Richard A. Mobley


Mobley, Richard A. [CDR/USN (Ret.)]

1. "Deterring Iraq: The UK Experience." Intelligence and National Security 16, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 55-82.

"After deploying forces to Kuwait ... in July 1961, the United Kingdom faced the daunting challenge of deterring an Iraqi invasion ... for nearly a decade.... [A] review of the interplay among intelligence, contingency planning and force posture provides a useful case study of deterrence under conditions affording little or no warning."

2. "Gauging the Iraqi Threat to Kuwait in the 1960s." Studies in Intelligence 11 (Fall-Winter 2001): 19-31.

Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) "assessments in the 1960s appear to have enjoyed high credibility within the British military establishment. The warning timelines they provided were central to UK military planning to defend Kuwait for over a decade."


Mobley, Richard A. [CDR/USN] "EC-121 Down!" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 127, no. 8 (Aug. 2001), 62-66.

The author looks at the shootdown by the North Koreans of a U.S. Navy EC-121M 90 miles off North Korea on 15 April 1969.


Mobley, Richard A. [CDR/USN (Ret.)]

1. Flash Point North Korea. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003.

Brooks, NIPQ 19.4, says that the author "has put together an excellent chronology and analysis of the Pueblo incident and the North Korean shoot-down of our EC-121."

2. "New Insights into the USS Pueblo Seizure and EC-121 Shootdown." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 19, no. 4 (Dec. 2003): 38-39.

The author offers a quick look at some of the questions raised by these two incidents.

3. "Lessons from the Capture of the USS Pueblo and the Shootdown of a US Navy EC-121 -- 1968 and 1969." Studies in Intelligence 59, no. 1 (Mar. 2015): 1-10.

"The two incidents are best considered together because they reveal related systemic flaws in indications and warning, intelligence analysis, military planning, and command and control."

[GenPostwar/60s/Pueblo; Recon/Planes]

Mobley, Richard A. [CDR/USN] "Intelligence Support to the Mine Warfare Community." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 12, no. 3 (Jul. 1996): 1-2.


Mobley, Richard A. "North Korea's Surprise Attack: Weak U.S. Analysis?" International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 13, no. 4 (Winter 2000): 490-414.

"The preeminent culprit [of the lack of warning by U.S. intelligence] is a failure of collection.... [M]any of Pyongyang's final attack preparations simply went undetected."


Return to Mo - Moh