Rusbridger, James. "Winds of Warning: Mythology and Fact About Enigma and Pearl Harbor." Encounter 66 (Jan. 1986): 6-13.


Rusbridger, James. The Intelligence Game: The Illusions and Delusions of International Espionage. New York: New Amsterdam, 1990. [pb] London: I.B. Tauris, 1991.

Surveillant 1.3 describes The Intelligence Game as a "controversial and thought-provoking work ... [which] argues that most espionage is ultimately fruitless and primarily involves flagrant law breaking and abuse of civil liberties." A Surveillant 1.6 review comes on a bit stronger, calling the book an "[o]verstated, intemperate, arrogant, controversial, purportedly-objective 'expose' of the international intelligence business." The author "draws mainly on the operations of MI5 and MI6, but also looks at U.S., French, Soviet, Israeli and other services."

According to Choice, Nov. 1992, Rusbridger's "thesis is that intelligence agencies exist ... to cover up the mess made by poor policy." Wines, Washington Monthly, Nov. 1992, proclaims that Rusbridger "doesn't know much about American espionage, but that doesn't stop him from attacking it at length. He gets facts and figures wrong and makes statements about celebrated American spy cases that are plain silly."


Rusbridger, James, and Eric Nave. Betrayal at Pearl Harbor: How Churchill Lured Roosevelt into World War II. New York: Summit, 1991. London: O'Mara, 1991. Old Tappan, NJ: Simon & Schuster, 1992. [pb]

According to Surveillant 2.6, Betrayal at Pearl Harbor "remains highly controversial with both sides denying that any ... findings are true. Rusbridger is an expert on the history of intelligence and the author of many books on that topic. Nave is the father of British codebreaking in the Far East and lives in Australia."

Biard, Cryptolog 14.1, provides a positive reading of Rusbridger and Nave's theories, while Whitlock, Cryptolog 14.2, suggests that "if you have not read this book, I would not recommend that you rush right out and buy one." Whitlock, Cryptolog 14.4, later responded directly to Biard's article: "I can state with authority and finality that no warning message from Singapore ever arrived at Station Cast." He concludes that "[t]he revisionist article by Forrest Biard is graced neither by facts nor by fairness and must be summarily rejected."

Rusbridger, "Did Singapore Send a Warning to Station Cast," Cryptolog 14.4 (Summer 1993): 3, 18. "There is absolutely no doubt the British Gov't Code & Cipher School (GCCS) ... broke JN-25 in the fall of 1939.... After the war, Churchill pretended he had got all his codebreaking intelligence about the Japanese only from Roosevelt ... whereas, in fact, he was ... getting it faster than Roosevelt.... [I]n the recent book Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement,... Clausen's material proves that Churchill deliberately falsified history in order to conceal the extent of his knowledge of Japanese plans." See also, Rusbridger, "[Letter] Roosevelt, Magic and Ultra." Cryptolog 14.4 (Summer 1993): 4.

Gish, IJI&C 6.3, opines that the book "makes a feeble case for a conspiracy based on hearsay and misconstrued bits and pieces of information misleadingly presented as evidence.... The book is filled not only with large and basic errors of a cryptologic nature ... but with errors of fact.... [T]he arguments and evidence presented ... reveal[] no basis for the fanciful conspiracy theory developed in the book."

For Tordella and Fishel, IJI&C 6.3, "this book does so much wanton damage to historical fact that it should not be allowed into the record without a thorough inquest." It "violates common sense" and is a "complete fabrication.... [I]n 1941 JN-25 was for all practical purposes unreadable, unproductive of intelligence." Nave's "knowledge of the history of JN-25 must have been so defective as to render his recollections worthless." Betrayal at Pearl Harbor is a "conglomeration of confusion and error.... This could be a book-length hoax."

