Perm - Perz


Perras, Galen Roger. "Covert Canucks: Intelligence Gathering and the 1924 Voyage of HMCS Thiepval in the North Pacific Ocean." Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 3 (Jun. 2005): 505-528.

From abstract: "In 1924, HMCS Thiepval provided logistical support to a British attempt to circumnavigate the world by air. But the ship had another secret mission. Concerned America and Japan were fortifying their north Pacific possessions in violation of the 1922 Washington Treaty, and fearing war might be inevitable, the Canadian navy sent the Thiepval to covertly spy upon American and Japanese facilities."


Perrault, Gilles [Pseud., Jacques Peyroles]. Tr., Peter Wiles. The Red Orchestra. London: Barker, 1968. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1969. New York: Schocken, 1969. [pb]

Clark comment: Originally published as L'Orchestre Rouge (Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1967). Constantinides comments that Perrault "does not fully and precisely identify where he ... got his information." Although detailed in nature, the work still contains inaccuracies, including a slanting of the story toward Leopold Trepper.


Perrault, Gilles [Pseud., Jacques Peyroles]. The Secrets of D-Day. London: Barker, 1965. New York: Little, Brown, 1965.

Constantinides finds this to be a work of "mixed quality." The author does "provide an overview of Allied deception and security efforts and operations" in preparation for D-Day. However, his lack of access to Allied records, the absence of knowledge of Ultra and of the work of the XX Committee, the presence of errors and gaps in the story, and the lack of documentation reduce the book's utility.


Perry, David L. Partly Cloudy: Ethics in War, Espionage, Covert Action, and Interrogation. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow, 2009.

For Jens, International Journal of Intelligence Ethics 1.1 (Spring 2010), the author provides "a persuasively argued approach to determining both individuals' and governments' ethical guidelines under the often extreme pressures of war and intelligence work." Prout, International Journal of Intelligence Ethics 1.1 (Spring 2010), thinks differently, arguing that Perry "fails in his analysis when he tries to consider" the four elements in the book's title "as similar and equal and thus subject to some general theory of ethics that might apply universally."


Perry, Mark. "The Case Against William Webster." Regardie's, Jan. 1990, 90-95.


Perry, Mark. Eclipse: The Last Days of the CIA. New York: Morrow, 1992.

Clark comment: The collection of review comments below reflects the ambivalence knowledgeable readers have about this work. It is the fullest account we have on this period in the CIA's organizational life, but includes details the sourcing of which seems questionable. The author appears to have listened to everyone with a personal ax to grind, while those more knowledgeable about some events either were not talking or were not consulted. Small factual errors (the covert operations in Iran [1953] and Guatemala [1954] did not occur in the same year) lessen Perry's credibility on more important matters. It is also a little tiresome to hear that Agency morale was terrible following each organizational upheaval. Morale may have been a concern in portions of the most affected component; but, for the most part, the rank and file barely noticed or were unaffected by what was going on at the top. All that said, Perry adds considerably to what we know about the Webster years; and he gets much of it right. Many of the CIA's problems in the years after his narrative ends are clearly presaged in Eclipse. In fact, the book's title makes more sense today than it appeared to when it was published.

According to Surveillant 2.6, Eclipse "examines the bitter internal debate over CIA policy and leadership from the death of director William Casey in 1987 to the swearing-in of Robert Gates in '91." Perry "staunchly defends Casey's immediate successor, former FBI head William Webster." The book's "highlights are thinly supported."

Choice, Jan. 1993, says that Perry's is a "critical but balanced analysis" which makes a "unique contribution" in "highly readable prose." On the other hand, Fein, FILS 12.1, sees Perry making "uninformed judgments of the agency ... on issues worthy of more serious discussion." Many of his "verdicts are either groundless or seriously arguable." The book contains "analytical and factual errors ... [which] are serious barriers to sophisticated understanding."

For Bates, NIPQ 9.2, the author's "method of documentation leaves a lot to be desired," while Powers, NYRB (13 May 1993) and Intelligence Wars (2004), 295-320, thinks the book is "oddly titled." To Allen, DIJ 2.1, Perry "has difficulty analyzing his material in a broader perspective." It is difficult to take "at face value an otherwise remarkable and revealing collection of anecdotes."

Minnick, NameBase, notes that President "George Bush is depicted as a novice in his understanding of the CIA, despite the fact that [he] was once CIA director. CIA director William Webster is slower still, apparently lacking even in his knowledge of world geography.... The work includes an excellent bibliography and chronology for further research."

