Pes - Pez


Pesce, Giovanni. Tr., Frederick M. Shaine. And No Quarter: An Italian Partisan in World War II. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1972.


Peskett, S. John. Strange Intelligence: From Dunkirk to Nuremberg. London: Robert Hale, 1981.

Constantinides identifies Peskett as an RAF air staff intelligence officer during World War II whose work included a stint in Hut 3 at Bletchley Park. Nevertheless, the author adds little to our knowledge of the RAF's science and technology work. "It is a light account largely of his travels during and shortly after the war."


Peszke, Michael A. "British Special Operations Executive Archives and Poland: An Analysis." Polish Review 42, no. 4 (1997): 431-446. [Capet]

[OtherCountries/Poland/WWII; UK/Refmats & WII/Services/SOE]

Petchell, Robert A. [pseud.] "Cash on Delivery: How to Obtain North Vietnamese Soldiers for Intelligence in Laos." Studies in Intelligence 17, no. 3 (Fall 1973): 1-7.

The author discusses the "Cash on Delivery" program in Laos from November 1970 through January 1972. The program used irregular guerrilla intelligence collection teams, called Paramilitary Team Operations, a program similar to the Hmong irregular battalions of Vang Pao. Selected guerrilla teams were told that for each North Vietnamese defector or abductee they would share $1,000 for an NVA officer, $400 for an NCO, and $200 for a private.


Peterecz, Zoltan. "Sparrow Mission: A US Intelligence Failure during World War II." Intelligence and National Security 27, no. 2 (Apr. 2012): 241-260.

"The inefficient planning, awkward timing, lack of proper secrecy, and ultimate failure of the Sparrow Mission in March 1944 encouraged the German occupation of Hungary." See Duke, Name, Rank and Serial Number (1969).


Peters, Brendan P. "Initial Phase of Radar Improvement Program for U-2 Completed." Journal of Electronic Defense, February 1999, 30-31.

Raytheon Systems Co. "has completed the initial phase of the Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System-2 (ASARS-2) Improvement Program of the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft."


Peters, Mark W. [CAPT/USMC], and Brian L. Gilman [CAPT/USMC]. "Refocusing the Effort: Another Perspective on 0203 Training." Marine Corps Gazette, Mar. 1999, 47-48.

"[T]he Corps needs its own military occupational specialty-producing ground intelligence officer's basic course."

[MI/Marines & Training]

Peters, Ralph.

Petersen, Peterson, Petersson

Peterzell, Jay.

Pether, John. The Post Office at War and Fenny Stratford Repeater Station. Bletchley Park Report no. 12. Bletchley Park, UK: Bletchley Park Co. Ltd., 1998.

Kruh, Cryptologia 24.4: "[T]hroughout World War II ... a variety of ... units depended on the [British] Post Office for their communications."


Pether, John. Black Propaganda. Bletchley Park Report no. 13. Bletchley Park, UK: Bletchley Park Co. Ltd., 1998.

Kruh, Cryptologia 24.4: "This detailed report discusses the use of Black Printed Material ... and Black Radio Stations."


Pethö, Albert. Agenten fur den Doppeladler: Österreich-Ungarns Geheimer Dienst im Weltkrieg. [Agents for the Double Eagle: Austria-Hungary's Secret Service in the World War] Graz: Leopold Stocker Verlag, 1998.

Kahn, I&NS 23.2 (Apr. 2008), notes that the author begins his story in 1850. The work is heavily footnoted and "especially well illustrated."

[OtherCountries/Austria; WWI/Other/A-H]

Petraeus, David H. [LTGEN/USA], and James F. Amos [LTGEN/USMC]. Counterinsurgency. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) No, 3-24, Dec. 2006; Washington, DC: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) No 3-33.5, Dec. 2006. U.S. Army and Marine Corps. The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual [COIN FM]. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007.

Berger, et al, I&NS 22.6 (Dec. 2007), find that the manual "provides a framework that draws on virtually all the key lessons that have been proposed by the wider literature on counterinsurgency.... What remains unanswered is how [the field manual] actually translates into practice on the ground in Iraq and elsewhere."

