmas until pushed by events meant political warfare lacked the consistency and definition that might have given it greater force."


Stepan, Alfred. Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988.

This work includes references to the Brazilian National Security Service (SNI).


Stephan, Enno. Geheimauftrag Irland. Deutsche Agenten im irischen Untergrundkampf 1939-1945. Hamburg: Gerhard Stalling Verlag, 1961. Spies in Ireland. Tr., Arthur Davidson. London: Macdonald, 1963. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1965.

[OtherCountries/Ireland/WWII; WWII/Eur/Ger]

Stephan, Robert W. Stalin's Secret War: Soviet Counterintelligence against the Nazis, 1941-1945. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2003.

Goulden, Washington Times, 29 Feb. 2004, and Intelligencer 14.1, finds that he is convinced by the author's argument that "Soviet deception operations 'contributed enormously' to defeat of the Germans on the Eastern Front." Peake, Studies 48.4 (2004), refers to Stalin's Secret War as exhibiting "exemplary German, American, and selected Soviet primary- and secondary-source research.... The extensive appendices provide useful mission and organizational details on the primary Soviet and German intelligence elements. A major contribution to the literature."

For Blank, Parameters 35.1, this work has been "deeply researched from sources on both sides." The author "recounts the Soviets’ attention to the importance of intelligence and counterintelligence, their growing ability to use these tools effectively in the conduct of combat and deception operations, and the penalties that the Germans incurred because of their blithe disregard for both forms of secret operations." To Brown, I&NS 21.4 (Aug. 2006), this is "a first-rate history"; it is "a well-researched and convincing work." The book "not only favorably compares to the best scholarship concerning the war on the Eastern Front, but it also helps to present a more complete picture of World War II in general."

Laurie, JIH 5.2 (Winter 2005), sees this as an "excellent study." The author shows Germany's "woeful lack of accurate strategic and tactical information about the enemy they faced.... Stephan emphasizes [that] in intelligence matters the Germans were their own worst enemy.... The diabolical, pervasive, and chillingly efficient Soviet security services compounded and exploited German errors and weaknesses.... Stephan has created a very comprehensive work that is likely to remain the standard book on the subject for years to come."


Stephanson, Jack. "The Glomar Explorer Story -- A Prequel." CIRA Newsletter 23, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 37.

A brief note on the "precursor surface mission to the site of the Soviet sub" later raised by the Glomar. The stay on site included observation and harrassment from Soviet ships.


Stephens, Robin W.G.. Intro., Oliver Hoare. Camp 20: MI5 and the Nazi Spies. Kew, UK: National Archives, 2000.

Wilson, I&NS 17.1, notes that Camp 20 was MI5's "interrogation and holding centre for enemy agents" during World War II. This work was written by the camp commander, Col. Robin Stephens, in 1946, and "contains an operational account of the camp and around 200 cases synopses." Stephens' history "reveals a forgotten link in an extremely important chain, namely in the success of the Security Service in countering and deceiving the German Abwehr."

For Peake, Studies 47.4 (2003), Hoare's introduction to the volume is "fascinating" and "gives details about the book's origins with commentary about its quirky author ... and his unusual staff.... [H]istorians looking for documentation will find little.... Nevertheless, Camp 20 will be an immense help as a road map to research." Kleinman, DIJ 14,2 (2005), sees this as "an enlightening and entertaining account of a World War II-era clandestine intelligence operation that proved to be a critical piece of the larger British counterintelligence effort [i,e., the Double-Cross System] that some historians would argue turned the tide of war against Nazi Germany."


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