Rip - Riz

Ripley, Tim. "Upgraded Predator UAVs Support Balkans Mission." Jane's Defence Weekly, 25 Apr. 2001, 30.

[Recon/UAVs]

Risher, Paulette M. [MAJGEN/USA] "U.S. Special Operations Command: Effectively Engaged Today, Framing the Future Fight." Joint Force Quarterly 40 (1st Quarter 2006): 49-53. [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/issue40.htm]

"U.S. Special Operations Command is unique because it can act as a supporting or supported command, and it has its own budget authority and program objective memorandum. Its relatively small number of assigned forces (49,000) and portion of the defense budget (1.7 percent) offer a tremendous advantage: the abilty to combine a service-like force provider role with a supported war-fighter role."

[MI/SpecOps/00s]

Rislakki, Jukka. "Finland's Military Intelligence in War and Peace." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 21, no. 3 (Fall 2008): 461-486.

"The present article was written to provide a general survey of the topic for American readers without a reading knowledge of Finnish." (p. 479/fn. 1)

[OtherCountries/Finland; WWII/Eur/Finland]

Risso, Linda. "A Difficult Compromise: British and American Plans for a Common Anti-Communist Propaganda Response in Western Europe, 1948–58." Intelligence and National Security 26, no. 2 & 3 (Apr.-Jun. 2011): 330-354.

From Abstract: This article examines how the British IRD worked with the CIA's International Organizations Division "in shaping the foundation and early activities" of the Western Union and the NATO Information Service in coordinating "the Western response to Soviet and Soviet-inspired propaganda campaigns." It seeks to explain "why, in the early Cold War, the West struggled to produce a coherent and fully coordinated propaganda response to communism."

[CA/Eur & PsyOps; UK/Postwar/IRD]

Riste, Olav. "Intelligence and the 'Mindset': The German Invasion of Norway in 1940." Intelligence and National Security 22, no. 4 (Aug. 2007): 521-536.

The German invasion of Norway and Denmark in April 1940 "was a brilliantly successful surprise attack." For both Norwegian and British policy-makers "the idea that Germany was about to launch a major invasion of Norway was remote from any of the preconceived scenarios about Germany's next move."

[UK/WWII/Overviews; WWII/Eur/Res/Norway]

Riste, Olav, and Arnfinn Moland. Top Secret: The Norwegian Intelligence Service, 1945-1970. London: Frank Cass, 1999.

According to Hess, IIHSG [International Intelligence History Association] Newsletter 7.2 (Winter 1999-2000) [http://intelligence-history.wiso.uni-erlangen.de/ reviews.htm], "Riste meticulously traces the 'looking-glass' activities, which pierced the Iron Curtain and provided invaluable intelligence results for the countries of the Atlantic Alliance.... This extraordinary book throws light on many intelligence aspects of the Cold War. The author has provided a thorough account of the NIS and struck the right balance between technical detail and readability. The book is well edited and richly documented."

Salmon, I&NS 16.3, says that Riste tells his story "with exceptional clarity and fluency." The author "avoid[s] sensation, and yet ... bring[s] out the very substantial achievements of Norwegian intelligence." For Kruh, Cryptologia 24.3, this is a "thoroughly documented history of the growth of the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) during the Cold War."

[OtherCountries/Norway]

Riste, Olav, and Berit Nøkleby. Norway 1940-45: The Resistance Movement. Oslo, Norway: Tanum, 1970. Oslo, Norway: Tanum-Norli, 1986. [pb]

[WWII/Eur/Resistance/Norway]

Ritchie, Sebastian. Our Man in Yugoslavia. The Story of a Secret Service Operative. London: Frank Cass, 2004.

According to Subelj, JIH 6.1 (Summer 2006), the subject of this book, Owen Reed, was the author's grandfather. While working for the BBC in Cairo, Reed "was recruited by SIS ... as a field officer for infiltration into Yugoslavia." He "had little knowledge of Yugoslavia and spoke no Serbo-Croat," but in 1943 he "was dispatched to Croatia with a radio operator and interpreter." Eventually, he would carry out several separate missions in Yugoslavia. "The book is very interesting,... with much information and a very good index."

[WWII/OSS/Balkans/Yugo]

Ritter, Gerhard. Tr., R. T. Clark. The German Resistance: Carl Goerdeler's Struggle Against Tyranny. London: Allen and Unwin, 1958. New York: Praeger, 1958.

A "Translator's Note" acknowledges that "some omission" and compression has been undertaken from the German original of Ritter's book.

[WWII/Eur/Ger/Res]

Ritter, Scott. Endgame: Solving the Iraq Problem Once and for All. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999.

Clark comment: Ritter is the former U.S. Marine who served as a UN weapons inspector in Iraq from 1991 until his resignation in 1998 as chief of UNSCOM's Concealment Investigations Unit. He, then, went public with criticisms of the Clinton administration's policies involving Iraq and the UN inspections. Ritter seemed to damn President Clinton and Secretary of State Albright from every conceivable angle, accusing them of being too soft on Saddam Hussein by undercutting the UN inspections regime and being too aggressive in using the cloak of the inspection teams to conduct U.S. intelligence operations. Only a fool would not expect the latter activities to be going on by whatever nationals are on such inspection teams. Ritter's protestations ring hollow, and are suspect as being political in origin.

