Rid - Rif


Rid, Thomas, and Marc Hecker. War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2009.

Cassidy, Parameters 36.4 (Winter 2009-2010), notes that this work "analyzes the effects of media and information on the current struggle to influence the perception of the populations within and across insurgencies.... War 2.0 sees the public and the media as the ... central battlefield where information is preponderantly open source, public, and intended for external use.... [I]n the new style of conflict ... modern information technology amplifies acts of violence.... The objective of information operations in irregular warfare is to win the competition for legitimacy in the eyes of the population."


Ride, Edwin. British Army Aid Group (BAAG): Hong Kong Resistance, 1942-45. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1981.

Founded by Col. Lindsay Ride after he escaped from Japanese-occupied Hong Kong. the British Army Aid Group "helped the prisoners-of-war in Hong Kong to escape from Japanese captivity, and successfully organised a network of agents to collect military intelligence that contributed much to the final victory of the Allied Powers." See "Press Release: Exhibition Introduces British Army Aid Group Drawings," at: http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201009/22/P201009220201.htm.


Ridenour, Ron. Backfire: The CIA's Biggest Burn. Havana, Cuba: Jose Marti Publishing House, 1991.

Rideout, George. "Parliament and the Subcommittee on Security and Intelligence." Optimum 24, no. 2 (Autumn 1993): 105-109.


Ridge, Tom, with Lary Bloom. The Test of Our Times: America Under Siege . . . and How We Can Be Safe Again. New York: Thomas Dunne/St. Martin's, 2009.

Alden, Washington Post, 18 Oct. 2009, says that Ridge's book "is much like his tenure as secretary [of Homeland Security]: folksy, deferential, unfortunately error-prone and yet, on the biggest questions of the post 9/11 years, rather sensible." In his tenure, Ridge "came to a balanced view in which he understood the serious threat from Islamic extremism but also recognized the high costs of overreacting."


Ridgeway, James. The 5 Unanswered Questions about 9/11: What the 9/11 Commission Report Failed to Tell Us. New York: Seven Stories, 2005.


Rieber, Steven. "Intelligence Analysis and Judgmental Calibration." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 17, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 97-112.

"[R]esearch indicates that experts tend to be quite inept at assigning even roughly correct probabilities to their predictions. At the same time, promising techniques for improving calibration, in some cases very rapidly, do exist. How well these techniques will work in the realm of intelligence analysis is unknown."


Rieber, Steven, and Neil Thomason. "Toward Improving Intelligence Analysis: Creation of a National Institute for Analytic Methods." Studies in Intelligence 49, no. 4 (2005): 71-77.

The authors argue that "systematic research" is needed to improve analytic practices. They would stimulate such research through establishment of a National Institute for Analytic Methods along the lines of the National Institute of Health.


Riebling, Mark.

Riedel, Bruce. "Al Qaeda Strikes Back." Foreign Affairs 86, no. 3 (May-Jun. 2007): 24-40.

"By rushing into Iraq instead of finishing off the hunt for Osama bin Laden, Washington has unwittingly helped its enemies: al Qaeda has more bases, more partners, and more followers today than it did on the eve of 9/11. Now the group is working to set up networks in the Middle East and Africa.... Washington must focus on attacking al Qaeda's leaders and ideas and altering the local conditions in which they thrive."


Riedel, Bruce. What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979-1989.Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2014.

Peake, Studies 59.1 (Mar. 2015), says that this "important book" examines the "secret intelligence alliance" that defeated the Soviets in Afghanistan. To Riedel Pakistani General Zia ul-Haq was "the most important figure" in thid struggle.


Rielage, Dale [LCDR/USN] "Before the Green Table." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 19, no. 4 (Dec. 2003): 10-11.

The author identifies what he views as significant structural problems in the way Navy terrorism and foreign intelligence analysis are configured. He argues against the current separation of the Navy's "key provider of terrorist threat warning, counter-intelligence, and force protection information [the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS)] from both its foreign intelligence structure and its operational forces."


Riemann, Robert H. "The Challenge of Glasnost for Western Intelligence." Parameters 20, no. 4 (1990): 85-94.


Rieul, Ronald. Soldier into Spy. London: William Kimber, 1986. [Chambers]


Riffice, Albert E. "Intelligence and Covert Action." Studies in Intelligence 6, no. 1 (Winter 1962): 73-80.

The author concludes that "the root of SOE's difficulties was its lack of coordination with the British espionage and counterintelligence services. At the end of the war, the responsibility for covert operations was returned to the jurisdiction of MI6.

[CA/To80s; UK/WWII/Services/SOE]


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