Roth, Mark. "Secrets of a Union Spy." Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 3 May 1998, G1, G10-11.
The writer relates some of the exploits of Archibald Hamilton Rowland, Jr., who served with Gen. Philip Sheridan's "scouts." The scouts served in "dual roles as cavalry soldiers and skilled undercover spies."
Rothenberg, Herbert C. "Identifying the Future Threat." Studies in Intelligence 12, no. 4 (Fall 1968): 13-21.
"How R&D analysts used mathematical techniques, inductive and deductive logic, mirror imaging, and 'thinking like a Russian' to cope with the 'bathtub curve' of data on new weapons development in the 1960s."
Rothkopf, David J. Running The World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power. New York: PublicAffairs, 2005.
To Destler, FA 84.5 (Sep.-Oct. 2005), "[e]xtensive quotations from ... many ... important players are the strongest element of the book, illuminating how policymaking really happens.... As a comprehensive analysis of its topic, however, the book falls short." The author "provides lots of raw material ... but no clear set of conclusions or even a general idea of how everything adds up."
Sewall, Parameters, Spring 2006, finds that this work "is less a systematic assessment of the NSC as an institution than a popular history of the making of American foreign policy." The author "writes well and holds the reader despite the scope and slipperiness of his nominal subject. But his underlying goal seems to be recommending a particular flavor of foreign policy.... Rothkopfs signal contribution lies in demonstrating the importance of personality and relationships in the formulation of American policy."
[GenPostwar/Orgs/NSC & Policy/00s]
Rothstein, Hy S. Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006.
Maitre, Air & Space Power Journal 21.3 (Fall 2007), notes that the author is "a retired career special-forces officer with 30 years' active duty." His "concise, well-documented review of the literature, which defines the context of special operations and the arena of unconventional warfare, transforms several vague definitions into clear terminology." Rothstein "argues that despite significant investment in developing special operations, the military lacks the institutional capability of engaging opponents with irregular methods. Employing SOF in a mission does not automatically constitute a special operation."
For Berger, et al, I&NS 22.6 (Dec. 2007), "Rothstein does an excellent job of laying out the requirements for conducting unconventional warfare and uses his analysis of operations in Afghanistan to expose the failures of the US military, more specifically, of US special operations forces.... The only major shortcoming of the book is that it focuses primarily on the infrastructure requirements of an unconventional capability." Moir, Military Intelligence 35.2 (Apr.-Jun. 2009), says that this work "poses important questions that may guide decision making and organizational structure for conflicts, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, that require UW capabilities."
Rottman, Gordon L.
Roukis, George S., Hugh Conway, and Bruce Charnov, eds. Global Corporate Intelligence. New York: Quorum, 1990.
Rousseau, Michel. "Deux réseaux britanniques dans la région du Nord: le réseau 'Garrow-Pat O'Leary' et le réseau 'Farmer'". Revue dhistoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale et des conflits contemporains 135 (Jul. 1984): 87-108. [Capet]
Rout, Leslie B., Jr., and John F. Bratzel. Shadow War: German Espionage and United States Counterespionage in Latin America During World War II. Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1986.
Haglund, I&NS 4.3, finds that the authors have provided excessive detail ("almost numbing") in this "definitive study" of the "wartime German-American undercover rivalry" in Mexico, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina. The work "could use a bit more analysis and synthesis."
[WWII/Gen & Eur/Ger]
Rowan, Richard W.
Rowan, Roy. The Four Days of Mayaguez. New York: Norton, 1975.
Warner, Time, 3 Nov. 1975, says "[t]his fresh, immediate account ... manages to put the event in lucid perspective." The author's "facts, speedily and scrupulously assembled, make a strong, if arguable case for the American response."
Rowen, Henry S. Reforming Intelligence: A Market Approach. Working Group on Intelligence Reform. Washington, DC: Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 1993.
Rowland, John Kenneth. "General Thomas Gage, the Eighteenth-Century Literature of Military Intelligence, and the Transition from Peace to Revolutionary War, 1774 to 1775." Historical Reflections/Réflexions Historiques 32, no. 3 (2006): 503-521.
Rowlett, Frank B. The Story of Magic: Memoirs of an American Cryptologic Pioneer. Laguna Hills, CA: Aegean Park Press, 1998.
See Rowlett's obituary in Telegraph (London), 18 Jul. 1998.
According to Bates, NIPQ 15.1, these are the memoirs of the man who "was largely responsible for the ciphers used by the United States in the thirties and forties and for duplicating the Japaneses diplomatic cipher machine, PURPLE, through cryptanalysis." Rowlett's story begins in 1930 and ends before Pearl Harbor. The memoir has "no footnotes because this is a first hand account."
Beard, I&NS 15.4, notes that "[t]hanks to this memoir, we know quite a lot more about just how the tiny corps of Army Signals Intelligence Service (SIS) and Navy cryptanalysts solved 'Red,' 'Purple' and other Japanese codes." David Kahn provides a "useful Foreword and Epilogue." For Kruh, Cryptologia 23.2 , this "is one of only a few cryptologic works that merits a place in the personal library of anyone interested in codes and ciphers."
Rowley, Coleen. "What the FBI Needs -- and Doesn't Need." Time, 26 Apr. 2004, 33.
Rowny, Edward L. "Homeland Defense Needs a Real Commander." Wall Street Journal, 14 Feb. 2002, A20.
Roy, Denny. "Human Rights as a National Security Threat: The Case of the PRC." Issues and Studies 32, no. 2 (Feb. 1996): 65-81.
Roy, H.K. [Pseud] "Betrayal in the Balkans." Intelligencer 12, no. 1 (Summer 2001): 45-51.
This is the first-person account of a CIA clandestine services officer's serious travails in Sarajevo in mid-1995. He was there "to provide intelligence on the military situation in Bosnia, and on Bosnian Serb military targets and capabilities, in advance of the expected NATO intervention." He was betrayed by the Bosnian government to Iranian intelligence and forced to leave Sarajevo quickly to avoid being kidnapped and/or killed.
Royden, Barry G. "CIA and National HUMINT: Preparing for the 21st Century." Defense Intelligence Journal 6, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 15-22.
This is largely boiler plate, churned out by a career CIA officer on the faculty at the Joint Military Intelligence College. He urges that the Defense HUMINT Service (DHS) "be viewed as complementing rather than competing with" the CIA's Directorate of Operations, a view that probably fits the hopes (or reflects the fears) of senior CIA managers.
Royden, Barry G. "An Exceptional Espionage Operation: Tolkachev, A Worthy Successor to Penkovsky." Studies in Intelligence 47, no. 3 (2003). [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol47no3/article02.html]
The author of this article, who obviously had direct access to the DO's files on Tolkachev, provides a detailed case study of a human intelligence operation. It deserves to be read by anyone interested in the spy game. For a negative assessment of Tolkachev, see Benjamin B. Fischer, "The Spy Who Came in for the Gold: A Skeptical View of the GTVANQUISH Case," Journal of Intelligence History 8, no. 1 (Summer 2008).
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