Ajami, Washington Post, 18 Apr. 1999, also finds that there seem "to be many Ritters, often at odds with each other.... There was Ritter the 'international civil servant,' incensed that UNSCOM had become an instrument of American power.... There was Ritter the cloak-and-dagger man, boasting that he had supplied American intelligence with the address of Saddam Hussein's mistress for use in a possible assassination attempt. There was Ritter the hawk, dismissing Operation Desert Fox as a 'relatively puny' endeavor that did nothing to change the standoff with Saddam. And there was Ritter the dove, concerned about the endless sanctions imposed on Iraq."

For Cohen, FA 78.4 (Jul.-Aug. 1999), Endgame would be fascinating "if Ritter's writing were not so disjointed." The author also shows that he has "little talent for policy analysis," and produces "particularly weak policy recommendations." Dorn, IJI&C 12.4/446/fn.46, comments that although "the interpretive and prescriptive elements of Ritter's analysis are questionable, his detailed description of his own UNSCOM experiences and its information-gathering methods appear[s] to be valid."

[GenPostCW/90s/99/UN-Iraq]

Ritter, Scott. Iraq Confidential: The Untold Story of the Intelligence Conspiracy to Undermine the UN and Overthrow Saddam Hussein. New York: Nation Books, 2005.

Peake, Studies 50.2 (2006), comments that "Ritter’s story of the problems experienced by the inspection team is interesting but not new. His depiction of the primacy of his role in the events is surprising and unlikely to be accepted by others familiar with the situation.... Iraq Confidential should be read with caution."

[GenPostCW/90s/99/UN-Iraq; GenPostCW/00s/Gen]

Ritz, Michael W., Ralph G. Hensley, Jr., and James C. Whitmire, eds. The Homeland Security Papers: Stemming the Tide of Terror. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College, Feb. 2004. Available at : http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cpc-pubs/hls_papers/index.htm.

This is an edited work with 12 different authors writing on a range on homeland security topics. Most of the 10 chapters are available in PDF format.

[DHS/Books]

Rivers, Gayle, and James Hudson. The Tehran Contract. New York: Doubleday, 1981. [Wilcox]

[GenPostwar/80s/Iran/HostageRescue]

Rizzo, John. "The CIA-Congress War." Defining Ideas, 30 Mar. 2012. [http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/112491]

Between 1976 and 2009, Rizzo rose through the CIA lawyer ranks to be Acting General Counsel. Here, he offers his "personal perspective" on why the relations between the Congress and the CIA "have gone inexorably downhill over the past three-plus decades." The primary reason for this is: "A failure to communicate."

[CIA/Components/DCIA; Oversights/10s/Gen]

Rizzo, John. Company Man: Thirty Years of Controversy and Crisis in the CIA. New York: Scribner, 2014.

Campbell, CIRA Quarterly 34.1 (Spring 2014), notes that the author "occupied a front row seat as a participant in and witness to the many political, legal, policy, and operational complexities inherent to the planning, coordination, approval, and execution of covert action.... Rizzo has produced a book full of unique insights and thoughtful reflection, with a good dose of humor along the way."

To Peake, Studies 58.2 (Jun. 2014), and Intelligencer 20.3 (Spring-Summer 2014), the author "provides a forthright account of his career's progress and along the way makes clear the contributions lawyers make. In a matter-of-fact writing style that shuns self-promotion, Rizzo describes one challenging episode after another that raised unprecedented legal issues.... He gives a detailed account of his role in the origins and implementation of the interrogation program." This book makes "clear why Rizzo acquired a reputation for competence and intellectual honesty."

Kaplan, New York Times, 3 Jan. 2014, is basically downbeat about these memoirs. He seems to want Rizzo to have said more negative things about the CIA, its actions, and the people he worked with and for: "[T]he book suffers from the lack not merely of a critical perspective ... but of any perspective whatever." Admittedly, there are a few "tidbits" here, but there should have been more. And the author "shies away from substance on many policy matters.... His chief failing here is that he took part in so much but tells us so little."

For Temple-Raston, Washington Post, 10 Jan. 2014, "[f]ew books have this scope or insider perspective on the CIA.... The book is by turns withholding and matter-of-fact, aggrieved and smug, and in the end could be read in one of two ways: as the diary of a legal enabler for the agency or as an atlas to navigate the dark, murky morality that governs the business of intelligence." Chapman, IJI&C 27.4 (Winter 2014), calls Rizzo's "an insider's explanation of many important events.... But too many questions remain as to how certain, often destructive, actions were taken without proper judgment being exercised at numerous points in the decision channel."

[CIA/Components/DCI-DCIA/GenCounsel & Memoirs]

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