Muller, David G., Jr. "Improving Futures Intelligence." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 22, no. 3 (Fall 2009): 382-395.

"Futures intelligence today has little credibility. Suffering from a variety of intellectual and methodological flaws, it provides little value to planners and strategists."


Muller, David G., Jr. "Intelligence Analysis in Red and Blue." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 21, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 1-12.

The author argues that the Red-Blue dichotomy in American culture reflects "two different and incompatible understandings of how the world works.... So an analyst's worldview has a fundamental impact on the accuracy of his or her analysis."


Müller-Enbergs, Helmut. Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit, Teil 2: Anleittungen für die Aebeit mit Argenten, Kundschaftern und Spion in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 1998.

According to Childs, I&NS 16.3, this work "deals with the work of the HV A, the GDR's external intelligence service, for most of its existence under the leadership of General Markus Wolf." It is "[b]ased on the Stasi archives as well as a mass of published materials."


Müller-Enbergs, Helmut. "The Place of Unofficial Employees (IMs) in the GDR's System of Governance." Journal of Intelligence History 8, no. 1 (Summer 2008). []


Müller, Klaus-Jürgen "A German Perspective on Allied Deception Operations in the Second World War." Intelligence and National Security 2, no. 3 (Jul. 1987): 301-326.

The author takes issue with the positive evaluation of Allied strategic deception operations by such writers as Ewen Montagu. "[V]ery often ... an exaggerated evaluation of the effects of deception operations is well founded.... Even where these strategems were 'bought' by those they were sold to, their effect at the strategic level was minimal in many cases. Deception at the tactical level, however, was very often successful."

David Hunt, "Remarks on 'A German Perspective on Allied Deception Operations,'" Intelligence and National Security 3, no. 1 (Jan. 1988), 190-194, argues that "Müller is in error in supposing that Mincemeat ... did not work and had no effect on German strategy; and ... he has misunderstood the nature of the aims that the Allies were pursuing in the Mediterranean."


Müller-Wille, Björn. "The Effect of International Terrorism on EU Intelligence Co-operation." Journal of Common Market Studies 48, no. 1 (Jan. 2008): 49-73.

From Abstract: "While the US has revamped its intelligence community by creating the Department of Homeland Security, little seems to have happened at the European level. The article seeks to explain why some intelligence co-operation takes place within the EU and why the bulk does not.... [I]t proposes that efficiency considerations offer the most convincing explanation why no new European Intelligence Agency has been created and why so little co-operation takes place within EU structures."


Müller-Wille, Björn. "Improving the Democratic Accountability of EU Intelligence." Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 1 (Feb. 2006): 100-128.

The author "identifies the establishment of mechanisms for quality control of EU intelligence as the main challenge at the EU level."


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