Aldrich, I&NS 7.3, argues that "[n]owhere do the authors provide convincing evidence" of deliberate duplicity on Churchill's part. Instead, what is offered is "only the thinnest of circumstantial evidence from which a number of questionable deductions are drawn." Sissons, I&NS 9.2, agrees with this judgment, noting that the evidence produced by the authors for "a signal sent to the [Japanese] carrier force on 25 November ... that revealed its position and likely destination ... is unconvincing."

See also, Pfennigwerth, A Man of Intelligence: The Life of Captain Theodore Eric Nave, Australian Codebreaker Extraordinary (2006), which Peake, Studies 52.2 (Jun. 2008), says shows that the critical parts of Betrayal at Pearl Harbor were written without Nave's involvement.


Rush, Myron. "A Neglected Source of Evidence." Studies in Intelligence 2, no. 3 (Summer 1958): 117-125.

The author discusses Soviet "esoteric communications": that is, hidden messages in "published texts whose surface meaning does not reveal their political significance.... Western observers underestimate the refinement and subtlety of Soviet esoteric communications."



Russo, Gus. Live by the Sword: The Secret War Against Castro and the Death of JFK. Baltimore, MD: Bancroft Press, 1998.

According to Latell, IJI&C 13.2, the author's mix of "rumors, irrelevant details, speculation, and hearsay" seeks to link Castro's Cuba to the assassination of President Kennedy. Although Russo's "lengthy, often tedious ... account reflect[s] a zealot's passion..., he has not presented ... any evidence or objective analysis to support such speculation."


Rust, William J. Before the Quagmire: American Intervention in Laos, 1954-1961. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2012.

Freedman, FA 91.5 (Sep.-Oct. 2012), notes that this "first-rate account focuses mainly on policymakers." Rust details how "the Americans tried to cope with a country whose politics they did not fully understand, at one point simultaneously supporting the Laotian government and a general plotting a coup against it." For Ruth, Proceedings 139.3 (Mar. 2013), the author provides a "careful examination of this sometimes bewildering conflict." This is a "compelling study of the people who implement abstract geopolitical strategy policy on the ground."


Rustmann, F.W., Jr. CIA, Inc.: Espionage and the Craft of Business Intelligence. Dulles, VA: Brassey's, 2002.

Jonkers, AFIO WIN 13.2 (1 Apr. 2002), calls this book "a rapid primer on how modern espionage relates to the national and international business world." The author tells "his stories in an entertaining, straight-from-the-shoulder fashion, warts and all, telling what worked, what did not work.... Rustmann's book is recommended reading for corporate professionals, but also for students and members of the public who want to know more about US and foreign espionage operations from a highly reputable professional."


Rustmann, F.W., Jr. "The Craft of 'Business' Intelligence." Intelligencer 10, no. 2 (Aug. 1999): 4-6.

The author makes the case for companies using "professional intelligence consultants from outside the organization ... to handle the most sensitive intelligence gathering missions."


Rustmann, Frederick W., Jr. "Debunking the CIA Case Officer Myth." Periscope 25, nos. 1 & 2 (2002): 1, 30.

The author debunks those reformers who call for case officers who can operate with native ease and cover in foreign environments: "[M]ost people simply don't understand the intelligence business -- in particular the difference between case officers and agents.... [O]n the one hand we have the case officer, who must fit into the U.S. diplomatic environment at home and abroad and who has total loyalty to the U.S., and on the other hand we have the principal agent, who is a trusted native of a particular foreign country who can be trained and vetted to the extent that he can be given the responsibilty to perform specific compartmented tasks within an operational and cultural environment totally familiar to him."

[CIA/C&C/DO; Reform/02]

Rustmann, F.W., Jr. "Finding Someone to Spy on Terrorists." CIRA Newsletter 22, no. 3 (Winter 1997-1998): 23-24.

The author discusses some of the difficulties, physical and ethical, in recruiting agents to work against terrorists. (An editor's note informs that this article was previously carried by the Baltimore Sun in October 1996.)


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