Pope, Edmond D., and Tom Shachtman. Torpedoed: An American Businessman's True Story of Secrets, Betrayal, Imprisonment in Russia, and the Battle to Set Him Free. Boston: Little, Brown, 2001.

Legvold, FA 81.1, comments that Pope was not a spy "but a former naval intelligence officer who had become a businessman dealing with highly sensitive military technologies.... Suspicious, benighted, petty, and jealous of its turf, [the FSB] made a mockery of fair play and anything approximating a search for the truth." For Bath, NIPQ 18.1, Pope tells well "his harrowing tale of arrest, interrogation, and trial on trumped-up charges of espionage.... [This] is a textbook on the pitfalls to be encountered in doing business in today's Russia." Pope has a Website at http://www.edmondpope.com/.


Pope, Laurence. "Department's Efforts to Combat International Terrorism." US Department of State Dispatch 4, no. 17 (26 Apr. 1993): 299-301.

Pope was Acting Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, Department of State. The terrorism "threat continues to be significant.... [T]ensions in many parts of the world have increased. We know ... that terrorism is often a by-product of such conflicts.... The basis of our policy is the effort to reduce and eventually eliminate the support which states provide to terrorist groups.... Of the current state sponsors, Iran is the major problem we face."


Pope, Ronald R., ed. Soviet Views on the Cuban Missile Crisis: Myth and Reality in Foreign Policy Analysis. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1982.

This was put together before there was a substantial stream of Russian sources available. It is useful primarily as a window into how the Soviet role in the crisis was perceived by some in the West prior to glasnost.

[GenPostwar/60s/Missile Crisis]

Popham, Hugh. The FANY in Peace and War: The Story of the First Aid Nursing Yeomanry, 1907-2003. Rev. ed. Barnsley, Yorkshire, UK: Leo Cooper, 2003.

Peake, Studies 49.3 (2005), notes that for the intelligence professional "[a] principal point of interest ... is the FANY's service in the Special Operations Executive (SOE) during World War II and their operations with the resistance in occupied France. Some 73 were trained as agents and 39 went to France. Several were caught by the Gestapo and ended their lives in Dachau and other camps. At a time when women in the intelligence services was not an everyday occurrence, the FANYs established a powerful precedent. Popham summarizes their story well, and the bibliography provides sources where more detail can be acquired." See also, Pawley, In Obedience to Instructions (1999).

[UK/WWII/Med & Services/SOE; WWII/Women/UK]

Popkin, Jim. "Ana Montes Did Much Harm Spying for Cuba. Chances Are, You Haven't Heard of Her." Washington Post, 18 Apr. 2013. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Former DIA analyst Ana Montes lives today "in a two-bunk cell in the highest-security women's prison in the nation," the Federal Medical Center Carswell in Fort Worth. She "spied [for Cuba] for 17 years, patiently, methodically," but years after she was caught spying, "Montes remains defiant."


Popov, Dusko. Spy/Counterspy: The Autobiography of Dusko Popov. New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1974. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1974. Greenwich, CT: Fawcett, 1975. [pb]

Clark comment: Popov was agent "Tricycle" in the XX System. What his role was during a mission in the United States in 1941 remains controversial, especially in relation to the Pearl Harbor controversy. Pforzheimer says that Popov's "autobiography makes pleasant and informative reading about the life of an unusual double agent." His comments about his relations with the FBI "should be read with some caution." To Constantinides, Popov offers "a rare first-hand account of double agent operations and deception of the XX Committee from the agent's vantage point."

The following comment is taken from a posting in the newsgroup alt.politics.org.cia, signed by Ernest Volkman:

"Popov's memoir, a mix of truth, half-truth, and outright falsehood (like many intelligence memoirs), should be approached with caution. Newly-declassified papers reveal the real story of Popov's 1941 mission.

"Briefly, Popov was dispatched by the Abwehr to the United States with a 'shopping list' of intelligence the Germans wanted, concealed in a microdot. J. Edgar Hoover took an instant dislike to Popov, a moral degenerate, and thus did not spend too much time analyzing the material contained in Popov's microdot. His animus also balked a plan by MI6 and MI5 to use Popov as a deception agent against the Abwehr in the United States.

"In any event, among the items the Abwehr mentioned in the microdot was a request that Popov collect intelligence about Pearl Harbor. Hoover did not wonder why the Germans would want information about Pearl Harbor. He did pass on the Popov material to both Army and Navy intelligence, but, regrettably, both those agencies also failed to demonstrate any curiosity about the German interest in Pearl Harbor -- a military base far removed from any possible German military interest. Obviously, the Germans were doing a favor for their Japanese allies; tragically, nobody in American intelligence asked the next obvious question: why were the Japanese interested in detailed intelligence about Pearl Harbor?