For Kahl, FA 86.6 (Nov.-Dec. 2007), "[t]he COIN FM is not an academic document, but it is deeply informed by classical counterinsurgency theory.... The manual embraces a model commonly referred to as 'clear, hold, and build.'" While "it is difficult to know whether its template can work in all cases,... overall, the COIN FM probably represents the single best distillation of current knowledge about irregular warfare."

See American Political Science Association, "The New U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual as Political Science and Political Praxis," Perspectives on Politics 6, no. 2 (Jun. 2008): 347-360.

Stephen Biddle sees the manual as "a remarkably thoughtful response to a vexing problem.... It is not perfect, however. In particular, it makes assumptions about the nature of insurgency and the relationship between the United States and the host government that are sometimes sound and sometimes not.... Iraq is precisely the kind of nonideological communal war of identity that the manual is least suited for."

To Stathis N. Kalyvas, "[t]he manual breaks little new ground." This is basically "an elaboration and reformulation of a body of work that emerged in the 1960s." It also "is in many ways a crysallization of the lessons that American commanders painfully learned in the wake of the invasion of Iraq in 2003-05. As such, it seems to have been overtaken by developments on the ground since that period."

Wendy Brown comments that "[i]f the COIN manual updates the military's approach to counterinsurgency, it remains premised on a severely outmoded figure of sovereign power, one in which American powers within the theater of war are imagined to be under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.."

For Douglas A. Ollivant, "the manual itself is not particularly radical," but "it is a radical challenge to conventional military culture and raises deep questions about the type of military -- and especially the type of army -- the United States wishes to maintain."


Petre, Jonathan.

1. "KGB Put a High Value on Quality Intelligence." Telegraph (London), 12 Sep. 1999. []

Comments by Christopher Andrew on Melita Norwood's value to the Soviets.

2. and Oliver Poole. "Scotland Yard Officer Was KGB Spy." Telegraph (London), 12 Sep. 1999. []

John Symonds, a former Scotland Yard detective, has been identified as a KGB agent by the Soviet defector Vasili Mitrokhin. "Codenamed Scot, he passed on sensitive information and was used as a so-called 'Romeo agent' whose task was to sleep with employees of foreign embassies in order to extract secrets.... Symonds makes a full confession in BBC2's The Spying Game, to be broadcast on September 19."

A sidebar carries "Melita Norwood's Statement."


Petro, James B. "Intelligence Support to the Life Science Community: Mitigating Threats from Bioterrorism." Studies in Intelligence 48, no. 3 (2004): 57-68.

The author offers an overview of the debate "about the potential openly published research findings have to enable BW or bioterrorism..., and it summarizes the most recent discussions among bioscience researchers. In addition, it offers some options the Intelligence Community (IC) can consider to help the life science community continue its work effectively, while safeguarding national security." (footnote omitted)


Petrov, Vladimir, and Evdokia Petrov. Empire of Fear. New York: Praeger, 1956. London: André Deutsch, 1956.

[Australia/Petrovs; Russia/Sov/DefectorLit]

Petrow, Richard. The Bitter Years: The Invasion and Occupation of Denmark and Norway, April 1940-May 1945. New York: Morrow, 1974.

Constantinides calls this an "incomplete, if good, version" of the intelligence aspects of the author's story.


Pettee, George S. The Future of American Secret Intelligence. Washington, DC: Infantry Journal Press, 1946.

Pforzheimer says this book "has historical value in its trailblazing discussion of specific intelligence substantive and organizational problems ... prior to formation of the CIA." This assessment is echoed by Constantinides, who comments that, while the book is dated, it is "of historical value for the role it played in formulating ideas and ultimately the organization of U.S. intelligence in the postwar era." However, Jeffreys-Jones, I&NS 12.1/38/fn. 24, is of the opinion that "Pettee's book was symptomatic of contemporary thought rather than a seminal influence on it."



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