Rip, Michael Russell. "Military Photo-Reconnaissance during the Yom Kippur War: A Research Note." Intelligence and National Security 7, no. 2 (Apr. 1992): 126-132.
"Israeli tactical intelligence barely functioned during the first few days with little attempt at ground reconnaissance and the Air Force was essentially unable to conduct low-level photo-reconnaissance missions over the Canal region.... Overall, the Israelis lacked an effective fusion capability and process to blend electronic intelligence (ELINT), SIGINT, and imagery intelligence (IMINT) information."
Rip, Michael Russell, and Joseph F. Fontanella. "A Window on the Arab-Israeli 'Yom Kippur' War of October 1973: Military Photo-Reconnaissance from High Altitude and Space." Intelligence and National Security 6, no. 1 (Jan. 1991): 15-89.
After about 15 pages of background on Soviet and U.S. photo-reconnaissance platforms and activities, the authors get down to their primary subject: the satellite and aircraft deployments made by the Soviet Union and the United States to cover the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. "The dimension of Soviet involvement can be ascertained by noting that within a three and a half week period, no less than seven photo-reconnaissance satellites were launched: a rate almost four times that observed for the rest of the year.... Additionally,... Soviet-manned ... MiG-25R ... reconnaissance jet aircraft ... specifically performed high-altitude/high-speed photographic missions off the Israeli coastline and over the Sinai desert.... [I]t is practically certain that the US provided the Israelis with valuable IMINT and Sigint information during the 1973 conflict."
The authors go off into less well-grounded speculation (that orbits were modified to look at specific target areas does not prove their point) when they argue in favor of digital transmission of photographic imagery from KH-8 satellites. The authors fail to tie down with any precision the use of SR-71 aircraft to overfly the conflict area, relying too much on too many qualifiers to their argument. They also are on less than firm ground with their suggestion that U.S.-supplied tactical intelligence made possible the Israeli crossing of the Suez canal on 15 October 1973. However, the conclusion that "the 1973 Arab-Israeli war demonstrated that with their superior surge launch capability the Soviets certainly were at no tactical disadvantage with the US" is probably accurate.
[Israel/YomKippur; Recon/Sats; Russia][c]
Rip, Michael Russell, and David P. Lusch.
1. "The Precision Revolution: The Navstar Global Positioning System in the Second Gulf War." Intelligence and National Security 9, no. 2 (Apr. 1994): 167-241.
"[T]he Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) [footnote omitted] and thermal night vision devices ... enabled Coalition forces to exploit the desert terrain with 24-hour-a-day freedom of maneuverability in all weather conditions, regardless of the lack of distinctive features and good roads." The article includes technical details of the system (pp. 179-194), and looks at use in aerial operations (fixed-wing and helicopter) (pp. 195- 201), air-breathing missiles (cruise and air-to-surface) (pp. 201-206), ground forces (pp. 206-216), and maritime operations (p. 216), as well as future military and civilian uses.
2. "The Navstar Global Positioning System in Operation Desert Storm." Intelligence and National Security 10, no. 2 (Apr. 1995): 327-335.
This is a follow-up article, drawing on additional information. The authors conclude: "In the future, with the rapid reliance on GPS-guided precision weaponry, the efficacy of the US military's precision strike capability could well be dependent on the integrity of the 24-satellite Navstar Global Positioning System."
[MI/Commo & Ops/90s/DesertStorm][c]
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