[CIA/80s/Gen & DCIs/Webster][c]

Perry, Robert L.

1. A History of Satellite Reconaissance. The Perry Gambit and Hexagon Histories. Chantilly, VA: Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance, NRO, 1973 (released Jan. 2012). [].

From "Preface": "Perry wrote five volumes of history related to the National Reconnaissance Office. They include volumes on the NRO's involvement in the Samos and Corona Programs as well as histories of early national reconnaissance efforts. The former Office of History of the NRO released a redacted and edited version of Perry's history of early NRO management [see below].... When Perry prepared individual volumes on the Gambit and Hexagon programs, they constituted the third volume of his series. The volume was broken into Part A for Gambit and Part B for Hexagon.... Redacted versions of all volumes are available at"

2.. A History of Satellite Reconaissance. Volume 5: Management of the National Reconnaissance Program, 1960-1965. Washington, DC: NRO, 1969.

Cited in Richelson, The Wizards of Langley (2002), 313/fn.75.


Perry, Robert L. Origins of the USAF Space Program, 1945-1956. Washington, DC: U.S. Air Force Systems Command, 1962.


Perry, Roland. The Fifth Man. London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1994.

Surveillant 3.6 identifies Perry as an Australian journalist who argues that the "Fifth Man" was not John Cairncross but Lord Nathaniel Mayer Victor Rothschild. The author purports to base his information on interviews with Yuri Modin. [Modin's own book does not support this conclusion]. The "evidence is circumstantial and relies on the acceptance of a complex pattern of similarities to clues supplied by the Russians." To Kerr, I&NS 12.2, "Perry's case against Rothschild is unconvincing because of dubious sources and slack methods.... [A]necdotal evidence and innuendo [are] simply inadequate to prove that Rothschild was a Soviet agent."


Perry, Roland. Last of the Cold War Spies: The Life of Michael Straight, the Only American in Britain's Cambridge Spy Ring. New York: Da Capo, 2005.

According to Anderson, Washington Post, 8 Aug. 2005, the author "asserts in this damning biography" that Michael Straight "was a dedicated communist and a covert agent of the KGB" from "his undergraduate days at Cambridge in the 1930s.... Straight may still have friends who accept his claim that his spying ended when he entered the Army, but Perry argues persuasively that this polished son of American capitalism was indeed the last of the Cold War spies." Similarly, Bailey,, calls this "an immensely readable and well-researched biography."

On the other hand, Peake, Studies 50.1 (Mar. 2006), has some doubts about Perry's version of events. The author "presents only speculation about Straight's continuing espionage." He also "gets too many documented facts wrong." The reviewer's conclusion: "Whatever Straight's reality, Perry's has been distorted by poor research and analysis, which has led to assertions not proved."

For Schecter, I&NS 21.6 (Dec. 2006), the author "argues hard, but not convincingly, that Straight remained under Soviet control until the 1990s." His evidence for this "is more circumstantial th[a]n documented.... Perry's prodigious research lacks a series of smoking guns to prove some of his conclusions."


Persak, Krzysztof, and Lukasz Kaminski, eds. A Handbook of the Communist Security Apparatus in East Central Europe, 1944-1989. Warsaw, Poland: Institute of National Remembrance, 2005.

Holland, IJI&C 19.2 (Summer 2006), sees this as an "exceptionally useful volume." Although the "volume's chapters are uneven,... each chapter provides a dependable base line of information."

[Bulgaria; Czech/CW; Hungary; Poland/CW; Romania; Russia/45-89]

Persico, Joseph E.

Persons, Albert C. Bay of Pigs: A Firsthand Account of the Mission by a U.S. Pilot in Support of the Cuban Invasion Force in 1961. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1990.

Surveillant 1.2: "A personal recollection of a CIA contract pilot." This book supplies an "interesting perspective to this unsuccessful covert operation."


Persson, Per-Arne, and James M. Nyce. "Intuitive Tools? Design Lessons from the Military Intelligence Community." American Intelligence Journal 25, no. 1 (Summer 2007): 38-50.

The authors suggest that while Stephen Marrin's "analogy with medical diagnosis and physician's work is of interest, it tends to underestimate the differences in organizational structure, intellectual resources and the endpoints between what goes on in the practice of medicine and in intelligence work."


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