"It should be noted that throughout 1941, the FBI (which in those days had foreign intelligence responsibilities) and the military intelligence agencies were aware of extensive Japanese intelligence operations directed against Pearl Harbor. (Indeed, the FBI was running a covert wiretap on the Japanese consulate in Honolulu, recording much information on the activities of Japanese agents working under diplomatic cover). The Americans concluded that all the Japanese spying was routine; i.e., Tokyo long had demonstrated an acute interest in Pearl Harbor, headquarters of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, so there was nothing to be alarmed about. Unfortunately, American intelligence failed to properly interpret the clues that in late 1941 unmistakably indicated that the Japanese were collecting intelligence preparatory to an actual attack on the installation. This conclusion was just one of a series of blunders that permitted a Japanese striking force to sail near Pearl Harbor undetected and launch a surprise attack that caught the Americans totally unaware."

[UK/WWII/Services/MI5; WWII/Eur/Deception; WWII/PearlHarbor/Tricycle]

Popov, Georgii K. The Tcheka: The Red Inquisition. London: Philpot, 1925.


Popplewell, Richard J. "British Intelligence in Mesopotamia 1914-16." Intelligence and National Security 5, no. 2 (Apr. 1990): 139-172. And in Intelligence and Military Operations, ed. Michael I. Handel, 139-172. London: Cass, 1990.


Popplewell, Richard J.

1. Intelligence and Imperial Defence: British Intelligence and the Defence of the Indian Empire, 1904-1924. London: Frank Cass, 1995.

Surveillant 4.1: The British "were able to defeat the Indian revolutionaries only by developing a complex intelligence network on a global scale."

2. "The Surveillance of Indian Revolutionaries in Great Britain and on the Continent, 1903-14." Intelligence and National Security 3, no. 1 (Jan. 1988): 56-76.

[UK/Historical & Interwar]

Popplewell, Richard J. "The KGB and the Control of the Soviet Bloc: The Case of East Germany." Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 254-285.

Abstract: "The Soviet Union's spying on its 'friends' took various forms. First, the ordinary population was watched by its own security services. Second, the security services spied on the rank and file of the local communist parties.... Third, at times the leadership of the satellite communist parties also came under the close scrutiny both of the KGB and its local auxilieries."

[Germany/East; Russia][c]

Popplewell, Richard. "'Lacking Intelligence': Some Reflections on Recent Approaches to British Counter-insurgency, 1900-1960." Intelligence and National Security 10, no. 2 (Apr. 1995): 336-352.

This "Review Article" includes comments on:

1. David M. Anderson and David Killingray, eds., Policing and Decolonisation: Nationalism, Politics and the Police, 1917-1965 (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1992). "Anderson and Killingray's volume ... shows clearly why intelligence failures occurred, which was invariably because the British ran their empire on a shoestring and simply could not afford effective police forces." With two exceptions, the authors of the essays "scarcely touch upon the role of intelligence in counterinsurgency."

2. Michael J. Cohen and Martin Kolinsky, eds., Britain and the Middle East in the 1930s: Security Problems, 1935-39 (London: Macmillan, 1992).

3. Peter Heehs, The Bomb in Bengal: The Rise of Revolutionary Terrorism in India 1900-1910 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,1994). This book "is written from the point of view of the terrorists themselves, and above all from the point of view of Aurobindo Ghose.... [It gives] an accurate picture of the workings of the terrorists and the scale of the problem facing the British."

4. Peter Hopkirk, On Secret Service East of Constantinople (London: John Murray, 1994). Hopkirk's work "ignores the Bengali revolutionary movement almost as much as it ignores British intelligence. Though he claims that the work 'draws on the secret service documents' of the times, it is unclear what these documents are."

5. Thomas R. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency 1919-1960 (London: Macmillan, 1990). "The most comprehensive account to have appeared on the subject.... According to Mockaitis, the key to Britain's success in combating insurgency lay in the careful application of minimum force.... Mockaitis' model reveals much about how Britain defeated insurgencies. It is less convincing as an explanation of why they failed."


Popplewell, Richard. "Themes in the Rhetoric of KGB Chairmen from Andropov to Kryuchkov." Intelligence and National Security 6, no. 3 (Jul. 1991): 513-547.

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